Decision-making in higher education and intercollegiate athletics:  case study on the Big Ten Conference realignment by Guin, Jeffrey S.
	   
 
 
DECISION-MAKING IN HIGHER EDUCATION AND INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS:  
CASE STUDY ON THE BIG TEN CONFERENCE REALIGNMENT 
 
 
 
BY 
 
JEFFREY S. GUIN 
 
 
 
 
DISSERTATION 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of Doctor of Education in Educational Organization and Leadership  
with a concentration in Higher Education  
in the Graduate College of the  
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2015  
 
 
Urbana, Illinois 
Doctoral Committee:  
Assistant Professor Lorenzo Baber, Chair  
Professor Emeritus Stanley Ikenberry 
Associate Professor Scott Tainsky  
Professor William Trent  
 
 
	   	   	  
	  
	  ii	  
Abstract 
This study focuses on the decision-making institutional leaders use during the process of 
conference realignment at the Division I level.  Intercollegiate athletics has existed within higher 
education for well over a century.  Conflicting values and objectives have persisted between 
intercollegiate athletic departments and the institutions of higher education with which they are 
affiliated.  The publicity an institution receives from intercollegiate athletics, however, is more 
than any academic achievement can provide, so how college presidents make decisions that 
involve intercollegiate athletics is critical to higher education.  The literature reveals that the 
economic climate has little to no significant impact on institutions’ spending when it comes to 
intercollegiate athletics (Frank, 2004; Smith, 2008; Fisher, 2009).  In fact, many institutions and 
athletic departments at the Division I level lose money every year (Knight Commission, 2010).  
Thus, if not financially, then how do decision-makers in higher education weigh the costs versus 
the perceived benefits when it comes to intercollegiate athletics?   
 Intercollegiate athletics at the Division I level has recently seen a wave of change in 
conference memberships.  Over a two and half year period (June 2010 to December 2012), 77 
Division I institutions changed conference affiliations for either their entire athletic departments 
or at least their football programs.  Traditionally, conference membership has been determined 
by geography and by shared institutional values and objectives, and so this high number of 
changes over a 30-month period is a departure from these traditions.  Examining conference 
realignment sheds insight into the decision-making process institutional leaders use when 
analyzing the costs and benefits of intercollegiate athletics to higher education.   
 Max Weber’s rational decision-making model (Weber 1956), which analyzed the cost-
benefit value of alternatives as well as the extent to which the alternatives reflected shared 
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cultural values and beliefs.  This model evolved when March and Simon (1958) proposed the 
common model for rational decision-making, contending that actors enter into decision-making 
situations with known objectives and that the cost-benefit value for each of the alternatives is 
determined by those objectives.  The actors gather information on alternative solutions and then 
select the optimal alternative.  Chaffee (1983) suggested five criteria for examining the rational 
decision-making process.  They are (1) values and objectives, (2) alternatives, (3) centralization 
of decision-making, (4) understanding of consequences, and (5) value maximizing choice.  
Chaffee’s criteria guided this case study on conference realignment in the Big Ten Conference.    
 This study found that presidents identify values and objectives prior to making decisions 
of whether or not to realign and expand conference membership, and then they evaluate 
alternatives in terms of how well their institutions match Big Ten leaders’ stated values and 
objectives   The affirmative decisions of the presidents studied resulted in increases in revenues 
and brands at each institution.  This research contributes to the process of decision-making by 
leaders in intercollegiate athletics, particularly at the Division I level.  From a broader scope, the 
results contribute to the rational decision-making model and the criteria used to test it.   
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 Institutions in California, Idaho, and Texas are forming coalitions with schools on the 
Eastern Seaboard.  The Big 12 represents ten members.  Seven institutions announce they are 
leaving the Big East together.  Traditional rivalries shunned for greener pastures.  Geographical 
footprints tossed to the side.    
As conference realignment took center stage in intercollegiate athletics at the NCAA 
Division I level, the sentiments expressed above were pervasive.  From June 2010 to December 
2012, there were rampant changes across college athletic conferences.  During this period, 77 
institutions at the Division I level either changed conference affiliation for their entire athletic 
department or for just their football program.  As conferences and institutions go through what to 
many feel like seismic shifts, some institutions have bonded together, forming coalitions to 
protect like interests.  In attempts to secure stability, members of conferences have raised costs 
for institutions looking to bolt (Peloquin, 2012).  Casting a long shadow over this extensive 
realignment was the concurrent historic economic downturn in the United States.  Institutions 
sought out a more stable, and more lucrative, financial future as the country emerged from a dark 
fiscal period.        
From 2008 to 2012, the United States experienced the biggest economic recession since 
the Great Depression (Yen, 2011).  Facing large deficits and growing debt, federal and state 
governments have revisited budgets repeatedly looking for ways to rein in spending, and higher 
education has felt the impact of budget cuts. Though the recent economic recession brought 
attention to these cuts, for the better part of thirty years, postsecondary institutions have seen a 
steady decline in federal and state support (Goldin & Katz, 1998; Zusman, 2005).  Making the 
situation more difficult, institutional costs (e.g. salaries and benefits, facilities, etc.) have steadily 
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increased (Wellman, Desrochers, & Lenihan, 2009).  Decreasing budgets combined with rising 
institutional costs have forced leaders in higher education to make some difficult decisions.  
Programs and services in the academic setting are being trimmed or cut altogether.      
 In order to make up for budget deficits, administrators have had to make critical decisions 
on resource generating and allocation. Seeking potential revenue sources for their respective 
institutions, some have looked to commercial avenues.  Bok (2003) argues that the 
commercializing of higher education is not something new and Toma (2003) further recognizes 
that, “institutions need to better understand themselves for what they really are-places that 
represent themselves apart from the commercial world in order to serve it-but they operate firmly 
within the ‘outside world’ in the acquisition of resources”(p. 272).   
 In efforts to compete for resources, schools vie for funds to improve the educational 
experiences offered by their institutions, a process made more challenging by the financial cuts. 
Since leaders want their institutions perceived as the best, they make to enhance academic 
reputation, thereby improving in national rankings.  “As in business, a positive image –  provided 
people become aware of it –  is the basis of prestige and the pipeline through which resources 
flow in American higher education.”(Toma, 2003, p. 118) Promoting positive perceptions of 
institutions builds their brand names with potential “consumers” – that is, prospective students, 
donors, and research partners in the corporate sector.  Universities and colleges want to raise 
money, but not for the same reason a business would desire to do so.  With the exception of for-
profit institutions, universities and colleges are generally defined as non-profit.  Therefore, the 
more revenues rise, the more the institution can spend.  The need for money is not just a reaction 
to budget cuts, but also a chronic condition of American higher education wherein institutions 
compete for the best faculty, students, and facilities, a competition that requires extensive 
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financial assets (Bok, 2003).  For the “potential buyer” or “investor” into higher education, 
evaluating seemingly comparable institutions can be problematic.  For example, how does a 
prospective student know that student support services at one school are any better than those at 
another?  Or how might a potential donor assess academic curriculum within the same major but 
from two separate institutions?  There is not a tangible measure to which a consumer can look to 
and provide answers to those questions.        
 Although it is difficult to compare institutions with one another using academic 
measures, they do compete in non-academic venues where measures of success are more easily 
determined.  One such sector is intercollegiate athletics.  Institutions can compete in sports in 
front of a national audience, vying for supremacy on the scoreboard.  For example, Ohio State 
University’s football team competed against the University of Oregon for the inaugural Division 
I FBS National Championship in January 2015 and the Ohio State Buckeyes won.  The public 
knows that the football team at Ohio State is better than the team at Oregon.  Since athletic teams 
are associated with their institutions, they must be considered a part of higher education.  
Athletic departments, though, are one area in higher education that appears to be immune to the 
budget cuts associated with the recent recession.  Actually, financial reports from intercollegiate 
athletic programs show steady increases in revenue and spending during this time from 2008 to 
2012 (Knight Commission, 2010; Fulks, 2012).  How did this part of higher education seem to 
thrive while other areas were feeling the pinch?   
 One explanation is the explosion of television revenues over the past thirty years for 
spectator sports, or revenue sports, at the Division I level of intercollegiate athletics, particularly 
Power 5 conferences, formerly referred to Bowl Championship Series (BCS) conferences.  
Spectator sports, or revenue sports, refer to football and men’s basketball.  Although basketball 
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offers more games to televise, football contracts command the most money (Staples, 2012).  An 
example: the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) packaged the entire 1983 
football season and sold the broadcast rights for $69.7 million dollars.  Fast-forward thirty years 
and ESPN paid $80 million to broadcast the Rose Bowl game on January 1, 2015.  Adjusted for 
inflation, the 1983 deal would be worth $90.3 million today (Staples, 2012).  In short, the 
amount of money that once bought a television network an entire season’s worth of games, now 
only gets a network one game.  Obviously not all games command this amount of money, but the 
growth of revenue in television rights is evident.  According to Dosh (2011), the PAC 12 and the 
Big Ten conferences receive $250 million and $248.2 million respectively a year in television 
revenue alone.  With revenues increasing at that pace, athletic departments were able to continue 
spending money without concern for larger trends in the economy.   
Television networks have a strong stake in college athletics.  Networks look especially to 
secure deals with Power 5 conferences for the broadcast rights to football and men’s basketball 
seasons. With intercollegiate athletics spending continuing to rise while budget cuts happening 
elsewhere on campuses, leaders from institutions demanded that their conferences negotiate 
bigger deals with the networks.  In order to do so, conferences explored means for improving the 
brand, or value, of the conference.  Seeking an advantage in negotiations, conferences have 
turned to realignment.  For the purpose of this study, conference realignment is defined as when 
an institution accepts an invitation to join an athletic conference with which they are not already 
affiliated.  For example, the University of Missouri is a Division I member that participated 
within the Big 12 Conference.  During the period of conference realignment mentioned earlier, 
Missouri accepted an offer to join the Southeastern Conference (SEC) and leave the Big 12.  
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Conference realignment touches all levels of intercollegiate athletics, but the “big-time” athletic 
programs at the Division I level receive the most attention for their activity.     
Conference realignment is not new to intercollegiate athletics.  Institutions changed 
membership in the early history of college athletics, but they did so out of desire to compete with 
philosophically similar institutions to or reform measures for decreasing investment in athletics 
imposed by their administrations (Thelin, 1994).  The NCAA has seen modest changes in 
conference membership at the Division I level in 1990-1992, 1996, and 2004-2006.  During 
those periods, however, only a few institutions changed conference membership.  Relatively 
speaking, the NCAA Division I athletic conferences have experienced an enormous shift in 
membership starting in 2010.  Since 2010, 64 schools have changed full-membership and 13 
others have changed conference affiliation of their football program (2010-2012 NCAA 
conference realignment, 2012).  With 335 members overall, Division I intercollegiate athletics 
has seen over 23% of its members move to a different conference between June 2010 through 
December 2012 while the previous twenty years saw less than a 3% change combined.   
Athletics can act as a window to an institution, providing tremendous amounts of 
exposure to potential consumers.  Conference leaders make decisions to invite other institutions 
to join them while institutional leaders search for more lucrative opportunities in different 
conferences. Exposure, perceptions of academic prestige, and revenue are all assumed benefits in 
conference realignment.  Inviting an institution with a successful and prestigious tradition in 
intercollegiate athletics can strengthen the overall brand of the conference, thereby also raising 
the profile of all institutions involved.  Conferences then have a better “product” to market and 
sell and can negotiate larger television contracts, which only continue to grow even during 
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difficult economic times.  With this said, the focus now turns to the process conference leaders 
use to make decisions about which institutions they should invite.     
Statement of the Problem  
 Nearly one in every four institutions who compete at the Division I level of 
intercollegiate athletics has changed conference affiliation since 2010.  During the twenty years 
prior, only 3% of Division I programs changed conference membership.  Revenue has been 
established as a driving force for these changes (Staples, 2012), but less is known about leaders’ 
decision-making process. Historically, intercollegiate athletic conferences have always been 
designed with geographic proximity in mind (Thelin, 1994; Sweitzer, 2009); however, with 
recent realignment, this is no longer the case.  Boise State, located in Idaho, accepted an 
invitation to join the Big East conference, made up of schools primarily on the Eastern Seaboard.  
West Virginia University left the Big East to join the Big 12, whose closest current member is 
880 miles away in Ames, Iowa (Iowa State University).  On a map, the moves may not make 
sense, but the opportunity to increase revenue and exposure, and to enhance brand, make moving 
to another conference an intriguing possibility.  Intercollegiate athletics provide an important 
opportunity to build and communicate the image and reputation of a university.  Television 
broadcasts of college football and men’s basketball games provide a level of exposure that 
cannot be achieved by academic events.  “The bottom line is that national publicity has long 
been the central factor in institutional prestige – and spectator sports continue to be what receives 
the bulk of the attention devoted to higher education among most people, particularly by those 
outside of academe” (Toma, 2003, p. 118).  The problem, however, is that little is known about 
the decision-making process of leadership regarding conference realignment.  When a 
conference decides to invite an institution(s), they are in essence tying the reputation of its 
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members to the reputation of the prospective member.  What are the steps leading up to that 
point?  Leaders from different institutions, each with concerns and issues unique to their own 
campuses, work together and make a decision to invite institution(s).  These decisions impact 
whole institutions and not just their athletic programs, thus it is necessary to explore the rationale 
and methods used in order to gain a better understanding of the process.        
Purpose of the Study 
 The purpose of this study is to understand how conference leadership and members make 
decisions related to conference realignment.  As previously stated, intercollegiate athletics has 
experienced an enormous shift conference affiliations, but little is known about the process of 
how these important decisions are being made.  There are two sides to the decision process in 
conference realignment.  They are (1) institutions discussing potential members to invite, and (2) 
institutions making the decision as to whether or not to accept an invitation or pursue an 
opportunity to join a different conference.  This study will examine the decision process current 
conference members experience when determining whether or not to invite another institution(s) 
to join.   
 Understanding this process includes: identifying and examining the roles decision-makers 
have in conference realignment, the criteria used to evaluate prospective institutions, internal and 
external influences on the discussion of prospective schools, and discussion of final decisions as 
to which institutions to invite.  
Research Questions 
 This study will focus on decision-making processes of senior level administrators in 
institutions of higher education, with a particular focus on decisions related to conference 
realignment.  Conference realignment involves institutions collaboratively making choices that 
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impact each of their athletic programs as well as their conference for both the short and the long 
term.  This study will examine these decision-making processes from multiple perspectives. 
 Within the realignment activity of the time period under examination, several questions 
emerge regarding the decision-making process of the leaders involved.  Who is involved in the 
decision-making process?  What is the rationale for the process used to identify and discuss 
prospective institutions?  What are the steps for making a final decision and selecting an 
institution(s) to invite? 
 To thoroughly examine these primary questions, further follow-up questions need to be 
asked.  With regards to who is involved and what influenced this group to consider conference 
realignment:  What factors led leadership to the decision that conference realignment was 
necessary?  Regarding the rationale used during the process of identifying and discussing 
prospective institutions:  How did leadership gather information on prospective institutions?  In 
order to be considered a good candidate for membership, what were the criteria?  Who 
established these criteria?  How was information shared on prospective institutions and what 
influence did outside sources have on the process?  What was the evaluation process for 
prospective institutions?  Finally, regarding the steps on making a final decision, selecting an 
institution(s) to invite:  What were the deciding factors for selecting an institution?  What was 
the process for determining the number of institutions to invite?	  
	   The primary questions guided the examination of the process that leaders followed when 
making decisions related to conference expansion.  The questions also allowed the researcher to 
obtain a better understanding of the rationale used in decision-making by leaders in athletic 
departments in institutions of higher education.    	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Importance of the Study       
 This study explores the decision-making process of conference and institutional leaders.  
It examines the intricacies of the strategic decision-making process in the context of conference 
realignment.  Chaffee (1983) called for more research in decision-making in higher education 
nearly thirty years ago.  Little is known about how leadership progresses through decision-
making processes that impact the long-term plans of an institution.  More recently, scholars have 
continued to push for more knowledge on decision-making and claim much of the process is still 
unknown (Eckel, 2002; Tierney, 2008).   
 The literature on intercollegiate athletics tends to group institutions by many different 
categories (e.g. by NCAA level, gender, sport, revenue, etc.); however, little has been done to 
examine conferences and how affiliation with other institutions can bring revenue, prestige, and 
overall strengthened brands for all members involved.  Prior research has focused on the impact 
conference realignment has on the academic reputation and achievement of member institutions 
(Kramer II & Trivette, 2012).  The critical piece that is missing is analyzing the decision-making 
process and the rationale for those strategic decisions.  In regard to college sports at the BCS 
level, the complexities of conference realignment offer an invaluable look at strategic decision-
making in higher education, especially in relation to developing a brand.  Findings could help 
conference officials, college presidents, and athletic directors in understanding the process of 
conference realignment both from the perspective of a conference looking to expand and from 
that of an institution changing affiliation.  This study will identify factors to consider, describe 
discussions amongst the leaders involved, and relate conclusions drawn by a group of high-
ranking officials.   
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 This study will also demonstrate how institutional leaders make decisions regarding 
intercollegiate athletics, particularly because of the effect conference associations in college 
sports have on the perception of academics on a campus.  The decisions made on conference 
realignment impact other areas of an institution, not just athletics. Understanding the process of 
conference realignment will provide insight into the value of perception and brand from the 
perspective of institutional leaders.  Further, this study could answer calls for accountability and 
transparency in higher education – namely, a better understanding of the place of intercollegiate 
athletics within the overall mission of higher education institutions, as well as of rationales for 
the investment of large sums of money into the athletic department by institutional leaders.   
This study could provide clarification as to why certain institutions are more appealing 
than others as prospective new conference members.  Clarity on the characteristics and qualities 
that make an institution desirable can be valuable to college presidents seeking ways to raise the 
reputation and perception of their campus.  With this knowledge, presidents can strategically 
plan for improving their athletic departments and institutions by seeking an invitation to a bigger, 
more lucrative conference.  This study could also explain why conference leaders sometimes 
choose an institution that does not fit the geographical footprint of the existing conference 
membership.  As mentioned earlier, athletic conferences traditionally came together on the basis 
of proximity of one institution to another, similarity in institutional type, and investment into 
athletics.  According to the recent activity in conference realignment, geography no longer 
appears to be a concern.  Recognizing the rationale and processes of leaders’ decision making 
will shed light on this recent activity that dominated “big time” college athletics during the three-
year period studied. 
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Scope of the Proposed Study 
The focus for this study is the decision-making process leaders use concerning 
conference realignment.  College presidents and athletic directors are trying to position their 
institutions so they can reap financial benefits and enhance their brands via conference 
affiliation.  The recent trend in conference realignment began in December 2009 when the Big 
Ten announced they were going to conduct a 12-18 month study about expanding their current 
11-member league.  Only six months later, in June 2010, the University of Nebraska accepted an 
invitation from the Big Ten and left the Big 12.  In this case, the process sped up because the 
PAC 10 was extending invitations to several members of the Big 12, and Nebraska received an 
ultimatum from the Big 12 requesting its intention to stay or leave the league (Moltz, 2010).  
This change sparked a massive wave of movement over the next two years, ultimately resulting 
in 64 institutions changing conference affiliations for their entire athletic departments and 13 
more making a change for only their football programs. 
 My research explores the decision-making processes involved in conference realignment.  
The boundaries for the study extend around the Big Ten Conference from December 2009 to 
June 2010.  The time period for this study begins with the conference office’s announcement that 
it was exploring possible opportunities to expand the conference and ends with the moment 
Nebraska received the invitation.  This study does not examine decision-making for realignment 
in other Division I intercollegiate conferences.  Attempting to examine more than one expansion 
process is beyond the scope of this project because each conference within Division I athletics is 
unique in its membership, size, history, tradition, and culture.  The Big Ten’s decision to invite 
Nebraska is a distinct case because it was the first domino to fall, so to speak, in this recent wave 
of movement across conferences.  Big Ten Conference officials’ announcement that they were 
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going to study conference expansion led to many other conferences and institutions reviewing 
and eventually changing memberships.  Other conferences were merely reacting, trying to 
maintain existence, and fight for survival.  This study uses interviews with conference and 
institutional leaders at the member institutions prior to conference realignment in order to obtain 
a better understanding of the decision process these leaders used during realignment from 
December 2009 to June 2010.  
At this time, it should be acknowledged that the Big Ten Conference realigned again in 
November 2012 when it announced the University of Maryland and Rutgers University were 
invited to join the league.  This study only examines the decision-making process for the time 
period from December 2009 to June 2010, and does not include the most recent activity within 
the Big Ten.   
There were two motivations for inviting Nebraska.  First and perhaps most obvious was 
the desire to add a 12th member to the conference so that the Big Ten Conference would be 
eligible to host a football conference championship.  This single game would significantly 
increase revenue.  Second, especially considering that football is the most popular intercollegiate 
sport, the Nebraska Football team’s long tradition full of triumph and tremendous national 
support made them an appealing prospect.  “Its successful football program provides the 
University of Nebraska with a specific identity when the institution is otherwise rather ordinary –  
it is a strong brand because of football” (Toma, 2003, p. 197).  Television contracts have pushed 
branding to the forefront for institutions and intercollegiate athletics.  When the Big Ten invited 
Nebraska it was making an attempt to build and strengthen the conference brand, a brand that is 
made from all the participating members.  
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 In 2012, the Big Ten Conference invited Maryland and Rutgers and for the first time 
went outside the geographic footprint of the league.  Both campuses, however, are located in 
large television markets.  According to Nielsen local television market estimates (Nielsen 
Company, 2012), by adding Maryland and Rutgers, the Big Ten would be adding the 1st (New 
York) and 8th (Washington, D.C.) ranked markets in the country.  Therefore, though neither 
school is within traditional geographic proximity of another Big Ten member,  adding them gave 
the conference five of the top fifteen television markets in the country, including 2 of the top 3.   
Though certainly worth examination, the decision-making process for this realignment 
was still developing at the time of data collection, and thus is not included in this study.  Further, 
it is difficult to put brackets on these decisions because they are still evolving and relatively new; 
Maryland and Rutgers just began participating in league play this academic year (2014-15).  As 
noted earlier, over the course of 18 months, a lot can change when it comes to conference 
realignment.  For example, Boise State announced in December 2011 that it was accepting an 
invitation for its football program to join the Big East Conference and leave the Mountain West.  
They would start participating in league games in the fall of 2013.  Over the next year, though, 
the Big East saw many defections, and its stability as a conference and membership in the BCS 
came into question.  Without playing a game in the Big East, Boise State announced exactly a 
year later that it was leaving the Big East and going back to the Mountain West.  The Big East 
announced it would charge Boise State an exit fee.  The situation in the Big East demonstrates 
that there is still shifting, and realignment is not complete.  It is not a given that the Big Ten will 
not continue to invite more schools during this research.  This study focuses on realignment that 
is completed and not on developing situations.  In fact, participants may be hesitant to discuss the 
Maryland and Rutgers situation, whereas those involved in the Nebraska case have had a 
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significant amount of time to reflect on the process since it has concluded.  A set of questions 
comparing the Nebraska case to the Maryland and Rutgers case will be prepared in case 
participants give the opportunity to do so.  However, the decision process for inviting Nebraska 
will be the main focus for the data collection in this study.                 
Delimitations and Limitations 
 As in all studies, the researcher set specific parameters, yet factors beyond the 
researcher’s control also influence the study. The decision was made to interview the Big Ten 
Conference commissioner, presidents of member institutions, and their athletic directors during 
the time period of the case, December 2009 to June 2010.   Faculty athletic representatives, 
student-athletes, development officers, and alumni were not included.  Thelin (1994) and Smith 
(2010) both address the decreased input and authority that faculty has in intercollegiate athletics 
today.  Faculty athletic representatives, along with the other groups, were not involved in the 
decision-making process, and thus do not pertain to the focus for this study.  These groups would 
be more useful if the research targeted perceptions of branding and the value it carries.  
This research also does not examine the expansion or realignment of other conferences.  
The population was narrowed in order to limit the number of factors under examination, which 
would be difficult when looking at 77 institutions choosing to change conference affiliation.   
Another decision was made to focus solely on the Nebraska decision, to the exclusion of 
the decision to add Maryland and Rutgers.  As stated in the previous section, those two additions 
revolved around television markets, whereas the Nebraska case is about building a stronger 
brand and getting the conference eligible for a conference football championship game.  Since 
the conference membership had remained the same for twenty years prior to Nebraska’s 
invitation – and since the other conferences were fairly static as well with only 3% of the 
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Division I population changing conference affiliation during this period – restricting the analysis 
to the Nebraska case allows for decisions that follow within the Big Ten as well as other 
conferences to be evaluated using this study as a starting point.   
A final limitation relates to methodology.  This project does not use quantitative methods.  
Qualitative research reveals more depth in the decision-making process and allows for 
exploration into the rationale leaders used.  This will be discussed further in chapter three.   
 There are limitations to this study that are beyond the control of the researcher.  These 
findings cannot be generalized to other conference realignment decisions or processes.  As 
mentioned earlier, the Big Ten conference has a number of factors that play a role in its decision-
making process that differ when compared to other intercollegiate athletic conferences within 
Division I.  The Big Ten initiated the recent flurry of movement in conference realignment; 
however, the member institutions’ financial situations are stable compared to other conferences, 
thereby creating further divergence from other conferences.  Another limitation is the 
researcher’s interview skills.  The researcher is not an expert, but a novice at best in this area of 
obtaining information.  The researcher did do two recent research projects and gained valuable 
experience in interviewing senior level administrators.  Related is the difficulty of obtaining 
information from participants who may or may not be willing to share all information and may 
especially choose not to share the details of conflicts and controversies that existed during the 
process.   
Logistical limitations include time constraints, research participants’ ability to recall 
events and information, change in leadership, and participation.  Due to the timetable of the 
study, the researcher could not interview more people on each campus.  The participants may 
have had a difficult time recalling the details of the process, and therefore, what participants 
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recall about the decision-making process and what actually happened could vary.  Since the 
realignment was completed in 2010, there have been changes in leadership at some of the 
member institutions involved in this study, making it difficult to contact the presidents who were 
involved in the realignment process.  The last limitation involves participation.  All institutions 
did not elect to participate in the study.  Six of the eleven institutions participated in the study.     
Definitions of Terms 
NCAA is an acronym for the National Collegiate Athletic Association.  This is the governing 
body that oversees intercollegiate athletics for its members.  Various levels, called Division I, 
Division II, and Division III organize members.  Each division has its own requirements that 
pertain to personnel, amateurism, recruiting, eligibility, financial aid, and season length (NCAA 
Membership, 2010). 
Division I is defined as the highest level of competition within the NCAA organizing structure. 
Member institutions must sponsor 14 varsity teams,  with a minimum six for men and six for 
women.  There are three subdivisions: Football Bowl, Football Championship, and Division I 
(remaining institutions that do not sponsor football).  Overall there are 335 members, two-thirds 
of which are public universities and one-third of which are private (NCAA Membership, 2010). 
Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) is defined by its use of the bowl system as a playoff when 
crowning a national champion in football.  Institutions are required to sponsor 16 teams and have 
minimum attendance standards in football.  There are 120 members divided into 11 conferences 
at the Division I FBS level. (NCAA Membership, 2010).  
Football Championship Subdivision (FCS) is defined by its use of an NCAA playoff to 
determine its national champion in football.  There are 118 members and it is considered 
Division I FCS level. (NCAA Membership, 2010). 
	   	   	  
	  
	  17	  
Bowl Championship Series (BCS) is defined as the bowl system formerly used to determine the 
national champion in football for the FBS.  It was created and managed by the commissioners of 
the eleven FBS conferences, the athletic director at Notre Dame, and bowl representatives from 
the five participating bowl games: the Tostitos Fiesta, Rose, Allstate Sugar, Discover Orange, 
and the BCS National Championship.  Of the ten bids, six were automatic, going to the 
conference champions of the ACC, the Big East, the Big Ten, the Big 12, the PAC 10, and the 
SEC.  The other four bids to these bowl games are considered at-large and open to any other 
team in these conferences, members of the remaining five other conferences in the FBS, or Notre 
Dame.  For this paper, when the term BCS is used, it refers only to the members of the six 
conferences who receive an automatic bid and Notre Dame (The BCS is ..., 2010).  
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 Though there is a plethora of research on intercollegiate athletics, within this body of 
work, conference realignment has received very little attention.  Most of the existing research 
focuses on the academic success of student-athletes, the welfare of the student-athlete, the 
finances of intercollegiate athletics, intercollegiate athletics and commercialism, and the benefits 
of intercollegiate athletics for higher education.   
From a historical lens, there has been conflict between academics and athletics since the 
beginning.  The student in the term “student-athlete” has not been taken seriously since the 
beginning of intercollegiate athletics (Thelin, 1994; Smith, 2010).  Special admission for 
academically unprepared student-athletes, coaches’ emphasis on sport over academics, and poor 
graduation rates are all examples of the distance commonly observed between athletics and the 
mission of higher education.  In 1991, the Knight Commission released its first report on 
intercollegiate athletic reform.  Reform measures focused on student-athlete welfare and 
achievement in the classroom (Knight Commission, 1991).  This group has continued to lead the 
call for reform in intercollegiate athletics.   
Towards the end of the twentieth century, the NCAA made attempts to better align the 
values and objectives of academics and athletics at the collegiate level, particularly at Division I 
institutions, by drawing attention to the ways that the conflict between the commercial value of 
intercollegiate athletics and the overall mission of higher education informs leaders’ decisions. 
The NCAA has increased the number of requirements for initial eligibility for incoming 
freshmen, and recent NCAA legislation has mandated progress towards degree requirements for 
student-athletes.  Commeaux and Harrison (2011) conducted a meta-analysis of studies the 
academic success of student-athletes who compete in Division I. They found that student-athletes 
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not prepared for the rigor of college work possessed common characteristics; they expressed 
particular concern for the low graduation rates for African-American males, especially those who 
compete in football and men’s basketball.  They also found a tendency for student-athletes to 
cluster in classes and majors at institutions.  Commeaux and Harrison (2011) proposed a 
conceptual model that frames the college experience for student-athletes competing in Division I 
in stages from pre-college all the way through graduation.  This conceptual framework guides 
future analysis in this sector of the literature on intercollegiate athletics.   
Research consistently criticizes the lack of transparency in the finances of intercollegiate 
athletics and the lack of standardized accounting methods to report revenues and expenses 
(Knight Commission, 2010; Hesel & Perko, 2010; Bennett et al., 2010).  Research reveals 
increased spending on intercollegiate athletic programs does not ensure success for those 
programs (Frank, 2004; Smith, 2008; Fisher, 2009).  Decisions related to conference realignment 
take the finances into account.  The decision-makers review cost-benefit analyses in exploration 
of the alternatives available within conference realignment.       
 This review includes a brief history of the NCAA and Big Ten Conference.  From there it 
defines events that have led intercollegiate athletics to the recent wave of conference 
realignment.    Studies on conference realignment come under review, followed by an 
examination of the role of rationality.  The literature closes with a discussion section that 
synthesizes the connection of the reviewed body of knowledge to this study.   
Background 
The crew races between Harvard and Yale in the 1800’s were the first intercollegiate 
athletic competitions in higher education.  By the end of the century, football had taken over 
most campuses. The commercialization of intercollegiate athletics was born then with the rise of 
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local and national publicity (Toma, 2003; Thelin, 1994; Smith, 2010).  Rudolph (1990) credits 
the rise of commercialism in intercollegiate athletics to the growth in popularity of football 
during the start of the 20th century.  Newspapers gave teams tremendous publicity, creating 
national heroes out of young men carrying pigskin around a field.  The increase in attention led 
to financial growth, brought in by gate receipts from large crowds attending games, as well as an 
increase in expenses. The tremendous growth in football stadiums in the 1920’s demonstrated 
athletic departments’ and institutions’ increasing invest in their financial futures with athletics.  
The popularity of the sport seized the American imagination and dominated higher education 
culture.  Rudolph even went as far to say, “from identifying an institution with color to 
identifying it with a football team was a very short step, and before long very many Americans 
would be acting as if the purpose of an American college or university were to field a football 
team” (p. 387). 
The NCAA formed at the turn of the 20th century.  The organization monitored and 
conducted championships for college athletics.  With so many institutions and an equal variance 
in the size of athletic departments, the NCAA organized the schools into different divisions -- 
from Division III, requiring the lowest financial commitment from institutions, to Division I (D-
1), which required the highest financial commitment.    
 During the lowest economic time for America, the Great Depression of the 1920’s, 
intercollegiate athletics appeared to be immune to the financial hardships the rest of the country 
faced.  Coaches’ salaries were larger than professors’ and by the end of the 1930’s, 74 concrete 
stadiums existed in the United States, with 7 of them seating 70,000 plus (Thelin, 1994; Toma, 
2003; Smith, 2010).  Critics claimed that athletic departments across the country lacked 
oversight on budgets, that presidents and chancellors had no control over athletics.  The 
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conflicting values and goals intercollegiate athletics presented to institutions of higher education 
were becoming apparent.  In 1929, backed by the Carnegie Foundation, Howard Savage released 
the findings from an extensive study of the corrupt practices occurring in college athletics.  The 
report concludes that commercialism and negligent attitude towards education were the roots of 
the dishonest trends emerging in intercollegiate athletics.  Savage based his findings from 
interviews he conducted at institutions with administrative leaders and not from statistical 
evidence.  In his 1930 book, Universities: American, English, and German, Abraham Flexner, 
another sharp critic of athletics, condemned administrations’ lack of control over the amount of 
institutional money spent on athletics (Thelin, 1994).  Commercialization of intercollegiate 
athletics had taken over the nation, and institutional leaders ignored calls for reform.  The 
commercial characteristics of intercollegiate athletics exposed cracks in higher education’s 
idealistic ivory tower.  Throughout the 20th century, though, the NCAA would continue to 
sponsor intercollegiate athletics, and this component of higher education continued growing and 
distancing itself from the mission of higher education, ultimately becoming the multi-billion 
dollar commercial industry it is today.  
Origin of the Big Ten Conference 
 On January 11, 1895, presidents from seven Midwest universities came together in 
Chicago to discuss best practices in regulating intercollegiate athletics.  From these meetings, the 
first intercollegiate athletic conference emerged, the Intercollegiate Conference of Faculty 
Representatives.  The founding members were University of Chicago, University of Illinois, 
University of Michigan, University of Minnesota, Northwestern University, Purdue University, 
and the University of Wisconsin.  Indiana University and the University of Iowa became 
members in 1899, and Ohio State in 1912 (Big Ten History, 2010).  Michigan State replaced 
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University of Chicago (UC) in 1946.  The original-founding members, also referred to as the 
Western Conference, eventually became the Big Ten Conference by 1917 (Big Ten History, 
2010).  Immediately, the conference would demonstrate its willingness to be a leader in change 
by advocating for eligibility rules for student-athletes.  The Big Ten Conference attempted to 
bridge the gap between the values and goals of academics and athletics in higher education.   
The conference has always been a leader in academics as is evidenced by its Committee 
on Institutional Cooperation (CIC) initiative founded more than half a century ago in 1958.  The 
CIC is a consortium of universities that includes all of the Big Ten institutions and the University 
of Chicago.  The mission of the CIC is to share information and resources with each other in 
order for all of the involved institutions and their scholars to achieve even more (About CIC, 
2011).  The conference has taken the lead when it comes to the academic requirements for 
student-athletes.  The Big Ten has consistently pushed for higher academic eligibility 
requirements for incoming as well as current student-athletes.  An example is the progress-
towards-degree requirements for Big Ten student-athletes, especially as those requirements are 
compared to those of the NCAA.  The NCAA passed legislation in 2003 mandating the 
following requirements:  upon completion of 4 semesters, student-athletes must have 40% of a 
degree completed, 60% after 6 semesters, and 80% after 8 semesters.  The average degree 
program requires 120 credits to graduate, thus the 40-60-80 equated to 48-72-96 credits (NCAA 
Academic and Membership Affairs, 2012).  The Big Ten demanded more from student-athletes 
by requiring them to have the highest of either 40-60-80% or 51-78-105 credits (regardless of 
total credit hours for degree).  Leadership has been stable in the Big Ten.  There have only been 
five commissioners in the conference since that position’s inception in 1922.  They are:  Major 
John L. Griffith 1922-1944; Kenneth “Tug” Wilson 1944-1961; Bill Reed 1961-1971; Wayne 
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Duke 1971-1989; and James E. Delany 1989-current.  The stability in leadership has been, in 
part, why the Big Ten has consistently set the standard when it comes to intercollegiate athletics 
connecting with the mission of higher education.              
The Big Ten has positioned itself as one of the premier conferences in America for both 
athletics and academics.  The conference has taken an active role in trying to maintain 
institutions’ of higher education professed or focus on academics.  Iconic figures and annual 
events in the athletic arena have raised the conference’s status through the years.  The Ohio 
State-Michigan football rivalry is arguably one of the best, and even had an ESPN documentary 
dedicated to it.  Legendary, national-championship-winning coaches (such as football coaches 
Bo Schembechler at Michigan and Woody Hayes at Ohio State, men’s basketball coach Bobby 
Knight at Indiana, and wrestling coach Dan Gable at Iowa) took on larger than life popularity 
even outside the athletic venue.  An even more impressive list of past student-athletes have gone 
on to have successful careers:  Magic Johnson (Michigan State), Jesse Owens and Jack Nicklaus 
(Ohio State), Dick Butkus (Illinois), Gerald Ford (Michigan), and Mark Spitz (Indiana) are just a 
few of the prominent former Big Ten student-athletes (Big Ten History, 2010). 
Major Events Impacting Athletic Conferences 
Intercollegiate athletic conferences have been in existence for over one hundred years.  
As of 2015, there are 31 conferences at the NCAA Division I level.  Division I is subdivided 
further into three categories:  FBS, FCS, No-Football.  The FBS has ten conferences; FCS has 
thirteen, and nine conferences that do not participate in football.  This study is focusing on 
conference realignment at the FBS level, specifically the Big Ten Conference.  The FBS has an 
informal divide between the Power 5 conferences and the Group of 5 conferences.  The Atlantic 
Coast Conference (ACC), Big Ten, Big 12, Pacific 12 (PAC 12), and Southeastern Conference 
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(SEC) make up the Power 5.  Conference USA (C-USA), Mid-American (MAC), Mountain 
West (MWC), Sun Belt, and Western Athletic (WAC) are the Group of 5 (NCAA.org).  Note, 
Notre Dame participates in Division I football and is member of the ACC for all other sports.  
The Notre Dame football program, while independent, is considered a member of the Power 5.   
The landscape of intercollegiate athletics has changed dramatically in the past thirty 
years, particularly because of conference realignment, as is evidenced, for example, by the 
number of independents today compared to thirty years ago.  In 1980 there were 31 football 
independents and now there are only four (Army, Brigham Young, Navy, and Notre Dame).  
More recently, intercollegiate athletic conferences have experienced a flurry of movement across 
FBS members.  There are 124 institutions competing in FBS conferences, and over a short period 
(June 2010 to December 2012), 32 of those institutions have changed conference affiliation 
(2010-12 NCAA conference realignment, 2012).  In other words, one in every four FBS 
institutions changed conference affiliation within a span of two and half years.   
Economic reasons have driven conference realignment.  Institutions want to secure 
membership within conferences that provide financial stability or more generated revenue.  This 
emphasis on profit is a defining characteristic of a commercial attitude, and thus, the influence of 
commercialism has been present in intercollegiate athletics for over a hundred years.  With the 
growth of commercialism surrounding intercollegiate athletics, revenues have expanded, 
particularly from television sources.   Over the last thirty years, for events have most 
significantly caused this expansion: the 1984 Supreme Court case Oklahoma vs. NCAA, Penn 
State’s 1990 move into the Big Ten Conference, the 1992 SEC Conference Championship 
football game, and the 2007 creation of the Big Ten Conference television network.   
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Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma v. NCAA.  In 1952 the members of the 
NCAA noticed a trend in decreasing attendance at college football games that coincided with the 
introduction of television broadcasts of games (Fort, 2011).  Concerned over lost gate revenue, 
institutions granted the NCAA the authority to act, and the NCAA obtained complete control of 
the broadcasting rights for its members.  Thirty years later, administrators changed their opinions 
when they saw the opportunity for increased revenue through television broadcasts.  The goal of 
the NCAA Television Plan was always to reduce the negative impact of live television upon live 
game attendance for college football.  By 1982, the plan had evolved into separate agreements 
wherein each network bid for distribution rights.  ABC, CBS, and TNT broadcasted fourteen live 
games each over the course of a season.  Over a four-year period, a given athletic program could 
appear a maximum six times, and the networks agreed to pay those schools either a set price or 
minimum aggregate compensation (Excerpts from Supreme Court..., 1984).   
 In (year), members of the SEC, Southwest, ACC, and many independent football powers 
convened and formed the College Football Association (CFA) in an attempt to challenge the 
existing structure.  No one from the PAC 8 or Big Ten joined the CFA.  Led by the University of 
Oklahoma and University of Georgia, members of the CFA felt their programs could command 
more appearances and more money per appearance.  In Oklahoma v. N.C.A.A. (1984) the CFA 
sued the NCAA over its television plan, claiming that it violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act. The NCAA argued that its mission to work as a non-profit model, educating its 
student-athletes and providing opportunities to compete, was unique, and thus that its policies 
and regulations should not be subject to antitrust laws (Pacey, 1985).  The Supreme Court ruled 
in favor of the CFA, finding the financial model of the NCAA, particularly football and men’s 
basketball, to be purely commercial.  The court therefore saw the NCAA as a monopoly 
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restraining the CFA’s institutions’ rights to negotiate television contracts.  This decision opened 
the door to a new revenue source for institutions and conferences, the selling of television rights, 
which would lead conferences to explore realignment in order to offer the best “product” and 
command the most dollars from networks in negotiations.     
Penn State joins the Big Ten.  Conference membership at the BCS level remained fairly stable 
until the last ten years of the 20th century.  In 1990, the Big Ten got the realignment ball rolling 
when Penn State University (PSU) joined the conference; however, it was not a smooth process.  
Until that point, the Penn State football team was an independent, while the rest of their athletic 
programs were members of the Atlantic Ten.  In 1988, the football team was coming off its first 
losing season, and Bryce Jordan, president at the time, was concerned about the financial 
stability of the athletic department.  Head football coach Joe Paterno had built the program into a 
national power and was the face for the Penn State brand, but the iconic football coach was 
aging, and the success of the football team appeared to be dwindling.  President Jordan reached 
out to a close colleague in Stan Ikenberry, president at the University of Illinois and former 
Senior Vice-President at the Penn State campus.  In December of 1989, the Council of Ten 
(committee of all Big Ten presidents) voted unanimously to extend an invitation to Penn State 
(Sansevere, 1990).   
 Prior to the announcement by the conference office, word of the invitation leaked to the 
media. Athletic directors, faculty athletic representatives, and coaches in the league were upset 
they had not been consulted (Kier, 1990).  University of Michigan Athletic Director Bo 
Schembechler was quoted saying, “This confirms the worst fear I have of presidents getting too 
much control in athletics…not one athletic director was consulted on this matter” (Sansevere, 
1990).  The athletic directors, coaches, and faculty athletic representatives bonded together in 
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protest of the council’s actions.  Stan Ikenberry, the chairperson for the Council of Ten, released 
a statement in December 1989 saying that the conference members would go back to their 
campuses and discuss details that remained to be resolved, particularly scheduling and other 
financial concerns related to Penn State’s inclusion in the Big Ten (Ikenberry, 1989).     
 Six months later, in June 1990, the Council of Ten voted 7-3 in favor of inviting Penn 
State to the conference.  Indiana University, Michigan State and University of Michigan did not 
support the expansion.  Presidents did not comment publicly on the vote, but Michigan State 
board chairperson Larry Owens criticized the expansion: “No one in this entire process has ever 
shown what advantages there are for MSU or for the Big Ten in adding an eleventh 
member”(Makinen & Miner, 1990, p. 1A-4A).  Where was the rationale for adding Penn State?  
Though representatives of the three dissenting institutions did not see the benefit outweighing the 
cost, President Jordan proclaimed the merger to be a perfect fit, academically speaking.  Penn 
State was a member of the AAU, and the Big Ten is the only athletic conference in the NCAA in 
which all participating institutions have also been elected to the AAU.  Jordan also commented 
that Penn State is a land-grant university, like the Universities of Illinois, Michigan State, 
Minnesota, Ohio State, Purdue, and Wisconsin (Jordan, 1989).  Leaders involved in the decision 
process did not address financial reasons for expanding.     
 Conference realignment had not been a topic for discussion in intercollegiate athletics for 
quite some time.  By inviting Penn State, the Big Ten initiated the conversation drawing 
attention to the potential financial appeals of television (Sherman, 1990).  Since the Oklahoma v. 
NCAA ruling, athletic conferences were negotiating new deals for their members; independent 
athletic programs did not want to be left out.  Exposure and market share are important to 
television networks, and the conferences with the most television sets in their region demanded 
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the most dollars from the networks.  Soon after the Big Ten announced it was inviting Penn 
State, the SEC announced it was looking to expand from 10 to possibly 12 or even 14 schools.  
Earlier that same year Notre Dame had announced an exclusive five-year $37 million deal with 
NBC (Sandomir, 1991).  Digital cable television and the limitless broadcasting opportunities did 
not yet exist, and thus institutions looked for the best combinations to get the most television sets 
in their conference footprint in order to secure a piece of the television revenue before the 
network space was gone.  The network deals athletic conferences were securing led to more 
exposure and only increased demand more.  One conference took conference realignment one-
step further than the Big Ten had, finding an additional revenue stream, the football conference 
championship game.               
SEC Inaugural Football Conference Championship Game.  In 1987, the NCAA passed a rule 
allowing conferences with twelve or more members to hold a title game, a decision that became 
a landmark event in intercollegiate athletics (Blum, 1992).  The SEC added the University of 
South Carolina and the University of Arkansas in 1992, which brought the overall membership 
to twelve institutions, taking advantage of the obscure new rule.  In December of 1992, the 
University of Alabama defeated the University of Florida in the inaugural SEC Championship 
football game, and the landscape of college athletics was never the same, “Other expansion-
minded conferences and institutions, looking for ways to erase the red ink in their sports budgets, 
kept close tabs on the SEC’s playoff experiment, which was expected to generate as much as $8 
million dollars” (Blum, 1992, para. 3).  The financial windfall of a conference championship 
game was the driving force for administrators looking to expand their conference to twelve 
members during this time period.  The ACC and Big East followed, both increasing their 
membership to twelve members.     
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An event that started out as an experiment twenty years ago became wildly successful, 
today generating nearly $20 million a year for the SEC (Ourand & Smith, 2010a).  The exposure 
that the conference championship games offer is larger games in the regular season.  On a typical 
Saturday in the fall, during the regular season, there might be anywhere from 40 to 60 
intercollegiate games played.  The conference championship games are the first Saturday in 
December where there are only 10 to 15 games played.  The ACC, Big Ten, C-USA, PAC 12, 
and SEC each only have 2 programs playing.  The networks pay a high premium for these title 
games because of the national audience they attract because of the limited number of games 
available that day (Weaver, 2009).  That said, the amount of money intercollegiate athletics 
spectator sports (football and men’s basketball) gained from the networks did not come close to 
the revenues of the professional sport leagues.  Therefore, it was not be long before conferences 
started devising plans to obtain larger shares of the pie by taking control of their own 
broadcasting rights.          
Big Ten Network.  During the 1990s, Commissioner Delany observed the changing landscape 
for revenues and broadcasting rights in the sporting industry.  Television contracts grew at 
exponential rates, and the networks dictated more and more who would play and when (Weaver, 
2009).  Digital television was expanding the space available for programming, and so cable and 
satellite companies were searching for more products to broadcast.  In the late 1990s, Fox 
launched sports regional networks in hopes of providing coverage of more sporting.  By the turn 
of the century, George Steinbrenner, owner of the New York Yankees, unveiled the Yankee 
Entertainment and Sports Network (YES).  It was not long after that the NFL, MLB, and NBA 
introduced their own networks, too.  
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Wanting to protect the values and mission of the Big Ten and seeing a demand for sport 
programming, Delany and the Council of Ten began explore options for the Big Ten as a brand 
on the media market (Weaver, 2009).  It was critical for the conference to maximize profits, and 
the best way to do that was to access the television landscape as a group.  With the NFL, MLB, 
and NASCAR contracts all coming up for negotiations around 2004-05, precise timing was 
imperative.  The Big Ten needed to strike a deal before these leagues negotiated their respective 
deals.  If Delany and the conference waited, there would be a lot less money left on the table.  To 
move ahead, the Big Ten agreed to a deal with Fox Sports, launching the Big Ten Network in 
2006.  The terms of the deal stipulated a twenty-year commitment, with the Big Ten receiving 
$70 million a year with a 3% increase annually; it also included a $35 million signing bonus for 
the conference.  The Big Ten saw an increase in exposure, ability to promote content other than 
athletics, and of course, increased revenue (Weaver, 2009).   
Money drove all of these four events, each of which had a major impact on changing the 
landscape of intercollegiate athletics, specifically for Power 5 conferences.  Since the Oklahoma 
v. NCAA decision, “the financial stakes have grown enormously…driven in part by the growth of 
the television market for college athletics, both on cable and the major networks”(Weiner, 2009, 
p. 7).  Shortly after the case, in 1990, the SEC distributed $16 million in revenue amongst its 
members.  By 2009, after conference realignment, the creation of conference championship 
game, and the birth of conference networks, the SEC distribution grew to $130 million (Weiner, 
2009).  Member institutions saw big increases in revenue from the broadcasting rights, which 
provided more fuel for the spending growth in intercollegiate athletics.   
These four events played a key role in the growth of revenue in intercollegiate athletics at 
the BCS level, particularly by shifting the control of revenue from individual institutions, to the 
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NCAA, and now to the conferences.  The two largest grossing revenue sports in college athletics 
are men’s basketball and football.  Conferences have control over the broadcasting rights during 
the regular season.  The NCAA controls the distribution of the postseason television revenue for 
men’s basketball, otherwise known as the NCAA Men’s Basketball Division I tournament. 
Division 1 Football is a different story. There, conferences have taken control of the broadcasting 
rights for their regular season (similar to basketball), but the NCAA does not sponsor the football 
postseason.  With conferences having so much control over the television revenue, membership 
is more important now than ever before.  With the background established for intercollegiate 
athletics, I move now to an examination of the literature on conference realignment.   
Literature on Intercollegiate Athletic Conferences 
The NCAA membership is divided into three categories, Division I, II, and III.  The focus 
for this literature review has been Division I.  Division I is broken down into three categories for 
football membership: FBS, FCS, or no football (see definition of terms in previous chapter).  The 
top tier, FBS, has ten conferences.  Very little research has focused on conferences.  The few 
studies available examined impact of affiliation and benefits of realignment.         
Sandy and Sloane (2004), obtaining data from IPEDS and US News and World Report 
rankings, used a fixed-effects panel framework to study the benefits received by an institution’s 
change in athletic department affiliation.  Of the 693 institutions that reported to IPEDS, their 
sample was the 109 schools that moved up from either Division III to Division II or Division II 
to Division I between 1991 and 1999.  Sandy and Sloane observed that there are “substantial 
gains in student numbers and in student quality when a given institution raises the level of its 
sports affiliation” (p. 93).  Although the research reviewed in the previous section on benefits of 
intercollegiate athletics to higher education had mixed findings, Sandy and Sloane found 
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significant benefits when using change of membership level as factor.  They did point out, 
however, that due to inconsistency in data available, their study does not measure the effects of 
any other programs or actual costs of having intercollegiate athletics. 
Maxcy (2004) reviewed the process and decision-making involved in the NCAA’s 1997 
restructuring of its governing body.  He found that though presidents obtained control, this was 
primarily a superficial revision.  Another change was from a democratic model to a federated 
one, wherein major revenue producing football conferences have majority on legislative issues.  
This shift gave control of allocation of revenues to BCS conferences (now called Power 5), 
which have the highest commercial investment.  The new structure gives 90% of bowl money 
and less than 50% of men’s basketball tournament contracts to the power conferences.  Maxcy 
infers that the altered governance structure emphasizes conference affiliation, which provides 
incentives for conference realignment.  This informative piece gives an overview of NCAA 
legislation that shifted political power to BCS conferences (Power 5).  Conference affiliation is 
important since the branding of a conference and its members is stronger than a single institution.   
Sweitzer (2009) studied the implications of division and conference membership for an 
institution in a project that examined all NCAA institutions with an athletic program.  Sweitzer 
found that the primary factors in conference alignment are institutional comparability and then 
geographic proximity.  “Given the investment in athletics in Division I, particularly among the 
larger programs in the major conferences, competing against like institutions is more important 
than geographic proximity” (Sweitzer, 2009, p. 58).  He credits significant exposure benefits for 
an institution that competes in a BCS conference.  The BCS conferences generate the most 
revenue through television and ticket sales, thus motivating other institutions to seek 
membership.   
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Sweitzer (2009) asserts that Boston College, University of Miami, and Virginia Tech left 
the Big East for the ACC in 2004 for the financial benefits presented earlier and to be connected 
to a more prestigious group of institutions.  Conference affiliation can enhance institutional 
prestige, so existing members care about the reputation of an institution they consider inviting, 
even at the expense of stretching the existing geographic footprint.   He argues that institutions 
will switch conferences for “reasons beyond athletics” (p. 60), supporting this contention with 
the example of Penn State joining the Big Ten and becoming a member of the collaborating 
academic group, the CIC.   
Sweitzer (2009) claims that, especially after the departure from the Big East of Boston 
College, University of Miami, and Virginia Tech, the financial allure of membership in a BCS 
Conference prompted the move of five institutions (University of Cincinnati, DePaul University, 
University of Louisville, Marquette University, and University of South Florida) from 
Conference USA to Big East.  However, he cites presidents from Louisville and South Florida 
claiming academic benefits in the change in membership as well, particularly their concern for 
improving national academic reputation as research universities.  Sweitzer found also that 
stakeholders outside the institution play a role in conference realignment.  The governor of 
Virginia, for example, advocated for the inclusion of Virginia Tech over Syracuse in the ACC.  
A public flagship institution is an economic engine for the state, and its value increases when it is 
affiliated with other elite research institutions,  Sweitzer concludes that institutions want to 
compete with like institutions, institutions that share the same approach, characteristics, and 
location.  If conference affiliation adds prestige, then institutions must consider it seriously.          
Four studies focus on conference realignment (Hill & Kikulis, 1999; Groza, 2010; 
Abbey, Capaldi, & Lombardi, 2011; Kramer II & Trivette, 2012).  These four pieces focus on 
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realignment decision-making, realignment’s impact on game attendance, realignment’s impact 
on academic distinction, and realignment’s effect on academic missions.  Hill and Kikulis (1999) 
examined the dynamics of strategic decision-making within western Canadian university athletic 
conferences. Recognizing methodologies used and differences between intercollegiate athletics 
and higher education structures in the United States and Canada limits the ability to generalize 
their findings to decision-making processes for conference realignment in the NCAA.  With that 
said, the Canadian process can be informative.  The structure of intercollegiate athletic 
conferences on the western side of the country had been stable since the inception of the Canada 
West University Athletic Association (CWUAA) and the Great Plains Athletic Conference 
(GPAC).  Hill and Kikulis (1999) cite financial pressure on Canadian athletic programs as a 
growing concern and the effects of local governments’ cost cutting approaches on budgets in all 
facets of postsecondary education.  In 1989, the deans of physical education departments at 
western Canadian universities met to propose solutions to maintaining their athletic programs.  
Proposals to restructure the two existing conferences and merge them together presented 
conflicting information as to whether travel costs would rise or fall.  Since the deans did not 
reach consensus, they did not take any action.  By 1994, discussion of conference realignment 
had emerged again, leading to the case study Hill and Kikulis present.   
Hill and Kikulis (1999) used a case study methodology because it provided the best way 
for better understanding “the dynamics associated with strategic decision-making process”(p. 
26).  Their study used the conceptual framework from the Bradford Studies, which, conducted by 
Hickson and associates, made critical contributions to the strategic decision-making literature.  
“The Bradford Studies acknowledged that many aspects need to be incorporated in order to fully 
understand and possibly develop a holistic theory regarding strategic decision making”(p. 19).  
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The three concepts identified that describe the characteristics of the decision-making process are 
politicality, complexity, and rules of the game.  Politicality is the impact people have on the 
decision process.  Complexity relates to the issues influencing the topic being discussed.  Rules 
of the game refer to the structure the decision-making process takes based on the organization 
involved in it.  All three concepts played a role in influencing a given decision as well as in 
influencing one another.     
Hill and Kikulis (1999) used this model to form interview questions and to code and 
analyze data collected in the form of documents and transcripts of their semi-structured 
interviews.  The authors used documentation from conference meetings, committee reports, 
memos by GPAC, and CWUAA constitution and bylaws.  Interviewees were identified from that 
documentation.  They interviewed seventeen people, including ten current athletic directors, two 
former athletic directors, one former conference president, two academic administrators, and two 
executive members.  They audiotaped the interviews, each of which from 40-90 minutes and 
took place over a two-month period in 1995.  They conducted sixteen interviews in person, and 
one was done over the phone.  They transcribed interviews and then reviewed them for general 
ideas and themes.  The areas discussed in the interviews were the people who are involved in the 
decision process for restructuring, the nature of restructuring, and the rules regarding the 
structure of the decision-making process.  They also questioned participants as to their 
backgrounds with university athletics and their overall views of restructuring issues and decision 
processes.  A non-numerical, unstructured data indexing, searching, and theorizing computer 
package, NUD-IST, was used to organize, store, and retrieve data.   
The two significant political themes identified were those in favor of restructuring and 
those who were not.  Birnbaum (1988) suggests coalitions form in a political environment and 
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participants join forces in order to protect their personal vested interests.  In Hill and Kukulis’ 
case, they found that external groups had an influence on the internal groups involved in the 
decision-making process.  The diversity of interest revealed a complex and political decision-
making process, with those who can control process becoming powerful.   
Hill and Kikulis (1999) found that diversity of interests, levels of influence, and both the 
constraining and enabling rules of the game contributed to the ways the topic of restructuring 
was interpreted and how processes emerged to make restructuring decisions.  One of the 
complexity issues influencing interviewees’ interpretations of restructuring was the resentment 
CWUAA representatives expressed each time discussion of restructuring came up.  The issues of 
scheduling, representation on national committees, and finances were also key in this decision-
making process.  The complexity issues associated with restructuring meant that different groups 
voiced different concerns.   
The third concept, rules of the game, can be divided into formal and informal rules.  
Since GPAC institutions were requesting membership in the CWUAA, decision-makers 
followed the formal rules laid out in the CWUAA constitution and bylaws.  The balance of 
power favored members of the CWUAA because only full members could vote on matters of 
restructuring.  Thus, the CWUAA institutions felt ensured that their interests would be protected.  
In this case, rules of the game gave power to one group over another, thus having as much 
influence, if not more, in the decision-making process as complexity and politicality did.  The 
results from the case study “suggest the rules of the game interact with complexity and 
politicality to define the decision-making process” (Hill & Kikulis, 1999, p. 40).  The authors 
recommended future research exploring the ways that the informal rules of organizational culture 
also influence the decision-making process.           
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Even though this case study on conference realignment applies to institutions in another 
country, it provides valuable insight for this study.  The steps in the methodology are valid, 
following a structured format.  Researchers included all major stakeholders, and conducted all 
interviews in same manner.  A conceptual framework guided the study and questions asked in 
the process.  The qualitative case format provides details that could not have been discovered via 
a survey or statistical analysis.             
Other studies on conference realignment examine the impact of realignment rather than 
the decision process toward realignment.  Groza (2010) used an empirical model to review the 
impact a change in conference affiliation has on football game attendance.  His sample included 
21 Division I programs that changed conference membership from 2004 to 2006.  Games played 
after the change in conference affiliation drew significantly more fans than the games prior to the 
change did.  These findings indicate that reputation of a conference may influence game day 
attendance.  Groza credited the increase in attendance to fan interest in seeing new, unfamiliar 
conference rivalries emerge as one reason for the drawing-power a conference might possess.  
The findings in this study motivate for athletic directors to work towards placing their programs 
into better conferences. A weakness in the study is the use of game attendance as a measure.  
Many different variables could impact attendance, such as cost of tickets, weather, or day of the 
week or time of day a game is played. 
Abby, Capaldi, and Lombardi (2011) recently used data from nine measures to index the 
universities in the six BCS conferences according to academic characteristics.  Measures used 
were total research expenditures from all sources, federal research conducted, endowment, 
annual giving, national academy membership, faculty awards, doctoral degrees awarded, 
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postdoctoral fellowships supported, and average SAT scores of entering students.  They found 
that: 
Although the decisions about conference alignments and realignments turn 
primarily on issues of television, audiences, institutional athletic comparability, 
and of course money, the quality of an institution’s athletic conference is one of 
the elements that helps universities create and sustain a reputation for high 
quality, much prized by prospective students and alumni.(Abbey, Capaldi, & 
Lombardi, 2011, para 13)   
Their findings after the wave of conference expansion ranked the Big Ten first in academic 
distinction followed by the PAC 12, ACC, SEC, Big 12 and Big East.  
Kramer II and Trivette (2012) presented a paper at the annual meeting for Association for 
Institutional Research on the impact of conference realignment on academic outcomes.  The 
study analyzed data from 2004-2011 IPED surveys, and EADA and USA Today databases.  The 
sample population was all Division I institutions.  Kramer II and Trivette found one-year and 
three-year lagged effects on institutional selectivity and student profiles.  Effects were larger for 
three-year lags suggesting that schools need two years to fully integrate their brand into new 
athletic conference markets.  Student applications increased by 34% immediately following 
conference realignment but diminished by the third subsequent year.  Institutions experienced a 
3% decrease in admission rate and 5% increase in admission yield rate after three years.  Kramer 
II and Trivette concluded that institutional and athletic administrators must understand the 
impacts that seemingly isolated decisions may have on one another.  Conference realignment 
appears to enhance a school’s ability to attract and retain new students of high academic quality.  
The study codifies the connections between athletics and academics and the benefits that can 
occur through mutual consultations.  Impact on out-of-state applications would be a stronger 
indicator for impact on application increases, as it would show increase in exposure to regions 
outside the institution’s proximity. 
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Discussion 
Toma (2003) argues that college athletics, particularly football, is part of the collegiate 
ideal, and that the high profile sports provide branding opportunities via television exposure that 
academic achievements cannot garner.  Institutional leaders tend to follow myths and perceptions 
more than research.  They believe investing in athletics and building a successful program on the 
field can improve prestige and institutional rankings (Sweitzer, 2009).  A measure of branding 
that has received little attention is the impact of conference affiliation and conference 
realignment.  A few studies have proven that conference realignment did enhance academic and 
athletic outcomes (Groza, 2010; Kramer & Trivette, 2012).  Abby, Capaldi, and Lombardi’s 
(2011) research confirms that students and alumni value their institution’s conference affiliation.  
Institutions in other conferences desire membership in the powerful and wealthy Power 5.  On 
the other side of the conference affiliation decision, institutional leaders must consider the 
benefits and reputation a prospective institution can bring to an already powerful, prosperous 
conference. Hill and Kikulis (1999) provide an in-depth analysis of the decision-making process 
for conference realignment, presenting both sides of the process.  A limitation, however, in terms 
of my own research questions, is that the subjects in the case study are from Canada.  Studies 
have looked at the reasons for conference realignment and the benefits for institutions, however, 
the decision-making process for conference realignment has not been examined through an 
organizational theory lens.         
Decision-Making 
 Conference realignment is a hot topic in intercollegiate athletics at the current moment.  
There are many concerns and issues institutional leaders must take into consideration when 
examining conference realignment.  Leaders approach decision-making in higher education with 
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complexity (Auerbach, 2008).  High stakes, public process, and the impact on populations within 
and outside of campus contribute to the complexity facing senior administrators trying to make 
decisions and plans for the long-term.  Strategic decision-making is important in terms of choices 
made and assets used.  It focuses on rare decisions made by top leaders that affect the path 
followed and level of success attained by the organization (Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992).  
Conference realignment is a rare decision that can have major ramifications on the public 
perception of an institution.  Research has not examined the implications conference affiliation 
has on branding but it is evident that national exposure does increase based on the television 
contracts associated with respective conferences.  The recent major break from traditional, 
geographical-based conference membership suggest that leaders are making these strategic 
decisions in a chaotic and inconsistent manner.  Revenue concerns drive these decisions, and to 
many in the higher education community, institutional-fit appears ignored.  Often, the question 
of benefits and costs of inviting an institution to a conference surfaces.  The values and 
objectives of a conference must align with the alternatives examined by a central group of 
decision-makers.  The rational decision-making model provides a framework for reviewing the 
decisions leaders make with regard to conference realignment.   
Rational decision-making.  The rational decision-making model traces back to classical theorist 
Max Weber.  Weber was a German philosopher and political economist who understood the 
cost-benefit analysis found in capitalism and the relationship it shared with cultural values and 
beliefs (Weber, 1956).  Simon (1976) introduced three steps when facing a decision: (1) list all 
alternative strategies, (2) determine all consequences that go with each strategy, and (3) 
comparatively evaluate all of the sets of consequences.  However, he argued “it is obviously 
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impossible for the individual to know all his alternatives or all their consequences” (Simon, 
1976, p. 67).   
 March and Simon (1958) proposed what is considered the common model for rational 
action.  Actors enter into a decision with known objectives and the cost-benefit value for 
alternatives as determined by the objectives.  The actors gather information on alternative 
solutions and then select the optimal alternative.  Eisenhardt and Zbaracki (1992) reviewed the 
literature since and found that empirical research supports the existence of cognitive limits to the 
rational model.  Decision-makers satisfice rather than optimize.  It is not possible for a human to 
engage in a comprehensive search for all alternatives.  The basic phases (identification of the 
problem, development of alternatives based on values, and selection of action) are not always 
performed in same sequence and are often repeated during the process.   
 Application of rational decision-making model.  The rational decision-making model is 
primarily used in studies of economics and political science (Allison & Zelikow, 1999).  
Milanowski (1997) examined the use of the rational model within the economics.  His research 
in the larger public sector concluded that decision-making on job pay is more consistent with a 
bureaucratic model than a rational one.  His case study evaluated the job pay for 250 
classifications over a ten-year period and his results proved that the “public sector job pay is not 
highly responsive to market pay levels” (Milanowski, 1997, p. 169).  Allison’s seminal political 
piece examines the Cuban-missile crisis and uses rational decision-making as one of the lenses 
with which to dissect that sequence of events.  Rationality adds consistency to the application of 
values and objectives in order to select the best alternative.  Allison and Zelikow (1999) define 
rationality as “consistent, value-maximizing choice within specified constraints” (p. 18).  The 
core concepts of rational the decision-making model are the values and objectives of the 
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organization, identifying the set of alternatives set before the decision-maker, assessing the cost-
benefit of each choice, and making the selection that ranks highest according to the stated values 
(Allison & Zelikow, 1999).  Allison’s case study on the government’s decision-making processes 
revealed how standard operating procedures conflicted with strategic decisions the government 
attempted to make during a time of crisis, thus Allison’s findings challenged the use of the 
rational decision-making model.       
  Application of rational decision-making model within higher education.  Higher 
education administrators make strategic decisions that impact their institutions.  The rational 
decision-making model has been used to evaluate the path higher education leaders follow in 
these decision-making processes.  A few examples include studies on policy and legislative 
decisions by political leaders that directly impact postsecondary institutions (Bachoo, 2008; 
Singleton, 2006).  Two recent studies evaluated the choices made at the institutional level by 
deans and chairpersons.  The rational decision-making model framed how their decisions aligned 
with their respective organizational or departmental missions (Hlavac, 2012; Keeney, 2012).  
 Bachoo (2008) examined the role of three governors shared in shaping the environment 
for higher education in the state of Connecticut.  Through the use of interviews, the case study 
found that the rational model was used more than other models in the decision-making processes 
under examination.  Singleton (2006), however, found bureaucracy and politics dominated 
administrative decision-making for universities dealing with new legislation reforms.  The study 
used three case studies, each one on a different institution.  Keeney (2012) examined strategic 
decision-making of fifty deans in academic health centers at public research universities.  Her 
mixed-method study found that deans tied professional identity to appreciation of data.  More 
than half of the administrators interviewed in this study initially said that information and facts 
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had great impact on their decision-making, thereby aligning with the rational decision-making 
model.  However, when further prompted, several deans professed the actual use of intuition 
frame over rationality. 
 The literature provides evidence of the rational decision-making model in use within 
higher education.  Critics have argued against the rational model and for the existence of 
cognitive limits (Simon, 1976; Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992).  Decision-makers must satisfice 
rather than optimize alternatives and can rarely engage in a comprehensive search.  An emerging 
perspective is that decision-makers can be rational some ways, but not in others.  The rational 
model is considered so stringent in theoretical demands that few efforts are made to test it.  Thus, 
research has focused on bounded or limited rationality rather than its ideal form.   
Chaffee (1983), an exception, argues that rational decision-making does occur and can be 
used by higher education administrators to their advantage.  Her study examined decision-
making for the budget process at one institution over a ten-year period.  The case study found 
that rational decision-making enhances credibility.  Chaffee (1983) identified essential features 
necessary for the rational decision-making model:   
• Clear set of values and objectives.  They serve as criteria for decision. 
• Stability, confidence and predictability present in organization’s atmosphere. 
• Consistency of decision-makers. 
• Analysis of the situation as strategic, tactical or operational.   
• Identification of who makes decision, who is affected, and to what degree each group 
participates. 
• Consider all possible solutions simultaneously. 
• Method to assess that an alternative produces results that match values and objectives. 
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• Evaluate match after decision made.  
 Chaffee (1983) also provided five criteria to test rational model.  They are: 
• Values and Objectives 
• Alternatives 
• Centralization of decision-making 
• Understanding of consequences 
• Value maximizing choice.   
Chaffee (1983) used mission statements to identify the objectives and values for a department or 
institution.  Her interviews searched for evidence of simultaneous consideration of a complete 
examination of a wide array of choices by a central authoritative body.  Through interviews, she 
examined the analysis of the cost versus benefit of each choice.  Documents and outcomes 
observed whether or not the alternative selected advanced the values and objectives of the 
department or institution.   
Chaffee’s study inspired the format used for this study on conference realignment.  The 
rational decision-making model has been used to examine different areas across higher education 
with the exception of administrative decisions impacting intercollegiate athletics.  Thus, there is 
a gap in the decision-making literature.  Decision-making models are not used to evaluate the 
decisions leaders are making in intercollegiate athletics, rather, this study will examine the role 
of rationality in conference realignment decision-making.      
Conceptual Framework 
 Chaffee (1983) presents a model to use in examination of the use of rationality in a 
decision-making process.  The five criteria described in the previous section allow the researcher 
to test the rational model.  Figure 1 portrays a framework for examining the use of rationality in 
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conference realignment.  The examination of decision-making by Big Ten Conference leaders 
uses the five criteria given by Chaffee to test the rational decision-making model. 
Figure 1 – The use of rationality in Big Ten Conference Realignment Decision-Making Process    
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Limitations of Literature                 
This body of literature also has limitations.  One limitation is the lack of qualitative 
research on conference affiliation and realignment.  For the past two years, conference expansion 
and realignment has dominated the attention in intercollegiate athletics.  However, conference 
realignment has been present in intercollegiate athletics since the birth of conferences (Thelin, 
1994).  After the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the institutions over the NCAA in Oklahoma v. 
NCAA, conferences took control of the television packages, thus obtaining power of a large and 
important piece of the financial structure under which Division I athletics operate. Presidents 
have been making strategic decisions as to conference affiliation throughout the history of 
intercollegiate athletics, yet there are no qualitative studies to document this process, allowing 
for comparison to the current wave of realignment washing over Division I athletics.  Examining 
the decision process on conference realignment through a qualitative lens makes it possible to 
develop an understanding for how leaders prioritize values and why they choose certain paths. 
Understanding the value leaders see in college sports is useful for beginning the construction of a 
plan for how athletics and academics can coexist within the dynamic of seemingly conflicting 
values and objectives.  More research is needed on the impact of conference realignment and 
affiliation.  The group of institutions to which a school is connected has an impact on quality and 
prestige, therefore placing a high importance on conference affiliation and the decisions for 
conference realignment. 
Future Research    
Avenues for potential future research can be found from these limitations.  One option is 
to examine the conference expansion process and investigate the decision-making process 
leaders used.  This can be done from a few different perspectives.  It could be looked at from the 
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perspective of institutions who choose to leave one conference for another, or from that of 
members of a conference who invite an institution to join them.  It can also be done over a 
particular time period, examining the history of a conference and its growth through time.  There 
are several different scenarios for the study of conference realignment within a decision-making 
model.   
Other future research that could prove valuable to this literature would be exploration of 
the concept of branding and how it benefits intercollegiate athletics at the Division I level.  With 
intercollegiate athletics becoming more and more commercialized, an institution’s brand can 
impact generated revenue dollars not only for itself but also for other members of the 
institution’s conference by adding to the marketability of the conference brand.  
Conclusion 
 Intercollegiate athletics at the Division I level receive constant attention from the media 
and researchers.  Debates persist as to whether “big time” sports benefit or bring detriment to 
higher education.  Presidents and athletic directors value the exposure, connection to alumni, 
branding, and increase in student quality and applicants that successful athletic programs bring to 
an institution.  These benefits along with the revenue generated provide justification to presidents 
for defending the spending trends seen in college athletics.  The amount of revenue generated 
yearly from these athletic departments is similar to that generated by big businesses.  Presidents 
and athletic directors are playing the roles of CEO, making decisions worth millions of dollars to 
their respective institutions.  “Decision-making as a process involves individuals making 
choices; similarly, strategic decision-making involves executives making choices that will affect 
the long-term future of the organization” (Keeney, 2012, p. 55).  Conference realignment is a 
process on which leaders must collaborate, making choices that impact the short and long-term 
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future of their institutions and conferences.  It is critical for leadership to understand the value of 
following a model when attempting to make strategic decisions that will benefit those involved.  
Decision-making by leaders reflects an institution’s values, ethics, and goals (Tierney, 2008).  
Strategic decisions are made with these factors in mind and objectives are prioritized and reached 
through long term planning.  Examining the decision-making process for conference realignment 
by leaders could reveal the qualities and characteristics leaders in higher education value and 
support.       
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Chapter 3 Methodology 
 This chapter includes the description of research design, case study design, case 
selection, data collection, data analysis, validity, role of researcher, and limitations.   
Research Design 
According to Manning and Stage (2003b), one of the most important decisions a 
researcher will make is the choice of which methodological technique to use.  The research 
design for this study is qualitative and the technique is case study.  Defining the orientation of 
qualitative research is beneficial when matching an approach with a research question.  A 
qualitative technique is a form of inquiry that assists in understanding and describing the 
meaning of social phenomena (Manning & Stage, 2003a).  Stake (2010) notes qualitative 
research relies on human perception and understanding through a microanalysis.  Qualitative 
designs do not manipulate variables nor do they have a predetermined hypothesis to test, but 
rather they involve listening to the experiences of the subjects.  This study emphasizes 
understanding the rationale for the choices leaders made during the (year) to (year) Big Ten 
Conference realignment process.  The “what” and “how many” are known; the conference 
invited one school, the University of Nebraska.  This study is not examining the cause and effect 
expansion has on institutions but rather exploring the experiences decision-makers had in the 
process, thus qualitative does fit.   
Yin (2003) defines the scope of a case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (p. 13).  To better understand conference 
realignment, it is highly pertinent to uncover the decision process leaders use when considering 
extending a membership invitation to another institution.  Three characteristics define case study 
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techniques.  They are the type of research question, the extent of control over behavioral events, 
and the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical events (Merriam, 1988; Yin, 
2003).  First, the researcher must determine the nature of the research question.  Questions 
“why” or “how” a phenomenon occurred are suited for a case study.  Second, case study methods 
require that the researcher have no control over behavioral or relevant events.  The third 
characteristic is the emphasis on contemporary events.  I desire to explore the “how” and “why” 
for the decision-making process used by the leaders of the Big Ten Conference that resulted in 
the extension of an invitation to the University of Nebraska in 2010.  I understands that I have 
little control over the happenings under examination and the results discovered.  The third 
characteristic of case study research is present in my focus on recent decisions involving 
conference realignment. 
Stake (2005) emphasizes designing a study that allows the researcher to understand the 
case rather than to make generalizations about a phenomenon.  Case studies emphasize 
relationships and comprehension of the experience(s) of subject(s) over attempts to make 
generalizations from those meanings.  A researcher chooses the case that allows for greatest 
understanding of the critical issue of interest (Stake, 2005).  The tension that exists between 
conflicting missions between academics and intercollegiate athletics at the division I level forces 
presidents to make decisions using a cost-benefit analysis.  This critical issue is present in the 
Big Ten Conference, elite research institutions that also compete in big-time athletics.  
Examining the role of rationality in Big Ten Conference realignment will provide a deeper 
understanding of decision-making in conference realignment.   
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Case Selection 
The initial step in designing a case study is to identify a case and establish the logic for 
the study.  Case study method contributes to our knowledge of a person, group, or organization 
(Yin, 2009).  The Big Ten Conference decision to invite the University of Nebraska was chosen 
as the case amongst many other conference realignment decisions.  The timeframe for the case is 
from the Big Ten’s announcement in December 2009 that conference realignment would be 
explored to June 2010 when Big Ten leaders announced that Nebraska was accepting an 
invitation to the conference.  A rationale supported by scholars (Yin, 2003; Stake, 2005) for 
using a single case study is that the case is extreme or unique.  From June 2010 through 
December 2012, seventy-seven institutions changed conference affiliation.  The reason the Big 
Ten Conference was chosen over others is because the membership has been long considered the 
best at promoting academics and athletics at the highest level (Thelin, 1994; Weaver, 2009; 
Smith, 2010).  At the Division I level these two areas share values but also have conflicting 
objectives.  As stated in the literature, the rational decision-making model involves assessing the 
data and making a choice by identifying the alternative that provides the best benefit at the least 
cost.  Thus, the Big Ten Conference is an ideal case to review when it comes to the role of 
rationality in conference realignment.    
The approach and timeline announced for this decision was unique.  The Big Ten first 
announced it would take twelve to eighteen months to examine conference realignment.  No 
other conference announced a timeline of this length.  The process sped up due to activity in 
other BCS conferences, thus forcing the Big Ten to make a decision within seven months.  Still, 
this case provides a unique opportunity to explore a decision-making process over a period of 
several months by learning about the relationships and discussions conference and institutional 
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leaders shared.  Enough time has passed that leaders should feel comfortable talking about this 
sensitive information, and the case has unfolded to completion with Nebraska making a 
transition to the conference.  Other conference realignment issues are still unfolding, even within 
the Big Ten; thus, those cases are still ongoing and an analytical bracket cannot put around them.           
Setting and Participants.  All the members of the Big Ten Conference, prior to Nebraska 
joining the league, will be asked to participate in the case study with the exception of the 
University of Illinois (UIUC).  The Champaign-Urbana campus was removed from the study for 
a few reasons.  First, during the conference realignment process Illinois was dealing with an 
admission scandal on its campus that resulted in the president being relieved of his duties and 
forced to leave his position.  Dr. Stan Ikenberry, former president of the UIUC campus and 
current faculty member, was selected as interim president until a permanent replacement could 
be found.  From a previous study that the researcher conducted, Dr. Ikenberry was forthcoming 
that he was not involved in the expansion decision-making process until the very end.  This fact 
and his position as a member of the researcher’s committee for this study provide a conflict in 
interest.  The remaining institutions include Indiana University, University of Iowa, University 
of Michigan, Michigan State University, University of Minnesota, Northwestern University, 
Ohio State University, Penn State University, Purdue University, and the University of 
Wisconsin.    
Conference Profile.  The Big Ten Conference membership includes twelve institutions.  The 
member institutions that will be asked to participate in this study are:  Indiana University, 
University of Iowa, University of Michigan, Michigan State University, University of 
Minnesota, Northwestern University, the Ohio State University, Penn State University, Purdue 
University, and University of Wisconsin.  As stated previously, the leaders at the University of 
	   	   	  
	  
	  53	  
Illinois will not be asked to participate, and the University of Nebraska became the 12th member 
when it accepted the invitation to join the conference in 2010.  All twelve institutions are 
affiliated with Division I athletics and members of a BCS conference.  The context of the case is 
the realignment process of the conference.  At the time of the realignment in the summer of 
2010, all of the schools were members of the prestigious Association of American Universities 
(AAU); however, in April 2011 Nebraska lost its status when the members of the AAU voted to 
eliminate the institution.  This is an important note to consider when examining the decision 
process of leaders.  It is an example of the conflict between academic values and athletic values 
that exists in higher education.  Conference members had to weigh the cost of lowering their 
academic values for the benefit of inviting an institution rich in tradition and athletic success.       
On page 55, Figure 2 provides a profile of the twelve members, concentrating on 
institutional type, membership status for Big Ten and AAU, number of varsity sports sponsor, 
and yearly revenue and expense totals.   Eleven of the twelve members of the conference are 
public institutions with enrollments ranging from 24,000 at University of Nebraska to roughly 
64,000 at Ohio State.  Northwestern, the only private institution, has the smallest enrollment at 
16,000.  The Big Ten has a long tradition of promoting academics and athletics.  It is the only 
athletic conference in the country whose institutions are all members of the AAU, but this 
changed when Nebraska officially became a member on July 1, 2011.  The athletic departments 
in the conference all sponsor more than the NCAA required 14 varsity sports.  Purdue and 
Northwestern are the smallest departments with 18 and 19 programs respectively, while Penn 
State and Ohio State are the largest with 29 and 35 apiece (Big Ten History, 2010).  It is well 
documented that the Big Ten considers all members of their conference as equal and shares all 
conference revenue evenly (Kalafa, 2010; Ourand & Smith, 2010a; Ourand & M., 2010b; Ubben, 
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2009; Weaver, 2010).  However, Figure 2 reveals that even with this agreement there is still wide 
disparity across the conference in total revenue for each member.  The Big Ten Conference 
revenue comes from national television contracts, bowl games, NCAA tournament, conference 
championships, licenses and royalties, and the Big Ten Network contract.  According to Ourand 
and Smith (2010c), the conference paid out $19.9 million dollars to each of its eleven members 
in the 2010 fiscal year, a 42% increase when comparing numbers from 2006-2007 fiscal year, 
where each school was paid $14 million dollars (Ubben, 2009).  The inflation in profits stems 
from new television contracts with ABC/ESPN and the Big Ten Network that paid $9 million 
and $7 million per school in 2010 fiscal year (Ourand & Smith, 2010a), which equates to close to 
80% of the total disbursement each school received.    The benefit for the Big Ten conference in 
adding a 12th member was the ability to host a championship game in football that would pit the 
two top teams of the conference against one another.  The Big Ten made the announcement it 
will bid the event as a separate entity and demand as much as $15 to $20 million for the rights 
(Mandel, 2009; Ourand & M., 2010a).  Critical to this process, however, was finding a program 
that would add to the pie and not diminish the existing school’s take on conference revenue.   
Figure 2 lists total revenue and total expenses for 2009-2011.  The data from EADA 
database was used for these numbers (http://ope.ed.gov/athletics/Index.aspx).  Eight of the 
institutions report expenses increasing at higher rate during this period.  Only Iowa and Ohio 
State report revenue growing faster than their expenses.  Presidents make decisions to subsidize 
athletic departments at the expense of academic programs on campus.  This case study will 
examine conflicting ideals and try to understand the role of rationality in institutional decision-
making.       
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For many years, membership within the Big Ten has been static.  The University of 
Chicago was the last institution to leave and that was 66 years ago, and the only additions during 
this period leading up to Nebraska’s invite was in 1949 (Michigan State) and in 1990 (Penn 
State) .  The stability and consistency in its membership was symbolic of the culture that 
permeates through the conference.  In an interview Morgan Burke, athletic director at Purdue 
University, summarized it best when he said, “Each conference develops its own culture.  Over 
the course of the 100-plus years that the Big Ten has been in existence, our culture, the way we 
share revenue, is much different than the way other conferences share revenue.  We tend to be 
much more ‘everyone gets an equal share,’ and that’s not the case in some conferences” (“What's 
the Game Plan,” p.4). 
Data Collection 
 Data collection for case study research is harder than most other methods because 
procedures for collecting data are not routinized (Yin, 2003).  A strength in case study research, 
however, is the opportunity to use multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 2003; Stake, 2005).  The 
rationale for using multiple sources is triangulation.  This principle allows the researcher to 
confirm findings and themes from different vantage points, thus providing validity to the study.  
For this study, data was collected from multiple sources -- collected documents and archival 
records as well as structured interviews.   
Documents 
This study examines the process decision-makers use in conference realignment.  The 
media portrays the presidents as the decision-makers, however the lack of studies presenting 
evidence to confirm this notion means that it is not certain. The impact of external and internal 
participants cannot be dismissed.  Thus, data collection began with review of documents and 
	   	   	  
	  
	  57	  
archival records in an attempt to identify any other potential key actors in the decision-making 
process.   
The strengths of using documentation in case study research are the stability, 
unobtrusiveness, exactness, and broad coverage they provide (Yin, 2003).  The documents 
gathered for this study include Big Ten Conference mission statements, the Big Ten policy and 
regulations handbook, and the Big Ten Conference website.  Following the criteria from Chaffee 
(1983), the objectives and values of the organization must be established in order to evaluate the 
role of rationality in the decision-making process.  Keyword searches were conducted on Lexus 
Nexus in order to recover newspaper clippings during this timeframe of the case.  Since digital 
media has become a popular medium for presenting the news, the websites of ESPN, The 
Chronicle, and Inside Higher Ed were searched for past articles referring to Big Ten Conference 
realignment during the timeframe for this case.  Membership status and AAU values and 
objectives were gathered from the AAU website.  Documents can be reviewed repeatedly and 
contain exact names and details of an event, at least from a given perspective.  Concerns with 
using documents are accuracy, bias, and access.  The researcher must identify the objective of 
author of each document.  The author might have used poor sources or have poor recall and 
therefore might inaccurately describe events.  Miles and Huberman (1994) recommend a 
document summary form to assist in identifying the significance of each document and to give a 
brief summary of each.  Appendix A provides a copy of that form.  This form assisted in 
organizing and coding the wide range of documents collected.  
Archival Records 
 The strengths of archival records are similar to those of documentation and are also 
valuable for their precise and quantitative nature (Yin, 2003).  Archival records gathered for this 
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study focused on meeting minutes and agendas from presidential archive materials.  Weaknesses 
are also similar for archival records to what they are for documentation, with an increased 
concern on accessibility due to privacy concerns.  These private records could have been 
requested under Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) but would have harm the study in two 
ways.  First, the amount of time it takes to obtain records through a FOIA request would extend 
the period required to complete the study.  The other concern is that it would irritate potential 
interview participants, thus limiting access.   
An option that was explored was that upon reviewing documents, I contacted authors 
who wrote several pieces on Big Ten Conference realignment and asking if they had any FOIA 
information that they could share with me for this study.  The two authors who responded back 
to me both said they did not keep any of the materials they were given via FOIA.  The archived 
material at member institutions was examined.  The online catalog for these archives was 
inspected for possible records or documents pertaining to conference realignment in the 
presidents’ papers that have been collected.  A review of organizational charts obtained from the 
conference also provided insight into the centralization of decision-making.  Documents and 
archival records only provide what is written on the paper or found on websites.  These two 
sources, however, built the foundation for the data collection within this case.  Documents and 
archival records, along with the criteria required for rational decision-making (Chaffee, 1983), 
guided the next phase of data collection: interviews that gave a deeper understanding than that 
achieved from reading documents.     
Interviews 
Interviewing is similar to having a conversation, but with a purpose: “The purpose of 
interviewing…is to allow us to enter into the other person’s perspective” (Merriam, 1988, p. 72).  
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Interviewing is a skill, and for the novice interviewer, a structured or semi-structured format is 
preferable.  I collected data through one-on-one, digitally recorded, phone or video chat 
interviews with participants.  A snowball sample was used for the selection of participants.  The 
first group of interview requests went to participants who were acting presidents during the time 
frame of the study but who are no longer serving in those roles.  The rationale was that these 
subjects may be more willing to talk on the subject since they no longer are serving in such a 
high profile position.  Following the snowball approach, upon completing these interviews, I 
asked these participants for suggestions as to whom I should speak next.  Media portrays 
presidents as being the primary decision-makers in conference realignment; however, using the 
snowball approach allows for external or internal subjects who participated or had role in the 
decision-making to be included in the study.    
Scholars prefer the structure of questions divided into stages: beginning with easy 
questions, progressing to tougher ones, and closing by toning them back down (Manning & 
Stage, 2003b).  Three types of questions serve as primary ones that explore all parts of the topic; 
they are followed by questions that explore themes and ideas introduced by the answers, and the 
third group of questions is more probing, eliciting more details without changing focus 
(Merriam, 1988; Rubin & Rubin, 2005; Stake, 2005).  Questions for the interviews were tailored 
from documents and archived resources acquired and followed Chaffee’s framework for 
necessary criteria for rational decision-making.  Questions examined participants perceptions of 
values and objectives of the Big Ten Conference.  Participants were asked about how 
information was collected on institutions that were considered for membership and how the cost-
benefit analyses were evaluated.       
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Participants were interviewed individually.  The interviews lasted between thirty to 
seventy minutes.  This study is approved by the IRB (Appendix B), and participants were fully 
informed of the intent of the study, the interview and data collection procedures, and their right 
to refuse to participate.  Five presidents and one athletic director agreed to participate.  Each 
participant was required to sign the informed consent form indicating his or her willingness to 
participate in the study (Appendix C).  The interview protocol, as I said above, was tailored from 
the documents and archives examined in the first stage of data collection (Appendix D).  
Chaffee’s framework for rational decision-making was used to guide the structure of the 
protocol.  All participants were given the same interview protocol, but additional questions were 
asked as issues and themes emerge.     
Though interviews give a targeted and insightful look into the issue, they have some 
disadvantages.  Interviews can suffer from poor questions, inaccuracies in an interviewee’s 
recall, or interviewee perception that s/he should give the answer that the interviewer wants to 
hear (Yin, 2003).  I am a novice when it comes to interview skills.  The pressures associated with 
the public offices presidents and other potential participants hold might have limited participants’ 
willingness to provide or discuss information that could be controversial.  The participants might 
choose to answer questions in a politically safe manner, not giving details on political issues that 
arose between institutions during the decision-making process.  Interviews conducted over the 
phone or via Skype are subject to some biases.  People tend to be more defensive and protective 
in phone interviews.  
Data Analysis 
Regardless of the research methodology, data analysis and interpretation must be 
organized:  “Analysis entails classifying, comparing, weighing, and combining material from the 
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interviews to extract the meaning and implications, to reveal patterns, or to stitch together 
descriptions of events into a coherent narrative” (Rubin & Rubin, 2005, p. 210).  Subject matter 
can develop all the way until the end of the writing process, so it is important to have a plan in 
place for how data will be organized.  The data analysis process in responsive interviews 
operates in two phases.  Upon completing each interview, the researcher prepares transcriptions 
and uses codes and themes to examine and organize the responses of the interviewee. The second 
phase involves comparing codes and themes across interviews.     
For this study, the data was analyzed in an interactive and simultaneous format.  The 
documents for this study were collected over two different phases of the research:  at the 
beginning prior to interviews and again after the interviews were concluded.  A timeline for 
when documents were found is listed in Appendix E.  The first step was to search archival 
records and documents (newspaper articles and online media reports) for data pertaining to this 
case.  The interview protocol was then framed using Chaffee’s criteria for the rational decision-
making model and with support from initial archival records and documents.  Using a snowball 
approach, attempts were made to the identified decision-makers asking for their participation in 
interviews.  Each participant agreed to be recorded during the interview. The recorded data was 
then transcribed to a computer-based document using Microsoft Word software.  The recorded 
data and the computer-based document contain the name of the participant as well as the date, 
time, and place of the interview.    Handwritten notes from the interview were also transcribed to 
a computer-based document using Microsoft Word.  There were forty-four pages of transcription 
to analyze that covered five hours and twenty minutes of interviews.  Follow up interviews 
conducted via email were not confidential, and most institutions archive all emails sent or 
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received through university servers.  Confidentiality could not be assured in this study, and each 
participant made his or her own decision about selecting this method for follow up.   
After interviews are transcribed, the researcher read each interview three times while 
coding and organizing the responses of the participants based on the five criteria for rational 
decision-making.  Upon completing the coding, the researcher compared codes and themes 
across interviews and across institutions.  Presidents’ responses were compared to other 
presidents in the study and to other subjects that participated.  The central themes identified were 
compared to the original transcripts to confirm meanings and interpretations.  Excerpts from the 
interviews included in Chapter 4 support generalizations I made on the case.  Documents and 
archival materials found were used to confirm any themes and trends from interviews for 
appropriateness of fit within the rational decision-making model.       
Validity 
Qualitative research is criticized for its validity and credibility of findings.  (Anfara, 
Brown, & Mangione, 2002).  The weakness stems from researchers not sharing their processes 
with their audiences.  This applies to data collection and the design of interview questions that 
connect to the research questions, data management and the analysis of qualitative data, and the 
methods of data triangulation and identification of findings.  For this study, the interview 
questions were cross-referenced with the research question and sub-questions guiding the study.   
The research question and sub-questions examine the role of rationality in the decision-
making processes involved in conference realignment.  The five criteria for the rational decision- 
making model provided the framework for data analysis.  Data collection began with retrieval of 
documents and archival materials.  The information relevant to the research questions (or lack 
thereof) found from these sources guided the questions for the interview protocol.  “Constantly 
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revisiting the central questions that the researcher hopes to answer is helpful in establishing a 
base of reference for the exploratory interview questions.” (Anfara, Brown, & Managione, 2002, 
p. 31)  During the course of the study, I had to keep an open mind to developing issues as they 
emerged (Stake, 2005).  Though perspectives differed between participants within institutions 
and across institutions, the interview protocol remained consistent in order to ensure a consistent 
process of data collection across; however, as themes or issues emerged, I asked the participant 
to provide more information regarding the respective theme or issue.   
Triangulation validates methodology by examining results from several different 
perspectives.  The author must take some ownership over the meaning the reader takes from the 
report (Stake, 2005).  A major strength of qualitative research is the opportunity to use many 
methods when collecting data (Merriam, 1988).  While experiments or surveys are limited to a 
standard measurement, case study methods can use interviews, documents, and archival records 
to collect data.  Triangulation of data is defined by the use of multiple perceptions to portray the 
meaning and confirming the redundancy of an interpretation (Yin, 2003; Stake, 2005). 
While case study research is not used to confirm a theory or make a generalization, the 
method can be used as foundation for creating new knowledge (Merriam, 1988; Stake, 2005). 
The findings in a case study could lead to future research that tests a hypothesis or contributes to 
more generalizable findings.  The triangulation of data eases concerns of validity by avoiding 
reliance on a single source for the author’s report.  The different perspectives of the different 
presidents and other participants supplied richness and a more complete recollection of the 
process.  Interviewees had knowledge of the event and were experienced in the area of higher 
education decision-making, contributing to my ability to use official documents and newspaper 
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stories to confirm and compare findings (Stake, 2005).  Documents and archival records were 
used to verify or negate the answers and responses given from the interviews.  
Role of Researcher 
As the primary analyst of the data collected, I must be aware of my own biases and the 
effect biases those have on interpreting data.  It is the author’s job to pass information on to the 
reader to develop greater understanding of a case’s meaning (Stake, 2005).  Therefore, it is 
imperative that I acknowledge my perspective, even as I make all attempts not to let it influence 
the study.   
 My passion in life is sports.  Since the age of seven when I first participated on my first 
school t-ball team, I have devoted my interest and time to athletics.  At the age of fourteen I went 
to my first college football game at the University of Florida, and my passion narrowed in its 
focus to intercollegiate athletics.  My entire professional career has been in college athletics at 
the Division I level.  Thus, it is not surprising that my research interest revolves around issues in 
Division I athletics.     
Upon reviewing the current events and issues in intercollegiate athletics in spring 2010, a 
dissertation on the creation of the Big Ten Network caught my attention (Weaver, 2009).  The 
study examined more than just the potential financial benefits of the network’s creation.  The 
detailed and in-depth interviews told a story of how, in a culture motivated by competition and 
gaining advantages, administrators, athletic directors, and a commissioner negotiated an 
agreement that would benefit all members of the conference.  Some institutions sacrificed their 
own gain for the financial position of the conference overall.   
At the same time, conference realignment was becoming a buzz word in Division I 
athletics, with the Big Ten and Pac Ten already announcing plans to expand and other BCS 
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leagues looking to survive, maintain, or even looking to expand themselves.  One conference in 
particular, the Big Ten, caught my attention for a few reasons.  Most obviously, this is due to my 
current employment in an intercollegiate athletic department in the Big Ten.  Beyond the 
familiarity aspect, though, the culture of collegiality amongst members in the Big Ten and the 
conference’s tradition of leadership in intercollegiate athletics at the Division I level were 
compelling.   
My professional aspirations are to advance in administration in intercollegiate athletics, 
and ultimately, to serve as a collegiate athletic director.  In previous chapters, the issues facing 
not only intercollegiate athletics, but also higher education as a whole make it important for 
leaders to research and examine decision-making procedures.  As a future leader, I think it is 
important to educate stakeholders not only about the decisions leaders making, but also about 
understanding the rationale and the processes involved in making those decisions.   
With strong and deep ties to a particular field and profession, there are concerns I need to 
acknowledge.  My current employment and future aspirations can be a hindrance.  Many would 
argue that an athletic employee would be subjective when interviewing other athletic employees, 
particularly the head of an athletic department.  I also need to acknowledge that my career in 
athletics could influence me to harbor opinions regarding the role athletics play on a college 
campus as well as their value to that campus.  It has been necessary for me to monitor my bias 
towards the Big Ten conference since I have worked for Big Ten institutions for over ten years.    
Limitations 
In addition to some of the limitations aforementioned in this chapter, a few more should 
be mentioned at this time.  To begin with, five of the ten presidents were not willing, or 
available, to participate in an interview.  Another limitation is that when interviewing senior 
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administrators, there is the possibility that she or he might have censored thoughts.  Given the 
politically and economically sensitive nature of the subject matter, the participants may have 
provided socially acceptable answers or purposefully withheld information so as not to reveal 
controversial issues that arose during the decision-making process.  Finally, the trustworthiness 
of the information found in the archives must also be taken into consideration.  Due to the 
sensitive nature of these discussions and decisions, presidents and chancellors may not be willing 
to provide all materials and data to the university archives.  The material that is given to the 
archives may present an edited view that protects certain discussions or issues that arose during 
this decision-making process that leaders may not want available to the public.   
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Chapter 4 Findings 
Overview 
 The purpose of this study is to understand the Big Ten institutional leaders’ conference 
realignment decision-making process.  The central research questions guiding this study focus on 
which factors institutional leaders considered when making conference realignment decisions, 
which constituents were involved in the decision-making process, how the identification process 
was rationalized, how the conference and the institutions involved in it were impacted by choices 
made on realignment.  After the document and archival search was completed, the researcher 
conducted interviews with five presidents and one athletic director across six different 
institutions.  Due to requests for anonymity from all participants, their identities and institutions 
are not revealed here.  The five criteria for testing the rational decision-making model (Chaffee, 
1983) frame the findings in this case study.  They are stated adherence to values and objectives, 
identification of alternatives, centralization of decision-making, understanding of consequences, 
and determination of the value-maximizing choice.   
 Reviewed above, Chaffee (1983) argues that rational decision-making does occur and can 
enhance the higher education administrators’ credibility with stakeholders impacted by their 
decisions.  Her study examined decision-making for the budget process at one institution over a 
ten-year period.  Chaffee (1983) identifies essential features necessary for adherence to the 
rational decision-making model.  An organization must have a clear set of values and objectives 
to serve as criteria for making a decision.  An organization’s atmosphere requires stability, 
confidence and predictability in order to identify who makes decisions, consider all possible 
solutions simultaneously, and ultimately make rational decisions.  Finally, a an organization 
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must have a method for assessing the decision made and the extent to which results match the 
values and objectives. 
The data from this case study recognizes all of Chaffee’s criteria except the requirement for 
determining the value-maximizing choice.  It is very difficult to assess one choice compared to 
another.  A prospective institution may, on paper, match all the values and objectives of the 
decision-makers’ institutions, but whether or not the value is maximized depends on so many 
outside variables that are beyond an evaluator’s control.  For example, if an institution from the 
East Coast or Southeast were added to the conference, it would be impossible to predict with 
certainty that another cable distributer in the new region would uphold the Big Ten’s existing 
television agreement.  Therefore, the impact that inviting an institution from the East Coast or 
Southeast this would have on the objective to increase revenue is difficult to predict.   
The studied institutions’ values and objectives, confirmed through the interviews and 
documents analyzed, provided the criteria for institutional presidents’ decisions about conference 
realignment. The requirement for matching values and objectives defined the possible alternative 
institutions to be considered.  Key constituents from membership institutions participated in 
discussions, but the institutions’ presidents ultimately decided to whom an invitation for 
membership to the Big Ten Conference would be extended.  Data reveals that though decision-
makers did recognize the consequences of inviting the University of Nebraska, it can neither 
confirm nor deny whether or not the choice maximized the conference’s adherence to shared 
values and potential for meeting objectives.  This chapter uses Chaffee’s five criteria to detail 
these themes found in the data.   
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Themes 
 This case study on conference realignment within the Big Ten Conference investigated 
institutional leaders’ decision-making process.  The rational decision-making model frames the 
case.  Chaffee (1983) uses five criteria to test for the extent to which a particular process aligns 
with the rational decision making model: adherence to stated values and objectives, identification 
of alternatives, centralization of decision-making, understanding of consequences, and 
determination of the value-maximizing choice.  Though the following sections report the 
findings using these criteria to organize the data, under analysis, the data revealed that not all 
these categories applied nor were presented in the same manner as Chaffee presents.   Values 
lead to the formation of the objectives, but are separate from each other.  Thus the findings 
present values and objectives in separate sections.  Following these two are sections on 
identification of alternatives, centralization of decision-making, and understanding of 
consequences.  As mentioned earlier, settling with certainty on the value-maximizing choice was 
not applicable to the findings in this case study due to the inability to confirm whether or not one 
choice would produce more favorable results than another.  All the data has been analyzed and is 
presented below by the adjusted criteria list as explained above.     
Values 
 
“We were very upfront that these were the things we would be looking for.  There were sort of 
three pretty broad categories in that.  One was academic fit.  One was what I would call the 
cultural understandings of the Big Ten.  We are a sharing conference, ok, as one example.  We 
are generally a conference that sponsors a lot of sports.  Title IX.  Gender Equity.  Diversity.  
There were several things that fall under cultural fit.”   (Anonymous, personal communication, 
February 13, 2014)      
 
 These words, quoted from a Big Ten institutional president, reflect how all of the 
participants in this case study view the values of the Big Ten.  Whereas Chaffee (1983) defines 
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values as the mission statement of a company or group, in this case study, values refers to the 
ideals considered most important to the leaders of the institutions in the Big Ten Conference.  
The data reveal many values that fall under three categories: academics, athletics, and culture.  
Another president at a member institution repeated the same values to the media.  Rittenberg 
(2010) writes that Michigan State president Lou Anna K. Simon says that academics, willingness 
to participate in the Committee on Institutional Cooperation, athletic competitiveness, and fiscal 
responsibility are important to the conference leaders.  This example demonstrates with clarity 
that presidents value academics and athletics.  Further, President Simon here hints at the culture 
with his emphasis on willingness to participate in the CIC and fiscal responsibility not only as 
institutions, but also in their connection to the rest of the members of the conference, thereby 
also demonstrating the culture, the relationships, that exist across institutions in the Big Ten.  
These three values (academics, athletics, and culture) are the core to the Big Ten Conference, 
defining the relationships that exist across the members.  The next section presents the data on 
these three values.   
Academic Quality.  All the interview participants said that the academic quality of a potential 
institution was not only important, but it was the first thing considered in discussions of 
realignment.  The Council of Presidents automatically dismissed any potential new member 
institution if its academic quality did not match up to the Big Ten institutions. President Simon 
commented to the press that of the criteria used to evaluate applicants, academics is at the top of 
the list. (Rittenberg, 2010)  Presidents recognize the history of the conference, including its 
academic reputation.  Another president interviewed for this study stated that, “the academic 
standing of an institution and the capability with respects to the types of research going on is 
who we are.  Nebraska is a land grant, Michigan State is a land grant, Wisconsin, Minnesota, 
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Purdue, Ohio State.  These are all historic universities with fairly strong research profiles.  We 
would not have asked an institution who for example that did not have same or similar academic 
profile”(Anonymous, personal communication, June 21, 2014).   This value is understood not 
only at the presidential level but among the athletic directors at conference member institutions 
as well.  An athletic director interviewed for this case study reaffirmed President Simon’s 
statement regarding academic quality, saying, “job number one, and they were not kidding 
around about it, was they wanted an institution that was a peer academically first and athletically 
second”(Anonymous, personal communication, April 30, 2014).   
Academic quality, however, is not easily defined.  Membership in the AAU is one marker 
for academic excellence, and all the Big Ten universities were members of the AAU at the time 
of this case.  The Big Ten institutions pride themselves on their combination of academics and 
athletics.  A president interviewed for this study says, “the Big Ten is the only conference where 
at the time we were looking at conference realignment including Nebraska all the schools were 
thought to be very strong academically and were members of the AAU” (Anonymous, personal 
communication, November 25, 2013). Another president interviewed for this study described 
AAU status as, “a code of quality” (Anonymous, personal communication, February 13, 2014).  
The prestigious group is a consortium of the sixty-two leading research institutions.  The official 
website for the AAU states:  
Membership in AAU is by invitation and is based on the high quality of programs 
of academic research and scholarship and undergraduate, graduate, and 
professional education in a number of fields, as well as general recognition that a 
university is outstanding by reason of the excellence of its research and education 
programs. (“Association of American”, 2014)   
Documents confirmed the importance of this membership by listing only schools that were 
current members in the AAU as potential new Big Ten members (Longman, 2010; Moltz, 2010; 
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Schlabach, 2010).  Commissioner Jim Delany, however, said that while membership in the AAU 
is an important common trait of the Big Ten’s members, it was not a requirement for any 
prospective institutions (Greenstein, 2010c). Another president reinforces this claim, stating in 
the interview that potential candidates did not have to be members.  Membership in the AAU, 
however, does make it easier to explain the strengths of a potential conference member 
institution.  Overall, three of the six interview participants agreed that AAU membership helped 
define the value of academic quality.  
The University of Nebraska belonged to this elite group of institutions and was actually a 
founding member of the AAU.  Throughout the whole process, from December 2009 to June 
2010, even up to Nebraska’s ultimate acceptance of its invitation to join, there was no concern 
that Nebraska might lose its AAU status. A few months after joining, though, Nebraska was 
removed from membership in the AAU.  The commissioner and president above, however, 
confirmed that while AAU does provide a public badge of academic quality, it is not necessary 
for Big Ten decision-makers to view an institution as an academic peer.  Academic quality is the 
number one characteristic that potential alternatives to possess in order to be invited to join the 
Big Ten; a close second is athletic success.  The athletic director interviewed for this study says, 
“we would not compromise on academics or athletic capability”(Anonymous, personal 
communication, April 30, 2014). 
Athletic Quality.  The members of the Big Ten Conference value their academic reputations. 
Following closely is their value for athletic quality of their intercollegiate programs.  The Big 
Ten is the oldest athletic conference in the country, and their members compete at the highest 
level in college sports.  This reputation was not lost on the participants in this study.  Five out of 
six participants said that athletics is valued within their institutions and that the athletic 
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departments are held to a higher standard, both on and off the field. Presidents expect their 
athletic programs, and those of potential member institutions, to compete with athletic excellence 
at an elite level as well.  
When discussing with each other the criteria for new members, both athletic quality and 
academic quality were important.  A president interviewed for this study explained, “if it had 
simply been about athletics, that would not have carried the day.  If it had simply been about 
academics, that would not have carried the day either.  It had to be a package” (Anonymous, 
personal communication, February 26, 2014).  Athletic quality is the second value that defines 
the Big Ten Conference.  The importance of athletic quality is found in the preamble of the Big 
Ten Conference Statement of Guiding Principles, which states:   
The association of universities known as the Big Ten was founded in 1895.  
Member institutions, chiefly but not solely public, cherish a mission of research, 
graduate, professional, and undergraduate teaching, and public service.  They 
have accorded athletics an important place within that array of missions. (The Big 
Ten Conference Handbook 2010-2011, 2010, pg. 21) 
Four presidents and one athletic director in interviews, several media sources, and even the 
conference handbook state the value athletic quality holds.  A president interviewed for this 
study lists academics first when it comes to value of the Big Ten Conference, but follows 
immediately with, “we also wanted to have institutions that could compete at a national scale in 
the Big Ten, and bring us recognition in athletics” (Anonymous, personal communication, 
December 13, 2013).  Another president interviewed for this study explains that conference 
member institutions value the national recognition that intercollegiate athletics brings to an 
institution and conference (Anonymous, personal communication, February 13, 2014).  It is 
important to presidents considering expansion that a new member adds to the existing level of 
athletic prestige in the conference.     
	   	   	  
	  
	  74	  
The key to how academics and athletics are valued in the Big Ten lies within how they 
intertwine and form the culture of the conference.  Interviewed for this study, a president 
described the balance between the two values, “the Big Ten had a very strong emphasis on 
academic validity of our conference but also wanted to make sure that institutions had similar 
abilities to be competitive in athletics”(Anonymous, personal communication, December 13, 
2013). Another president interviewed for this study reaffirmed the strength a potential institution 
needs in these two areas stating, “One of the earlier conversations about expansion the presidents 
were all about only looking at quality institutions.  By that I mean academic quality institutions 
that had something to bring in terms of a combination of academic and athletic prowess into the 
Big Ten” (Anonymous, personal communication, February 26, 2014).  A third president 
interviewed for this study pushed this even further by saying that success for athletics is viewed 
as a student-athlete who is successful in the classroom and on the sports field (Anonymous, 
personal communication, June 21, 2014).   
The University of Nebraska possesses the same desire for excellence in academics and 
athletics professed by the Big Ten presidents interviewed.  Focus on student-athlete experience 
and welfare is important to the Cornhuskers.  Dr. Tom Osborne, former head football coach and 
athletic director at the time of expansion, has a legacy at Nebraska that reveals his time and 
energy spent mentoring student-athletes inside and outside the sports arena.  Regardless of 
whether a student-athlete is a scholarship or walk-on, the Nebraska athletics department provides 
the resources, facilities, and support necessary to excel academically and achieve athletic 
success.  Evidence is seen in Nebraska’s 314 CoSida Academic All-Americans (second and third 
is Notre Dame and MIT with 238 and 220) and twenty-nine intercollegiate athletic national 
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championships. Thus, in terms of commitment to academic and athletic excellence, Nebraska 
was a good fit for the Big Ten. 
Culture.  Members of the Big Ten Conference feel that the culture embedded in their 
relationships with one another separates them from other intercollegiate athletic conferences.  
The academic rigor and athletic competitiveness on a national scale are values the institutions in 
the Big Ten hold dearly. Leaders feel that they are truly peer institutions to one another in every 
way.  The institutions share resources and collaborate to solve academic and athletic issues 
among their group.   
This is nowhere more evident than in the Committee on Institutional Cooperation (CIC).  
The CIC is a consortium made up of all the Big Ten institutions and the University of Chicago (a 
former member of the Big Ten).  According to the CIC website, the CIC, “aims to be the model 
for effective, voluntary collaboration among top research universities” (About CIC, 2011).  The 
CIC emerged at the semiannual meetings of the Big Ten presidents in 1956 from the desire of 
Big Ten presidents to cooperate across state boundaries to solve mutual problems.  There was 
born the persistent Big Ten culture of working together and sharing resources in order to develop 
strength across their institutions’ academic and athletic programs. This committee continues to 
have value for member institutions. A president interviewed for this study claims: 
We value that tremendously because it allows these powerhouse research 
universities to share a whole lot of resources and to do talent development and 
many other things that are the envy of, I think, in some cases of, uh, institutions in 
other conferences where that does not go on. (Anonymous, personal 
communication, February 26, 2014)    
 
Discussing and collaborating on issues such as conference realignment comes naturally to 
this group of higher education leaders whose collaboration does not stop at sharing ideas.  The 
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2010-2011 Big Ten Handbook lists business-revenue sharing as one of the overall principles 
guiding the Big Ten Conference.  Under business-revenue, the handbook states, “the conference 
shall promote competitive equality and collegiality through distribution of televised revenues, 
tournament and bowl receipts, and football gate receipts.  The principle of nourishing and 
maintaining the concept of the Conference shall have priority in the distribution of revenue” 
(2010, p. 10).  Sharing financial, athletic, and academic resources in collaboration amongst 
members defines the Big Ten culture of reaching for excellence collectively and not just 
individual institutions.  A president interviewed for this study confirmed the spirit of the 
conference’s culture:  
We like to think there is a culture associated with the Big Ten.  We like to think 
there is a set of higher standards that we put out there that we expect our 
institutions, our student-athletes, our coaches, our athletic directors, our 
presidents…top to bottom to embrace and espouse. (Anonymous, personal 
communication, February 26, 2014)  
From the beginning of the conference to the present day, leaders of Big Ten universities 
have identified themselves as a sharing, collaborating, and competing group that expects to set 
the national standards for academics and athletics.  The University of Nebraska has similar 
qualities and characteristics, giving it reason to leave the Big 12’s political culture for the Big 
Ten’s.  As is the case with the majority of Big Ten members, Nebraska is a land grant, public 
school located in the mid-west, and it is the flagship institution for the state.  Graham Spannier, 
former chancellor at Penn State spent five years (1991-1995) as chancellor at the University of 
Nebraska, providing a connection to a member in the group of decision-makers.  Spannier’s 
relationship with the administration at Nebraska allow for open channels of discussion.   The 
mission of the Nebraska Cornhusker athletic department is based on its core values of integrity, 
trust, respect, teamwork, and loyalty.  The department funds twenty-three sport programs with 
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over six hundred student-athletes participating.  The financial investment in athletic facilities 
demonstrates the high level of commitment the department and school have in their athletic 
programs.  From Memorial Stadium to the Devaney Center to the NU Coliseum, and on down 
the line, the institution provides a quality athletic environment for its campus community.   
The Big 12 as a different philosophy when it comes to sharing revenue amongst its 
members than the Big Ten.  The institutions divide all the money evenly except for half of their 
television revenue (Griffin, 2008; Ourand & Smith, 2010c; Ubben, 2009).  As the conference 
revenue varies considerably across member institutions, the Big 12 culture has been described as 
being characterized by adverse competition more so than by collegial collaboration.  The Big 8 
conference expanded in 1996 and became the Big 12 by inviting Texas A&M, Baylor, Texas 
Tech, and Texas.  It did not take long for long for the perception to set in that the conference 
wanted to shine the light on the University of Texas a little brighter (Forde, 2010).  Events seen 
as detrimentally political were the 7-5 vote to move the conference offices to Dallas from Kansas 
City.  Nebraska was on the wrong side of that count.  After the introduction of the four new 
institutions, the new division formats did not honor the long time rivalry between Nebraska and 
Oklahoma. The once called “Game of the Century, ” once scheduled annually, came to occur 
only once every few years.  Instead, the Texas and Oklahoma rivalry moved to the forefront.  
The final objectionably political move for Nebraska was the move of the Big 12 conference 
championship game Dallas.  The University of Nebraska was not only an original member of the 
Big 12, but it was also traditionally treated as one of the premier programs in the league.  It is 
possible that Nebraska felt slighted by the lack of respect demonstrated by Big 12 leaders while 
all the attention was diverted to to their neighbors in Texas.  In contrast, again, the Big Ten 
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culture emphasized inclusivity, working together to raise the bar for all members and not just a 
select few.     
Their values clearly established, Big Ten presidents’ next step in deciding about 
conference realignment was to determine the objectives in alignment with those values.  The 
next section presents this case study’s findings on the question of how Big Ten presidents 
articulated the goals that they hoped to achieve by expanding Big Ten conference membership.  
Objectives 
 
“The Big Ten conference, which many would consider the most financially, academically, and 
athletically successful of all the athletic conferences, has always been mindful of the need to 
monitor the conference structure and realignment landscape.  We always wanted to make sure 
that the Big Ten was well positioned.  We also looked at geography.  You also not only look at 
the markets but the following schools have nationally, their brand, so to say.  Finally, you want 
to go in a direction where revenues will be enhanced.”(Anonymous, personal communication, 
November 25, 2013)     
 This statement by a president interviewed for this study sums up the objectives of 
conference realignment for the Big Ten conference presidents.  In decision-making, Chaffee 
(1983) asserted that a group’s mission statement reveals both its values and objectives, but in this 
case study, the academic and athletic values are defined by the Big Ten’s culture, while finances 
drive realignment objectives.  Values provide the criteria for fitting in with the group, while the 
objectives identify the goals for expanding that group.  The objectives for this case are stability 
and increasing revenue for conference members.  The next section provides the data on the two 
objectives identified by participants in this case study.   
Stability.  The Big Ten Conference is the oldest intercollegiate athletic conference.  Seven 
members formed the group in 1895, and by 1946, the membership was at ten.  Only one 
institution has ever left the conference, and from 1946 to 2010 only one institution joined.  
During this same period, four major college football conferences have folded: the Big East, 
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Missouri Valley, Western Athletic Conference, and Southwest Conference.  Two have 
reclassified from FBS to FCS: the Ivy League and The Big Ten is joined only by the PAC 12 and 
SEC in not having had a member leave since 1965 (Bostock, Carter, & Quealy, 2013).  With 
change comes new terrain, and when they announced their consideration of expansion, the Big 
Ten leaders wanted to make a rational decision that served the current members and provides 
continued stability.  In an interview for this study, a president described this objective for 
realignment, explaining that leaders agreed that they should “try to have us evolve to a consensus 
so that the way it was done would assure that we remain built to last” (Anonymous, personal 
communication, February 13, 2014).  Consistent membership has been key to the success of the 
Big Ten Conference over 119 years.  Barbara McFadden Allen, Director of CIC, stated, “I 
attributed our success to our longevity” (Moltz, 2010, para. 23).  Despite conference leaders’ 
commitment to stability, they could not sit and watch as the collegiate landscape changed 
dramatically.     
 In the market, the key to stability is making the product offered is well positioned in 
relation to its competitors.  As stated above, other BCS conferences were looking at realignment 
and expanding conference membership from twelve to potentially as many as sixteen members.  
In order to not get left behind, Big Ten leaders believed it was important to examine expansion 
and determine if it would benefit the.  A president interviewed for this study stated that the group 
began discussing realignment and:  
What was going on with the instability, the expansion, was going to create and 
how that might impinge on the Big Ten.  This was driven really by the instability 
of some of the other conferences and seeming desire to rearrange the deck chairs.  
So for us, we were, ok, lets take a look at this, and we are only going to do this if 
we think it really benefits the Big Ten.  We are not going to do this for the sake of 
expanding. (Anonymous, personal communication, February 26, 2014) 
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The thought amongst institutional leaders was this period of instability offered a good 
opportunity to examine the potential costs and benefits of expansion, ultimately determining, as 
is made obvious by the subsequent realignment, that expanding the conference would benefit 
their institutions.  Presidential leaders identified an opportunity to strengthen the conference’s 
position.  A president interviewed for this study reflected, “the Big Ten has always been mindful 
of the need to monitor the conference structure and realignment landscape, and we did not want 
to be caught being unaware of the changes that were out there” (Anonymous, personal 
communication, November 25, 2013).  Big Ten leaders found in other conferences’ instability 
the opportunity to expand and thereby improve the position of the conference.  The same 
president continues, “as things were changing from Big 8 to the Big 12, to movement in and out 
of the Big 12, to the expansion of the PAC 10, to changes in the Big East and ACC and other 
conferences, over time we always wanted to make sure that the Big Ten was well positioned” 
(Anonymous, personal communication, November 25, 2013).  The words “well positioned” and 
“market place” in this case refer to the Big Ten Conference’s ability to compete at an elite level 
in intercollegiate athletics while maintaining the values of its members and achieving the 
objectives set forth for realignment.     
 The Big Ten presidents agreed that the key to continued stability in the long term was an 
ongoing conference realignment process, one that could change with the addition or subtraction 
of a member(s) for a conference.  In an interview for this study a president summed up this 
objective by saying: 
You’re constantly positioning yourself in relation to the other three of four major 
conferences.  So you know if there is a rumor that one conference might be 
moving from 12 to 16,, or one conference might be collapsing or there might be 
some realignment, you want to be aware and how it will affect you, and if you are 
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thinking about expanding you want to position yourself as well as possible. 
(Anonymous, personal communication, November 25, 2013)  
Stability was an objective driving the decision to expand Big Ten expansion.  Presidents valued 
the long tradition of elite academics and athletics that exists among Big Ten institutions, and 
protecting their status among intercollegiate athletic conferences was a driving force in 
conference realignment.  Another president interviewed for this study confirmed this objective 
when explained, “obviously we are trying to protect our space and brand.  You know the Big Ten 
Conference remains the wealthiest conference in the country, and we want to protect ourselves” 
(Anonymous, personal communication, December 13, 2013).  In the Big Ten, stability is a by-
product from revenue sharing.  The Big 12 model described above was based on performance in 
competition and thus benefitted the winners more than the group as a whole, thereby widening 
the divide between institutions within a conference.       
Leaders interviewed reiterated the importance of the group not only maintaining, but also 
strengthening their position among intercollegiate athletics through expansion.  In order to 
achieve this, the second objective, increasing revenue, was the other goal critical to the current 
institutions with conference realignment.     
Increase Revenue.  As stated in the value section, sharing revenue among all members is an 
established cultural practice in the Big Ten.  All conference television contracts, football bowl 
game distribution, and NCAA Men’s Basketball tournament payouts are dispersed evenly each 
year among the members.  Therefore, adding a new member(s) made it important to also increase 
the revenue or risk decreasing the revenue taken in by current members.  A source inside the 
conference said “The point was:  We can all get richer if we bring in the right team or teams” 
(Greenstein, 2010a, para. 3).  Revenue sharing provides stability within the conference and 
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increasing revenue assists the institutions collectively in the conference’s competition with the 
other BCS conferences.  Three interview participants confirmed the importance of raising 
revenue, or at the very least maintaining it, in their considerations of realignment.   
 Of the shared revenues detailed above, conferences can only negotiate television 
contracts.  The other areas of revenue generation are determined by athletic performance.  For 
institutions considering realignment, it is imperative the outcome of their decision be attractive in 
terms of media distribution.  This fact is not lost on leaders in higher education.  Alan J. Hauser, 
president of the Faculty Athletic Representative Association, claimed, “it is quite obvious the 
reasons that the conferences want this – so they can leverage more and better television 
coverage, giving them more revenue” (Moltz, 2010, para. 15).  A president interviewed for this 
study reinforced this sentiment when stating:  
We looked at the viability of expanding the conference in relation to what newly 
negotiated television contracts might be.  So since there are financial consequences in 
conference realignment. You want to go in a direction where revenues will be enhanced, 
or not decline (pause), or at the very least be held constant. (Anonymous, personal 
communication, November 25, 2013) 
In order to identify the potential impact realignment would have on revenue, the 
presidents hired William Blair and Company, a consulting firm, to examine different regions 
within and outside the Big Ten geographic footprint to determine the revenue potential of each 
(Greenstein, 2010b).  When it came to contracts with national television networks, the Big Ten 
Conference competed with the other BCS conferences; however, the Big Ten had an additional 
television revenue source that other conferences did not at this time.  
The Big Ten Network launched in 2007 and provided a new revenue stream that leaders 
of Big Ten institutions controlled.  The conference received eighty-eight cents per subscriber, so 
adding more television markets to their geographic footprint would add to the revenue generated 
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by the Big Ten Network (Schlabach, 2010).  In an interview for this study a president echoed 
Schlabach’s assertion, saying, “the Big Ten Network was a very young entity at that time.  We 
were looking at if we expand the television footprint of the conference where would it make 
sense” (Anonymous, personal communication, February 26, 2014).  Expanding conference 
membership to a new market would increase the gross revenue, but how much it would do so 
depended on the size of the television market annexed.  Another president interviewed for this 
study expanded on this thinking: “In the case of Nebraska it is not as if the state has a lot of 
television sets.  There are about 1.6 million people living in the state of Nebraska.  It is not 
anything like New Jersey, Pennsylvania, or Illinois for example” (Anonymous, personal 
communication, November 25, 2013).  Adding a large television market would offer the 
opportunity for the conference to negotiate a license fee per subscriber with the television 
provider(s) in that area (Jones, 2010).   
Adding large television markets can guarantee increase in total revenue.  Adding a new 
brand, however, could increase television revenue through its appeal to television subscribers. 
The same president continues, “However, you also look not only at the markets around those 
schools but the following they have nationally.  The brand name appeal and sport brand name 
appeal and logos are important” (Anonymous, personal communication, November 25, 2013).  
Four participants in this study stated improving the brand was key to increasing the revenue.  An 
athletic director interviewed for this study summarized the importance of brand best when he 
said, “I think we really wanted to add, and I use an overused word, a brand that needed to be an 
entity that really added a quality element.  As football royalty certainly, plus the great traditions 
they have in volleyball and other sports, Nebraska certainly fit that bill” (Anonymous, personal 
communication, April 30, 2014).  Nebraska football is a strong brand, 340 consecutive sell-outs 
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at Memorial Stadium in Lincoln, Nebraska, is evidence of that.  “For half a century, fans have 
packed Memorial Stadium, making it the third largest city in the state on game days”(Sturgeon, 
2014, para. 11).  The stability and national following of Nebraska evidenced a strong brand that 
could add something to the table for the Big Ten.   
With values and objectives established, Big Ten presidents’ next step in conference 
realignment decision-making, in the rational decision-making model, is to discuss the 
alternatives, or choices.  The next section presents from the data collected in the case study a 
description of how the presidents identify and collect information about the various among the 
alternatives or potential institutions and their athletic programs. 
Alternatives 
“Then what we simply did was sort of looked at, as you might, the universe of institutions.  That 
you know that independent, whether they were available or unavailable, to test truly the 
assumptions.  And it had to be a mutual understanding.  And the other piece about it was that we 
were in the process. We had our list, we had our analysis done, and along those broad scale 
categories, but we sort of sat back and waited for somebody to sort of begin the process with 
us.” (Anonymous, personal communication, February 13, 2014) 
 
This statement by a president interviewed for this study reflects the process of searching 
for alternatives within discussions of conference realignment by the Big Ten conference 
presidents.  In decision-making, Chaffee (1983) used interviews to search for evidence of 
simultaneous consideration of a complete, wide array of alternatives by a central authoritative 
body.  In this case study, the Big Ten presidents defined the criteria for conference realignment 
through their values and objectives.  The criteria guided the Big Ten presidents when evaluating 
all alternatives.  This process included, as the next session describes, collecting data, having a 
collegial discussion to evaluate alternatives, and gauging the desire of given institutions to join 
the Big Ten Conference. 
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Considering all Alternatives.  Considering all alternatives is an essential characteristic 
necessary of the rational decision-making process (Chaffee, 1983).  Due to the sensitive nature of 
conference realignment, however, participants would not discuss the institutions considered for 
expansion.  Secondary data searches only resulted in documents that speculated on possible 
alternatives and could not verify all institutions considered.  The list of rumored candidates 
included the University of Missouri, University of Nebraska, Notre Dame University, University 
of Pittsburgh, Rutgers University, Syracuse University, and University of Texas (Garcia, 2010; 
Greenstein, 2010a; Longman, 2010; Thamel, 2010).     
For this case study, conference realignment provides a set of values and objectives that 
puts a requirement on alternatives.  With that said, five of the six participants for this study 
believed the Big Ten presidents reviewed all possible institutions.  A president interviewed for 
this study reflects this when states:  
We looked at a range of possible institutions and some of them were too distant, 
or were not similar in academic profile, or in the judgment of people were not 
great academic and athletic institution but it came down to a lot of criteria and 
extensive discussions. (Anonymous, personal communication, June 21, 2014).   
The criteria identified by the Big Ten presidents narrowed the list of alternatives down allowing 
them to consider all possible choices.  “This is not an infinite set of institutions that fit the Big 
Ten,’ said Michigan State president, Lou Anna Simon.” (Rittenberg, 2010, para. 14)  With the 
criteria set and the possible alternatives identified, the presidents then gathered data on possible 
alternatives.  For example, the University of Missouri, University of Texas, and Syracuse 
University would all have been realistic choices for the Big Ten to consider based on their 
current membership in Power 5 conferences and their similar financial commitments to 
intercollegiate athletics.  Western Illinois University, Florida Atlantic University, or University 
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of Alabama at Birmingham would not have been realistic alternatives and could be dismissed 
automatically based on the financial commitments to intercollegiate athletics articulated in their 
budgets.  The latter schools listed compete in the Summit and Conference-USA conferences, 
where the budgets are $12.6, $21.9, and $31 million (EADA).  These figures do not compare to 
even the lowest member of the Big Ten, $55 million.    
Collecting Data.  Collecting data was the next step in the Council of Presidents and Chancellors’ 
consideration of all alternatives.  The Big Ten Conference office admitted that it had been 
gathering information on expansion prior to the announcement on December 15, 2009 that the 
conference was going to study expansion opportunities (Rittenberg, 2010).  The official 
statement released by the conference office reported: 
The COP/C has asked the conference office to obtain, to the extent possible, 
information necessary to construct preliminary options and recommendations 
without engaging in formal discussions with leadership of other institutions.  If 
and when such discussions become necessary the COP/C has instructed 
Commissioner James E. Delany to inform the Chair of the COP/C, Michigan State 
University President Lou Anna K. Simon, and then to notify the commissioner of 
the affected conference(s).  Only after these notices have occurred will the Big 
Ten engage in formal expansion discussions with other institutions.  This process 
will allow the Big Ten to evaluate options, while respecting peer conferences and 
their member institutions. (DeArmond, 2009, para 5)  
The first and last sentences of the statement reveal the presidents’ intentions to collecting data on 
potential institutions and evaluate all realistic alternatives.  The conference office used the 
consulting firm William Blair and Company to gather data (Jones, 2010).  A president 
interviewed for this study explained, “we used them because we felt we were getting into some 
really deep water here with respect to the role of the media, economic trends taking place, issues 
that had to do with the reach and range of audiences” (Anonymous, personal communication, 
June 21, 2014).  Positive financial impact of expanding the membership was an important 
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objective, and the presidents felt it was very important to have a complete understanding of the 
financial possibilities attached to each potential new conference member.  The same president 
continued, “There are some big complexities that had to do with the growth and development of 
television, Internet, and everything you can imagine” (Anonymous, personal communication, 
June 21, 2014).     
 William Blair and Company assisted the council by providing data on the economic 
landscape in a way that stakeholders at the member institutions could understand.  “They 
provided solid data for us to make a decision,” a president interviewed recalled, “I mean, 
obviously it was the point of having some external validation to our thinking in what we were 
doing.  They certainly did that” (Anonymous, personal communication, December 13, 2013). 
The period between when the presidents announced that the conference was going to study 
expansion opportunities in December 2009 to the time it concluded in June 2010 with the 
University of Nebraska’s acceptance of their invitation was short for a group of eleven presidents 
and chancellors to gather data, review it, discuss it, and make a decision.  This was a small 
window of time to execute a decision with large financial implications for those involved.  To 
stay aligned with their own values and objectives, the presidents knew they had to be prepared.  
A president interviewed for this study expressed this sentiment: 
Yea, we decided that whatever was going to happen would probably happen 
relatively rapidly, and at that point in time we couldn’t be as thorough as we 
wanted to about all the information we would want to have on these three broad 
categories: academics, cultural fit, athletics compatibility. And so we went ahead 
and did some work ahead of time, not because we were out sort of prospecting as 
much as the desire to be ready at the moment forced into a decision. (Anonymous, 
personal communication, February 13, 2014) 
Upon collecting the data, the presidents needed to examine it and discuss the potential costs and 
benefits of inviting the institutions identified.  It was imperative that the council explored all 
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alternatives and whether or not each met the values and objectives elaborated above.   Being 
prepared allowed the time for the council to discuss and evaluate alternatives.  In an interview 
for this study a president explained, “It gave everyone a chance to talk about, over more than one 
meeting, the sort of pros and cons.  It gave everybody a chance to talk and think about things 
before you had to make a decision” (Anonymous, personal communication, February 13, 2014).  
Having a collegial discussion was the next step in evaluating the alternatives and the extent to 
which inviting each would allow member institutions to stay within the boundaries of the Big 
Ten’s established culture and values while also aiming for the financial objectives stated above.   
Collegial Discussion to Evaluate Alternatives.  The Big Ten Conference’s statement on 
guiding principles defines presidential authority in this way: “the Big Ten Conference values the 
concept of one institution – one vote in a system of shared governance” (Big Ten Conference 
2010-11 Handbook, 2010, pg. 23).  The culture of the Big Ten is one of collegial and cooperative 
interaction.  Jim Delany reaffirms, “it is not just a conference making a decision.  It has always 
been and will continue to be about institutions making a choice” (Rittenberg, 2010, para. 16).  
The Council of Presidents and Chancellors (COP/C) is committed to discussing concerns or 
issues in a collegial environment.  
Upon collecting the data, presidents convened to discuss the institutions with acceptably 
similar values and objectives.  One president remembered, “It was not a decision but a collegial 
discussion because the Big Ten is, by and large, is very oriented collegial discussion” 
(Anonymous, personal communication, February 13, 2014).  Jim Delany sent an email to the 
COP/C and athletic directors in March 2010 that addressed the collegial process.  The Chicago 
Tribune, in a public records request, obtained the email.  The subject of the email was a reminder 
from Delany to the institution leaders to avoid commenting to the press which would be 
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“inconsistent with the protocols of collegiality and trust which are the foundational elements of 
moving big and meaningful issues thru (sic) a governance system such as our own” (Assael, 
2010, para. 1).  Collegiality can be difficult to achieve in processes of making financial 
decisions, especially when the stakeholders each have different concerns to consider.  The Big 
Ten institutions’ individual budgets vary, but the leaders but work to make decisions that are best 
for the group.  When asked about the atmosphere of discussions of expansion, an athletic director 
interviewed for this study described this collective decision-making process:  
Absolutely.  Absolutely, one of the things I liked about the Big Ten is it is very 
collaborative.  You poll people and get their point of view and they disclose 
biases but they hang their institutional hats at the door and really try to approach 
things from a conference perspective.  I think some have different perspectives.  I 
think it is no secret that Penn State felt like, “Hey, we really would like to go 
east.”  But when we had the opportunity to add a Nebraska, Penn State was right 
in there saying it was a no-brainer. (Anonymous, personal communication, April 
30, 2014) 
 
Primary source interviews confirmed that the COP/C engaged in collegial discussions of 
conference expansion that got into the evaluation of evaluate potential institutions.  Secondary 
sources are non-existent due to the private nature of such conversations.  In an interview for this 
study a president explained, “I don’t know how willing all these people are going to be talk about 
it.  It was a very confidential matter” (Anonymous, personal communication, November 25, 
2013).  In the same email referenced above, Delany reminds the COP/C to decline opportunities 
to comment to the media regarding the Big Ten’s expansion study (Assael, 2010). Data collected 
guided the collegial consideration all realistic alternatives.  The last component in the selection 
of alternatives in this case was the desire of the considered alternatives to join the Big Ten. 
Desire of alternatives to join.  This case study revealed that the desire of institutions to join the 
Big Ten also informed leaders’ selection.  When asked how conference leaders compared 
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potential schools, a president interviewed for this study agreed that values and cultural fit are 
important but added, “we are also thinking about desire.  What would be the desire on the part of 
another team to join the Big Ten?” (Anonymous, personal communication, February 26, 2014).  
Secondary sources (Brackin, 2010; Rittenberg, 2010) reported that the Big Ten bylaws require an 
institution to apply for membership, and then the COP/C vote on whether or not to accept the 
application.  It takes seven votes for an institution to be accepted.  The Big Ten Conference 
2010-11 Handbook (2010) confirms that this is the case.  The process included collecting data, 
having discussions on all possible alternatives, and then discovering if an institution(s) had a 
desire to join.  Once an institution(s) applied, then the COP/C would vote on whether or not to 
accept them.  A president interviewed for this study recalled that at the end, “when we voted 
formally, it was on the request of an institution to join”(Anonymous, personal communication, 
February 13, 2014).     
 The University of Nebraska expressed interest in joining the Big Ten Conference shortly 
after the Big Ten’s announcement to study expansion.  In an interview for this study a president 
explained how this unfolded:   
There was a kabuki dance.  A wooing.  A quick conversation.  The truth of the 
matter is we would not have invited Nebraska without knowing they would say 
yes.  There were informal conversations going on.  That there were informal 
conversations that had been going on between Harvey Perlman and several of our 
presidents who are closer to him.  So we knew basically their interest.  We were 
not flying blind on this. (Anonymous, personal communication, December 13, 
2013) 
In January 2010, Jim Delany was at the Rose Bowl supporting the Big Ten participant University 
of Wisconsin.  While there, he had a conversation with Barry Alvarez, athletic director for 
Wisconsin, who played football and graduated from Nebraska.  Alvarez had dinner with Delany 
and, “peppered Alvarez with questions about the Huskers:  Do they do things the right way?  Do 
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you think they would fit in the Big Ten?” (Anderson, 2011, p. 66).  Tom Osborne, athletic 
director at Nebraska, heard the rumors that the Big Ten might be interested in Nebraska and 
called Alvarez to confirm whether or not it was true.  Osborne shared this information with 
Harvey Perlman, chancellor of the University of Nebraska-Lincoln campus.  “Then Perlman, 
intrigued by the potential for an enhanced academic profile in the Big Ten, talked to 
commissioner Jim Delany”(Forde, 2010, para. 38).   
 The instability within the Big 12 conference informed Nebraska’s interest in joining the 
Big Ten, with its 114-year history of stability.  A president pointed out that Nebraska was the 
right choice and right fit, but just as important, “the timing would be good just because of the 
unstable conditions at that point in time in their own conference, and they were probably feeling 
and wondering what the future would hold for them” (Anonymous, personal communication, 
February 26, 2014).  Nebraska officials would not comment publicly, but popular media outlets 
offered reasons for why Nebraska wanted to leave the Big 12 (Associated Press, 2010b; Trotter, 
2010).  From Nebraska’s view, the University of Texas, who joined the Big 8 in 1994 with three 
other institutions to form the Big 12, was receiving preferential treatment from the conference 
office.  In June 2010, it was reported that the PAC 10 was courting Texas, Texas A&M, 
Oklahoma, Oklahoma State, Texas Tech, and Colorado.  Within a matter of six days, Colorado 
accepted an invitation from the PAC 10, reports surfaced that Texas A&M was considering 
joining the SEC, and the Big 12 office gave an ultimatum to Missouri and Nebraska, stating that 
they had five days to decide whether or not they were committed to the Big 12.  With the 
existence of the Big 12 hanging by a thread, Tom Osborne and Harvey Perlman were convinced 
that the best option, most stable option was to apply for membership in the Big Ten (Associated 
Press, 2010b; Trotter, 2010). 
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      In June 2010, Osborne and Perlman presented their proposed resolutions on conference 
realignment to the Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska, testifying to what alignment 
would mean to Nebraska (Agenda: The Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska, 2010).  
At the conclusion of the presentation, the Board agreed with the rationale for applying to the Big 
Ten and approved Nebraska’s application for membership in the Big Ten (Report from the Board 
of Regents, 2010).  Thus, the COP/C had confirmation of the Nebraska’s desire to join the Big 
Ten.  After collecting data, having collegial discussions about all possible alternatives, and 
identifying Nebraska’s desire to join the Big Ten, the group was ready to make a decision.  With 
values and objectives defined, and alternatives thoroughly reviewed, the next criterion in 
Chaffee’s rational decision-making model is the centralization of decision-making.   
Centralization of Decision-Making 
 
“This was very heavily driven by the presidents and by really a sub group within the presidents 
and by the conference commissioner supported by a couple of his staff and athletic 
directors.”(Anonymous, personal communication, November 25, 2013) 
This statement by a president interviewed for this study summarizes who was involved in 
the decision to expand and accept University of Nebraska’s application to join the Big Ten 
Conference.  Chaffee (1983) used interviews to confirm there was a central authoritative body 
that reviewed all alternatives.  The rational decision-making model calls for the centralization of 
decision-making.  The authoritative body must understand the values and objectives of the 
organization and must consider all alternatives when executing a decision.  In this case study, 
interviews and documents provide evidence that the Council of Presidents and Chancellors for 
the Big Ten Conference (COP/C) was the central authoritative authority making the decision as 
to whether or not the conference would expand.  The COP/C, however, did lean heavily on the 
conference commissioner for information and data and, to a lesser degree, on their respective 
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athletic directors.  Due to sensitive and political nature of this decision process, other groups 
were not included, such as Boards of Trustees and faculty athletic representatives.  The next 
section provides evidence on the centralization of decision-making in the Big Ten Conference 
expansion process.   
COP/C Central Authority.  When it came time to make the decision as to who would be 
accepted, and who would not for that matter, the COP/C was the central authority.  The Big Ten 
Conference bylaws (2010) state in the Rules and Organization section that the COP/C are the 
chief executive officers.  The duties and responsibilities reserved to the council list thirteen areas 
where their authority rests, including admission into membership.  This authority is reserved to 
the council and requires a vote of not less than 60%, or seven out of the eleven (Big Ten 
Conference 2010-11 Handbook, 2010).  At the annual spring meetings for Big Ten athletic 
directors and coaches in Chicago in May 2010, Wisconsin athletic director Barry Alvarez 
stressed that “any expansion would be a decision for university presidents, not athletic directors.” 
(Ubben, 2010, para. 6).  Other media reports confirmed that this was a presidential decision, not 
a conference one (Brackin, 2010; Moltz, 2010; & Rittenberg, 2010). 
 Beneath the COP/C is the Joint Group and it is comprised of faculty athletic 
representatives, athletic directors, and senior women administrators (Big Ten Conference 2010-
11 Handbook, 2010).  According to the bylaws regarding membership referenced above, the 
council normally would expect to take such action upon the recommendations of the 
Commissioner, with the endorsement of the Joint Group.  Others had influence into the decision 
and will be discussed in the next section, but overall the COP/C was the central authority.  A 
president interviewed for this study recalled, “It was our vote.  Jim had done all the homework 
for us and answered all our questions, and he continued to answer questions and was always 
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there to answer questions for us, but in the end it was the vote of the council that allowed it to 
happen” (Anonymous, personal communication, February 26, 2014).     
Presidents and chancellors have very busy schedules, and getting eleven together at the 
same time to discuss expansion was a difficult task.  The six-month timeline for this decision 
process was intense for the higher education industry.  A lot of information was collected and 
needed discussion among the eleven institutional leaders.  An executive group within the council 
facilitated discussion across all eleven presidents and chancellors.  In an interview for this study 
a president described it as, “usually very intense with the people on the executive committee.  
And I use the word intense, but I do not remember how often” (Anonymous, personal 
communication, February 13, 2014).  When it came to sharing information discussed within the 
executive committee with the rest of the council, the same president said, “We would have very 
frequent calls with the rest of our colleagues and sometimes not everybody could be on the 
phone so there would be two calls.  Everyone felt they had input and knew what was happening” 
(Anonymous, personal communication, February 13, 2014).  In another interview for this study, 
an athletic director confirmed, “the presidents were extremely engaged.  They asked a lot of 
questions and gave a lot of leadership” (Anonymous, personal communication, April 30, 2014).  
The COP/C drove this decision process, and all member institution presidents participated in the 
decision process, led by the executive group, but that is not to say it did not receive input and 
influence from others.  Commissioner Jim Delany and the athletic directors also played a part in 
the decision process.   
Commissioner’s Role in the Decision process.  The rules of organization for the Big Ten 
Conference stated that the COP/C would make membership decisions based upon 
recommendations from the commissioner (Big Ten Conference 2010-11 Handbook, 2010).  The 
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importance and significance Jim Delany played in this decision process cannot be overstated.  
The COP/C did have the final vote, but Jim was key in providing the data and answering 
questions asked.  Interviews revealed the high esteem in which the COP/C and athletic directors 
hold him.  A president interviewed for this study proclaimed Jim Delany a strong leader in the 
process and the most knowledgeable commissioner when it comes to the impact of media on 
sports. When asked about the role the commissioner played, an athletic director interviewed for 
this study replied: 
Jim Delany is a visionary.  He sees around corners.  The things he is talking about 
five years ago are percolating in the public consciousness now.  His engagement 
and the confidence in which he is held by the presidents and athletic directors is a 
key component of this.  The trust is really high that he was evaluating all of these 
things and making the appropriate recommendations to us.  He certainly did not 
dictate things but he took us every step of the way.  (Anonymous, personal 
communication, April 30, 2014) 
In another interview for this study, a president said that the commissioner provides expert 
judgment on the landscape.  He continued, citing Delany’s longevity within the conference and 
willingness to seek out answers to COP/C’s questions as evidence for the justified trust bestowed 
upon the commissioner to represent their interest to outside groups as well as provide analysis to 
the COP/C (Anonymous, personal communication, February 13, 2015).  
 The commissioner’s role really involved collecting and providing information to the 
COP/C and keeping the process as private as possible.  Due to the sensitive nature of conference 
realignment talks, Delany knew the need for those involved to keep discussions and 
conversations out of the public domain in order to protect the conference as well as prospective 
institutions.  On March 3rd, 2010, Delany sent an email reminding the COP/C and athletic 
directors to continue to be discreet and not reveal information to the media regarding the 
expansion process: 
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Fyi – I appreciate Gordon and Barry being unavailable for this story per my 
request as we move our process forward.  I made myself unavailable also and it 
had the consequence of making me a focus of the story.  To reiterate as a 
collective we have no conference stake in contributing either on or off the record 
or via background on these stories.  These comments can 1) do some brand 
damage because they tend to focus on the pecuniary side 2) they do not accurately 
reflect the complexity or the political challenges both internal and external 
associated with expansion execution 3) they tend to complicate and confuse the 
messages with respect to process that we painstakingly crafted in order to insulate 
ourselves re charges of insensitivity to others 4) are an affront to those who are 
practicing discipline by refraining from commenting 5) are inconsistent w the 
protocols of collegiality and trust which are the foundational elements of moving 
big and meaningful issues thru a governance system such as our own.  At the end 
of the process the conference will expand or not because of what our board wants 
to do in the best interests of the conference and for no other reason.  I will try to 
guide the process so that you have the opportunity to make that judgment in an 
appropriate environment with the appropriate information.  We are moving into a 
substantive phase and the challenges in the media will become greater. (Assael, 
2010, para. 3) 
Delany’s comments above to the COP/C and athletic directors evidence his large role in the Big 
Ten Conference expansion process.  While the COP/C asked questions and made the final 
decision, the commissioner oversaw the whole process.  Delany understands the values, 
objectives, and culture of the Big Ten and the importance of working together without leaking 
information to the media, making the COP/C’s responsibility even more difficult.  Delany is 
considered an expert by the COP/C when it comes to intercollegiate athletics and their trust lays 
with him to be the architect for this process.  He leads the COP/C through the expansion process 
by providing all the facts to the central decision-makers.  Another note to take away from this 
email is that it was sent to the COP/C and the athletic directors.  Athletic directors did have an 
active role in this process, while other groups did not.   
Athletic Directors and Others impact on the Decision.  Secondary sources are limited to the 
few referenced above due to the private nature of this decision-making process.  Primary sources 
via interviews, however, provide some sense of the roles that athletic directors and other groups 
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played in this decision-making process.  All participants in the interviews stated that the athletic 
directors were involved in the decision-making process.  The athletic directors did not have a 
vote but provided suggestions and gave opinions on potential alternatives.  When asked about the 
role of athletic directors, a president interviewed for this study said,  
Obviously we work as a team, and the athletic directors had a significant role, and 
their views on adding another team, and whether it made sense, and if Nebraska 
made sense.  This is not solely a president decision.  It is ultimately a presidential 
decision but not solely. (Anonymous, personal communication, December 13, 
2013)   
Anderson (2011) reveals in an interview with Wisconsin athletic director Barry Alvarez that 
Commissioner Delany met with Alvarez in January 2010, a month after the conference 
announced it was studying expansion.  The commissioner asked Alvarez a lot of questions 
including one about his opinion on Nebraska’s athletic program since Alvarez played football 
and earned a degree from Nebraska.   
During the next few months the presidents acted in advisory roles.  An athletic director 
interviewed for this study remembered that, “the presidents were more like the Board of 
Directors, if you will, and we would gather recommendations” (Anonymous, personal 
communication, April 30, 2014).  The athletic director continued,  
Each athletic director worked closely with their president to keep them advised so 
they were not walking cold into discussions.  One of our charges, frankly, as 
athletic directors, was to keep our president advised to the ebb and flow and how 
things were going, so when they walked into the room and got an overall briefing, 
they were not playing a lot of catch up. (Anonymous, personal communication, 
April 30, 2014)   
After the commissioner and athletic directors, other groups (on campus and off campus) were not 
involved in the decision-making process.  Some presidents expressed concern about the 
additional politics involved if boards were to be brought into the equation.  In an interview for 
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this study, one president made the point that a board serving multiple institutions that participate 
in multiple conferences could lead to a conflict of interest (Anonymous, personal 
communication, February 26, 2014).  For example, one institution could gain by leaving for 
another conference, while other schools in state may suffer because they lost a conference 
member, bringing the stability of their own conference into question.   
Stakeholders outside the COP/C, Athletic Directors, and Commissioner Delany did not 
have direct input to specific alternatives, or which schools to consider. As mentioned in the 
section above, the consulting firm William Blair and Company provided data to the conference 
office and presidents in order to assist with the presidents’ understanding of the landscape, but 
not to make decisions.  Whereas athletic directors were providing opinions and suggestions on 
specific institutions, a third party consulting firm was used to provide an overall picture of the 
landscape.   An athletic director interviewed for this study explained the firm’s role:  
Yea, my recollection of that was that they were very helpful on sort of getting 
common set of information that we could compare, you know, from a variety of 
criteria, whether it was demographics or other areas.  There was a lot of comfort. 
We had all the information we need to put in a digestible format.  In my view they 
were really were not a driver as consultants can sometimes be. (Anonymous, 
personal communication, April 30, 2014)   
On campus, boards of directors and faculty athletic representatives were not included.  A 
president interviewed for this study explained,  
It is one thing to have eleven or twelve people in on a discussion. Then you bring 
in athletic directors; now you’re into twenty-five some people and if you bring in 
the eleven governing boards now you have hundreds of people.  And so things 
start leaking, and when they leak it causes a certain amount of chaos in a situation 
like this. (Anonymous, personal communication, November 25, 2013)   
That chaos did play out in the Big 12 Conference with several rumors and so-called leaks 
swirling during that process.  Numerous reports (Associated Press, 2010a; Associated Press, 
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2010b; Trotter, 2010; Ubben, 2010) reported politicians, college presidents, and a conference 
commissioner expressing concerns over the stability of the league, coverage that distracted from 
decisions, causing them to being made in haste, rather than through a rational process.  
Over the course of six months, the Big Ten presidents, led by Jim Delany and assisted by 
the conference athletic directors, made the decision to accept the University of Nebraska’s 
application for membership.  The COP/C defined the conference values and identified the 
objectives for considering expansion.  All realistic alternatives were considered by the COP/C 
and this central authoritative body made the decision only after collecting data from trusted 
working groups.  The next phase in this process was predicting what the potential impact of 
Nebraska’s addition to the conference.  The next section examines decision-makers’ 
understanding of the consequences of expanding the conference by adding Nebraska. 
Understanding of Consequences 
“So anything that is good for the conference, good for the Big Ten Network, good for our 
financial viability, I think is particularly good for us.  Anytime though when a group gets bigger 
you lose a little of the essence of how you were before you started.  You’re more widespread and 
there are more people you shared less history but that is why it was important to align with 
universities who are a lot like us.  I think we had our eyes wide open about the differences, and 
the positives way outweighed any potential negatives, and frankly I do not think there were any 
negatives.”(Anonymous, personal communication, April 30, 2014) 
This statement from an athletic director interviewed for this study reflects the conference 
leaders understanding of the consequences from conference expansion.  Chaffee (1983) 
examined through interviews how the decision-makers analyzed and weighed the costs versus 
benefits of each choice.  Understanding the consequences is the fourth criteria in the rationale 
decision-making model.  Upon executing a decision, the authoritative body must understand the 
impact that decision will have on its group.  Documents and interviews for this case study 
identified impacts on revenue and brand as consequences for Big Ten conference realignment. 
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The three financial areas impacted by expansion were television contracts, revenue distribution 
with an additional member, and team travel costs.  The addition of Nebraska directly impacted 
the brand and had an indirectly influenced the next expansion process.  The next section provides 
evidence of Big Ten presidents’ understandings of consequences within the Big Ten Conference 
expansion process.  
Impact on Revenue.   The consequences expansion would have on institutions and their 
revenues were an important factor.  Increasing revenue was an objective identified at the 
beginning of the process.  Would institutions still receive the same, if not more financial gain, by 
adding a twelfth member?  How would the addition of Nebraska affect television contracts?  
How would expanding the conference’s geographic footprint impact travel costs?  The COP/C 
understood that these were consequences that would be revealed once the decision was made.   
 In an interview for this study a president explained the financial concerns of expansion: 
What does it mean for Nebraska to leave the Big 12?  What are the penalties 
going to be?  What will they lose in the transition?  What are their athletic 
revenues?  What do they need to be made whole?  At what point do you start 
giving the school coming in their equal share?  If the Big Ten Network contract 
and the ESPN contract get adjusted upward, how much of that upward adjustment 
do they get, and how soon? (Anonymous, personal communication, November 25, 
2013)   
The Big Ten combines all revenue (from television contracts, bowl games, and the NCAA men’s 
tournament) and distributes it evenly among its members.  Bowl game and NCAA tournament 
distributions are based on performance thus fluctuate from year-to-year.  Television contracts, 
however, are fixed amounts with values that do not depend on winning or losing.  In 2010-11, 
the year prior to Nebraska joining the Big Ten Conference, the Big Ten paid its members $22.8 
million each from television contracts, while Nebraska received $9 million from the Big 12 
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(Carmin, 2014a; Cordes, 2014).  Nebraska would incur a penalty of $9 million for leaving the 
Big 12 (Cordes, 2014).  
Reviewing the data bolstered the COP/C’s confidence that Big Ten that revenue would 
rise after expansion.  A president interviewed for this study says,  
We had a series of meetings regarding the question of the future of the Big Ten.  
Part of that conversation was the question of whether or not we should consider 
adding another team or teams and how that would impact us financially.  
Advantages for adding were the championship game and the terms of television 
footprint of the Big Ten. (Anonymous, personal communication, February 13, 
2014)  
The addition of a football conference championship game increased revenue with a six-year deal 
worth $145 million with Fox (Dosh, 2012).  In another move to help offset cost of the addition to 
the member institutions, the Big Ten negotiated an agreement with Nebraska that they would not 
receive a full share of the conference’s revenue until after six years (Carmin, 2014b; Cordes, 
2014). The Big Ten institutions incurred start up costs when the Big Ten Network was first 
founded in 2007 and did not feel a new member should be able to receive a full share without 
investment.  “‘You just don’t jump into the league and get a full share of what everyone else in 
this league has established over time,’ Wisconsin athletic director Barry Alvarez told the 
Associated Press. ‘I think someone has to buy their way into the league’”(Greenstein, 2010a, 
para. 9).  The six year financial integration plan would allow time for the conference television 
contracts to become more profitable for member institutions, thereby raising the eleven 
members’ revenue and still providing Nebraska with more money than it had received in the Big 
12.   
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Figure 3: Big Ten Revenue Distribution and Projections (2007-2018) 
Figure 3 (financial numbers on y-axis are in millions) shows that from2007 to 2014, the 
members of the Big Ten have seen a 44% increase in television revenue, starting at $18.7 million 
in 2007-08 and growing to $27 million in 2013-14 (Bennett; 2012; Bennett, 2013; Durando, 
2012; Durando, 2013).  The numbers for 2014-2018 in Figure 3 are projections the Big Ten 
released in 2014 (Carmin, 2014a; Cordes, 2014; Fornelli, 2014).  During the six-year financial 
integration plan, Nebraska went from taking in $14.3 million in 2011-12 to taking in $16.9 
million in 2013-14. Compared to the $9 million Nebraska received in its last year as a member of 
the Big 12, the projected $44.5 million of revenue in 2017-18, when the institution receives a full 
share, amounts to almost a 500% increase over six years.   
 Presidents also considered that adding the University of Nebraska would expand the 
geographic footprint of the Big Ten.  A president interviewed for this study pointed out:  
We were cognizant of the impact on student travel and impact on academic work 
from travel, and whole range of things were considered, so we wanted to make 
sure we drew a circle around the institutions of the Big Ten, that it was a fairly 
cohesive group with good transportation routes at reasonable costs. (Anonymous, 
personal communication, June 21, 2014)    
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Only two interviewees expressed concern about an increase student-athletes’ travel distances as a 
consequence, thus it could be a geographic location issue for those interviewees’ schools but not 
an overall concern for all members  Outsiders also noticed the perceived lack of concern on 
travel and student welfare.  Alan Hauser, president of the Faculty Athletic Representative 
Association lamented:   
It is quite obvious the reasons that the conferences want this – so that they can 
leverage more and better television coverage, giving them more revenue.  But this 
coverage comes at a price, and few people ever mention the pressures placed on 
student-athletes when discussions such as these are held. (quoted in Moltz, 2010, 
para 15)   
The reward of greatly increased revenue far outweighed the consequence of extended team travel 
and increased travel costs.   The next consequence the COP/C had to consider the impact that the 
addition of Nebraska would have on the Big Ten brand.     
Impact on Brand.  Expansion’s consequences for the conference brand were something the 
COP/C took into consideration.  The culture of the conference, built on the pursuit of athletic and 
academic excellence through the collaborative efforts of the members, combined with the 
stability of it, the oldest conference, defines the brand of the Big Ten. The sharing of resources 
and revenue across athletics and academics has built the Big Ten brand into arguably the 
strongest brand in college athletics.  What impact did the COP/C expect expansion to have on the 
brand of the Big Ten?  In an interview for this study a president recalled, “We had expansion 
discussions about this but in the end the case was compelling enough it was hard to see what 
potential downside there would be” (Anonymous, personal communication, February 26, 2014).  
Adding Nebraska was seen as having a positive impact on the Big Ten brand.  Another president 
interviewed for this study added, “in terms of branding and recognition, and in terms of 
expanding our portfolio Nebraska was obviously a no-brainer.  Nebraska is such a national 
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reputation” (Anonymous, personal communication, December 13, 2013).  The state of Nebraska 
does not add a large populated area to the Big Ten footprint.  The COP/C, however, saw the 
addition of a storied athletic tradition with a strong national following making up for that.  In 
inviting Nebraska to join them, “The Big Ten gained a recognized football power with five 
national championship trophies and a strong local and national following”(Cordes, 2014, para. 
30).   
 The addition of Nebraska also meant adding a championship game in football for the 
conference.  As cited above, doing so brought in more revenue for the conference, and it also 
impacted the brand of the conference by providing exposure on a weekend usually reserved for 
the other power five conferences.  A president interviewed for this study argued, “I think that the 
visibility and capacity for the championship game is, I think, as a whole, people would argue it 
was good for the conference” (Anonymous, personal communication, February 13, 2014).  Prior 
to this expansion, the Big Ten football season always concluded on Thanksgiving weekend, 
leaving the Big Ten brand out of sight for the more than a month between then and the start of 
the bowl season.  The COP/C viewed the additional television revenue and extended exposure of 
the championship game as a positive consequence for the Big Ten brand.   
 The conference members predicted that the addition of Nebraska would be positive for 
the Big Ten athletic brand.  The consequences, however, have been mixed.  Prior to the addition 
of Nebraska, the Big Ten was the only athletic conference in which all member institutions were 
also members of the prestigious AAU.  No other conference could make that claim, even the 
academically prestigious Ivy League (Abourezk, 2010).  Nebraska lost its AAU status a few 
months after being accepted into the Big Ten.  As stated above, the member institutions of the 
Big Ten pride themselves on their academic achievements and statuses as much as they do on 
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their tradition of athletic accomplishments.  Thus, Nebraska’s loss of AAU membership, as well 
as its drop in national rankings, after accepting the invitation to join the Big Ten negatively 
impacted the brand.  Interviewees, however, insisted that while AAU membership confirmed 
elite status, it was not required of Big Ten member institutions.  One president interviewed for 
this study clarified, “I wouldn’t say it wasn’t AAU membership explicitly.  It was schools of 
AAU membership or quality” (Anonymous, personal communication, November 25, 2013).  
As a result of Nebraska’s loss of AAU membership, the Big Ten could no longer tout the 
exclusive moniker across all of its member institutions.  Though this could certainly be viewed 
as a negative consequence for the Big Ten, the COP/C could not have seen this coming at the 
time of their invitation.  Further, the COP/C did not believe that Nebraska’s academic quality 
had changed.  “The discussion of Nebraska possibly losing their membership had not occurred in 
the AAU when discussions started on the athletic side,” remembered a president interviewed for 
this study.  The interviewee continues, “By the way I did not agree [with the decision to revoke 
the University of Nebraska’s AAU status]” (Anonymous, personal communication, November 
25, 2013).  In another interview for this study a president explained that it had never only been 
Nebraska’s AAU status that made the institution appealing academically, but also, “the factors of 
academics fit in terms of beyond AAU status such as international programs, breadth of 
programs, and areas of research remained” (Anonymous, personal communication, February 13, 
2014).  AAU was a shorthand for demonstrating quality, but not a requirement.  While others 
questioned Nebraska’s academic quality, the COP/C didn’t waiver.  A third president 
interviewed for this study reiterated, “at that time we extended the invitation, they were 
members, and one of the founding members I might add” (Anonymous, personal 
communication, June 21, 2014).  “We were curious as to why [Nebraska’s AAU status] was 
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changed,” one athletic director interviewed recalled, but ultimately, “We understood why and 
were not particularly bothered by it” (Anonymous, personal communication, April 30, 2014).   
The COP/C felt that Nebraska ranked as a quality academic institution when it accepted 
their application for membership.   US News and World Report releases rankings of institutions 
each year.  The process has its flaws but year-in-year-out institutions publicize their rankings in 
attempts to help promote their academic brands to consumers.  Prior to joining the Big Ten, the 
University of Nebraska was ranked 96th overall for national universities and 47th for public 
schools only in 2010.  In comparison, the Big Ten institutions ranged from 12th overall to 71st for 
national universities in 2010.  Over the five years since joining the conference Nebraska’s 
rankings have stayed steady, dropping as low as 101st overall and 49th for public schools and 
rising to 99th overall and 45th for public in the 2015 rankings.  The consistent rankings also 
suggest that the University of Nebraska’s academic quality had not changed even though their 
AAU status had.     
Conclusion 
 Chafee (1983) presented five criteria for examining an event through the rational 
decision-making model:  establishment of values and objectives, identification of suitable 
alternatives, centralization of decision-making, understanding of consequences, and 
maximization of value.  For this study the data presented found evidence of all of these criteria 
except for value maximization.  Through primary and secondary evidence, values and objectives 
were clearly identified.  The COP/C believed that the Big Ten was built on the values of 
academic quality, athletic quality, and collaborative culture.  The COP/C aimed to increase 
revenue and improve their brand’s public perception through conference expansion.  All 
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alternatives were discussed amongst the COP/C, and only institutions with a desire to join were 
considered.  The Big Ten commissioner and athletic directors played supporting roles in the 
decision-making process, but the COP/C was the central authority in the decision.  The COP/C 
understood the consequences, both positive and negative, that would follow the addition of 
Nebraska to the Big Ten Conference, but data was not found that supported whether or not the 
Big Ten maximized its value by ultimately choosing to extend an invitation to the University of 
Nebraska.   
 The next chapter will discuss the implications of this study by addressing three 
audiences: scholars, practitioners, and future researchers.   
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Chapter 5:  Discussion and Implications 
Overview 
College presidents and chancellors are faced with many financial decisions that impact 
their institutions across time in complex ways.  Operating costs and stakeholders’ needs are 
rising while state and government funding is on a steady decline.  Institutional leaders want to 
make their campuses more attractive to consumers by improving their brands.  Intercollegiate 
athletics is a vehicle institutions can use to do so.  Successful athletic programs can bring a level 
of national exposure to a university that no other entity can.  This kind of recognition is gained 
through success in two sports: Division I FBS football and men’s basketball.  The amount of 
revenue generated via big time athletics television contracts is staggering, but it is tied to 
conferences and not to individual institutions.  Thus, conference affiliation plays a pivotal role in 
the brand and exposure a university can receive.  The Power 5 conferences have been identified 
as the strongest brands and, compared to other conferences, distribute the largest revenues to 
their member institutions.  During a two-year period, from 2010 through 2012, seventy-seven 
institutions changed their conference affiliations.  This dissertation focused one conference and 
its members’ conference realignment decision-making process, using the rational decision-
making model as a framework, and thereby uncovered a variety of insights into the conference 
realignment process.  This concluding chapter summarizes the findings of this research and 
offers suggestions for future scholarship in the areas of higher education and intercollegiate 
athletics decision-making.   
Then and Now 
 The Big Ten Conference released a statement from the COP/C in December 2009 
announcing that the conference leaders would study opportunities for potential expansion of their 
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membership.  By June 2010, the University of Nebraska applied for membership and was 
accepted into the conference.  Twenty-six other conferences, and seventy-seven other 
institutions, experienced changes in membership between 2010 and 2012.  The decision-making 
process for conference realignment impacts institutions in many ways.  Brand, prestige, and 
revenue are the key areas conference membership decisions influence. Rudolph (1990) would 
likely not be surprised.  He argued that intercollegiate athletics and commercialism have been 
intertwined from as far back as the early 20th Century, thriving financially even during the Great 
Depression when so many other industries struggled.  This study reported similar findings where 
revenues and spending have continued to increase even coming off the Great Recession.   
For the first time in twenty years, The Big Ten decided to expand membership in 2010.  
The objectives and processes of the 2010 expansion and the earlier one were both similar and 
different.  When conference leaders accepted Penn State’s application in 1990, the focus of the 
decision-making process was academic fit, not revenue.  The landscape then was very different 
from what it was in 2010.  Conference championship games in football, conference television 
contracts, and conference networks did not exist at that time.  Media cycles were also different.  
The Big Ten made a public announcement that it would study expansion in 2010 because the 
presence of the 24/7 news cycle would have made it impossible to keep their consideration of 
expansion quiet.  With Penn State, the process started with a phone call from one president to 
another; whereas in 2010, the start of the process was less direct.  In both cases, the COP/C 
arrived at their decision through a vote, and both times Big Ten presidents sustained a collegial 
effort to work together.  In 2010, this collaboration also included athletic directors.  The 
conference presented a unanimous front when announcing Nebraska’s acceptance, but with Penn 
State, publicly endured criticism from then current members, three of whom had voted against 
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the expansion.  In both cases, conference leadership demonstrated a commitment to discussion of 
alternatives amongst all of the decision-makers.  Both expansions maintained the geographic 
footprint of the Big Ten while building on the conference’s value of athletic tradition.  On the 
surface, the Big Ten’s expansion in 2013 seems to have been driven by different factors again.  
Maryland and Rutgers added television markets by expanding the footprint to new regions with 
large populations, but did not contribute to the conference’s tradition of a strong athletic brand.    
As higher education continues to move further and further into the marketplace (Rudolph, 
1990), intercollegiate athletics, through conference memberships, leads the way.  Major events 
have moved the focus of brands from single institutions to conferences.  The Supreme Court’s 
decision in Oklahoma vs. NCAA, the addition of Penn State to the Big Ten, the birth of the SEC 
championship game, the introduction of the Big Ten Network, and the recent wave of conference 
realignment have transitioned the center of power from the NCAA and individual institutions to 
the conferences.  This series of events culminated in proposed NCAA legislation that will give 
autonomy to the power five conferences, allowing them to provide more financial benefits to 
their student-athletes.  Leaders argue that the rationale for doing so is to improve the welfare of 
student-athletes, but the ability to do so is a direct result of the growth of the commercial 
enterprise known as college athletics; in response, student-athletes have gone as far as to create 
unions and file lawsuits in order to receive a piece of their institutions’ financial windfall.  
Nearly a hundred years ago, Howard Savage and Abraham Flexnor criticized the same 
commercial values and negligent attitude towards academics that has fueled current critiques of 
the treatment of student-athletes in a highly commercialized arena.   
The prevailing theme during the history of intercollegiate athletics has been the 
movement towards professionalization of student-athletes.  Recent proposals of cost of 
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attendance, pay-for-play, and unlimited meals, and acts by student-athletes at private institutions 
to consider unionization all mirror the professional model seen in the four major professional 
sport leagues in North America.  Institutions in higher education are moving more and more to 
professionalization of the student-athlete.  The tension between academic values and athletics 
keeps growing as financial commitments for athletic programs increase.  The question one may 
ask is should institutions consider breaking from the traditional student-athlete ideal and look at 
creating a new model that focuses on strictly developing the individual’s athletic skills rather 
than academic ones as well.  An extreme alternative could be the institution that strictly pays 
athletes to come to their campus, work and develop their athletic skills, and represent the 
institution in competition.   
The Division I membership could split into two different groups, those that follow the 
traditional model and those that choose the apprentice, or professional one.  Institutions that 
choose the traditional could scale back the emphasis on athletics and promote an experience that 
offers an education as well as the opportunity to participate in athletics.  The other side would 
identify athletic talent and offer the opportunity to come to campus and spend all their time 
honing their craft, just as an apprentice would do.  In this scenario, athletes would not attend 
classes and work on their development with the only goal being to make a living as a 
professional athlete.  In theory, the professional model would attract the best athletes, best 
coaches, and offer the best resources.  Institutions would spend more but could potentially 
receive more in revenue from television contracts and media sponsorships.  Institutional leaders 
would have to discuss with their campus leaders and make a decision on which model fits their 
values and objectives and where do they want to spend their money.  Is academics most 
important?  Is it athletics?  Is it a combination of both?  Essentially, leaders would need to define 
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their culture.  This study found, that in the Big Ten, while members valued and based objectives 
for expansion on financial revenues, they also focused on academic and athletic achievements.  
The pursuit of excellence in both areas is rooted deeply in the culture of this conference.     
Summary of Findings 
Question One:  Who is involved in the decision-making process? What factors led leadership to 
the decision that conference realignment was necessary? 
 
 With the large number of institutions changing conference affiliation within a three year 
time period, the primary inquiry of this study centered on the questions of who was involved in 
these decisions and what factors led these decision-makers to believe that conference 
realignment was necessary.  The rational decision-making model (Chaffee, 1983) framed the 
analysis of the process that the Big Ten Conference and its members used in making their 
decision.  Conference realignment is sensitive in nature and is best done away from the media 
spotlight, a reality challenged by the need for numerous people to be involved in order to reach 
agreement across a group of institutions, forcing numerous people to be involved.      
 The findings from this case study reveal that, consistent with Chaffee’s rational model, 
the Council of Presidents/Chancellors (COP/C) were the central authoritative decision-makers 
even though they they used their human resources (i.e. conference commissioner and athletic 
directors) to help educate and guide them through the decision-making process.  The culture of 
an organization significantly informs the decision-making process especially in a complex 
organization with multiple partners, like intercollegiate conferences.  Hill and Kikulis (1999) 
used the Bradford Studies model to evaluate a conference decision made by institutional leaders 
and argued those that have power control the decision.  Their study argued that the rules of the 
game were more important than the people involved since conference bylaws dictate that those in 
power make the decisions.  This case study found, though, that since collaboration and resource-
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sharing are embedded in Big Ten culture, political battles for votes is not as important as it was 
in the institutions Hill and Kikulis studied.  In the Big Ten, the COP/C want to make a decision 
that is best for all and not just for those in power.  The conference announced in December 2009 
that they would conduct a 12-18 month study of conference expansion, seeking out and 
examining the various factors that would help them determine if expansion was the right thing to 
do for the group as a whole.  Ultimately, the potentials for increasing the revenue and improving 
the conference’s brand led the COP/C to the decision that conference realignment was not only 
the best decision for the future of the institutions and the Big Ten’s status as one of the elite 
conferences in intercollegiate athletics, but was actually necessary.       
Question Two:  What is the rationale for the process used to identify options, discuss them, and 
decide on whom to invite?  How did leadership gather information on prospective institutions?  
What were the criteria for consideration? Who established these criteria?  How was information 
about prospective institutions shared? What influence did outside sources have on the process?   
 
 Since it was evident that conference leaders were willing to leave geographical rivalries 
and other traditions behind, the second inquiry sought information on the process of identifying 
the desired criteria for potential institutions and how those discussions among conference 
members evolved.   Following Chaffee’s model, leadership first clarified the values most 
important to the current members.  The Big Ten Conference was founded on the shared belief 
that it was better to work together than alone.  The leaders identified academic and athletic 
quality and willingness to exist in a culture of sharing as the values that define the conference’s 
culture.  Potential institutions had to meet these requirements to be even considered for 
evaluation.  Sweitzer (2009) argues that institutions are concerned with competing with similar, 
or peer, institutions, that proximity is no longer as important as it was in the past.  The findings 
in this case study support Sweitzer’s assertion.  The COP/C were more concerned with academic 
and athletic excellence and cultural fit than they were with whether or not a school was located 
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nearby member institutions.  The only concerns about location were revenue-oriented, 
specifically, concern over how location correlates with demographics and television subscribers.     
 The COP/C relied on the conference commissioner and his staff, as well as a consulting 
firm, to gather information on the landscape of intercollegiate athletics and on the impact 
annexing certain regions would have on television revenue and brand exposure.  Discussions 
were held via conference calls that sometimes would take several rounds in order to pass along 
data and share opinions across all member institutions.  All members of the COP/C participated 
in the discussions, some more so than others.  In addition to values-oriented criteria, an 
institution to be considered an acceptable candidate had to possess an individual brand that 
would increase conference revenue. The COP/C had the final say on which institution to invite, 
but relied heavily on the opinions they requested from the commissioner and their athletic 
directors.  The other stakeholders (i.e. student-athletes, alumni, faculty, television networks, and 
coaches) did not influence the decision process. Chaffee’s rational model calls for an 
understanding of consequences among decision-makers, and the COP/C did evaluate prospective 
institutions based on whether or not they possessed the high academic and athletic quality 
common among current Big Ten institutions as well as on their willingness to join the culture of 
the Big Ten.   
Thus, the data presented demonstrates that the COP/C took a rational approach in the 
2010 expansion decision.  Contrary to what Keeney (2012) reports, the decision-makers 
interviewed in this case study did not rely on intuition, but rather on defined values and 
objectives.       
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Question Three:  What are the steps for making a final decision as to which institution(s) to 
invite?  What were the deciding factors or criteria for selecting an institution for invitation?  
What was the process for determining the number of institutions to invite?   
 
 After the COP/C defined their values and identified their objectives for expansion, the 
next step was evaluating institutions against their values and objectives in order to determine 
whom to invite.  Eisenhardt and Zbaracki (1992) reviewed the research literature on rational 
decision-making model and argue that there are cognitive limits on the applicability of the 
model.  However, in this case study, there were a limited number of institutions that were 
acceptable candidates for Big Ten membership.  These confined parameters for prospective 
institutions made it possible for Big Ten decision-makers to consider all possible alternatives.  
According to media reports (Garcia, 2010; Greenstein, 2010a; Longman, 2010; Thamel, 2010), 
the list of potential institutions included University of Texas (UT), Notre Dame, University of 
Missouri (Mizzou), and University of Pittsburgh (Pitt) to name a few.  The COP/C held 
discussions to talk about potential institutions and the extent to which each of them matched the 
profile of an ideal conference member.  These schools had to possess strong academics and 
successful athletic programs.  Finally it was imperative that the new member(s) express a 
willingness to join the Big Ten and to operate in a culture of sharing and working together.      
 Knowing the values and objectives the COP/C had established I can revisit the decision 
and speculate if the other realistic alternatives listed above would have met the Big Ten leaders 
goals for expansion.   UT, Mizzou, and Pitt are all members of the AAU, thus possessing the 
code of quality the COP/C were looking for.  Notre Dame, while not a member of the AAU, is 
consistently ranked in the top 20 institutions in the country by U.S. News and World Report and 
possesses the academic reputation.  When it comes to athletic quality, Notre Dame and UT are 
considered football royality (like Nebraska) and have strong athletic programs across the board 
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in all their sports.  Mizzou and Pitt, while members of a Power 5 conference, are not considered 
on the same level as a Notre Dame or UT.   
As for the objectives of the COP/C, increase revenue and brand, Notre Dame and UT 
could do both while I speculate Pitt and Mizzou would not increase the brand nor revenue.  Notre 
Dame is a brand all to itself, evident from their ability to remain and independent all these years 
in football and have an exclusive contract with NBC for fifteen years.  UT is strong brand that is 
recognized all over the country while Pitt and Mizzou are both strong in their respective regions, 
but not on a national scope.  With regards to revenue, adding the 12th member would increase 
conference revenue for simple fact the Big Ten could sell the rights to a conference football 
championship game.  Beyond that initial increase, however, Notre Dame and UT would increase 
the Big Ten’s overall revenue because of their brand awareness mentioned earlier.  UT’s location 
would also increase revenue.  The Big Ten footprint would be expanding into a new region, the 
southwest, which means more cable subscribers for the Big Ten Network and bigger television 
contract with the networks.  The addition of Pitt would not add any new cable subscribers due to 
being in same state as Penn State.  Mizzou would expand the Big Ten footprint, thus adding new 
cable subscribers, but the state does not have a large population when compared to Texas and the 
latest demographic reports show a stagnant population growth for the Midwest, including 
Missouri.   
All the schools fit the academic criteria, and do meet the athletic quality, although Notre 
Dame and UT clearly more so than Pitt and Mizzou.   Only Notre Dame and UT  could likely 
contribute significantly to conference objectives.  The final piece is do they demonstrate 
willingness to participate in the Big Ten’s collaborative culture.  Notre Dame and UT have 
strong academics and athletics and have strong brands that would increase conference revenue.  
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UT, however, did not have an interest in sharing resources and collaborating with conference 
members.  At the time of these expansion talks, UT had just received the blessing of the Big 12 
to create its very own network, the Longhorn Network.  Notre Dame had been pursued by the 
Big Ten conference a few other times in the past but was never willing to give up its own 
television rights and share revenue.  Both Notre Dame and UT did not have a desire to join the 
Big Ten and participate in the collaborative, sharing culture when they already had situations that 
allowed them to pursue all the revenue each could demand and keep for their institution.  Pitt and 
Mizzou did have a desire to join due to the instability of their conferences at that time and overall 
revenue being generated in the Big Ten.  Pitt was a member of the Big East and the league 
revenue was significantly lower than the Big Ten was distributing amongst its members.  
Mizzou was a member of the Big 12 which was also experiencing instability.  Rumors 
were swirling the league might lose up to six institutions to the PAC 10.  The Big Ten and SEC 
were also considering potential members.  Mizzou wanted stability and bigger revenues, 
something Big Ten could offer.  Mizzou would have been willing to join the culture of the 
conference and did have a desire to do so.  In the end, the Big Ten did not have an interest in 
Mizzou nor Pitt because neither met the objectives given by the COP/C.  Notre Dame and UT 
did fit the academic and athletic criteria.  They both would have been huge additions to the 
overall brand of the Big Ten and had big impacts on future conference television revenue, but 
neither had a desire nor would have fit the culture that defines the Big Ten.  Pitt and Mizzou, on 
the other hand, would have met the academic and athletic quality, neither would have increased 
brand awareness nor overall revenue in big picture.  It is safe to say both Pitt and Mizzou  would 
have been willing to join in resource-sharing and collaboration with the Big Ten and willing to 
do so at a reduced percentage of allocated revenue for the first six years of their membership. 
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Unfortunately for these two institutions their lack of brand awareness would have meant small 
revenue increases in the next round of television contract negotiations.  Thus, none of these four 
potential institutions would have ended the    
Nebraska, as mentioned in the data, did meet all the values and objectives and was 
willing to join the Big Ten, even at a partial revenue share for the first six years.  The importance 
of a school willing to forgo receiving its full revenue share during the transitional period cannot 
be overstated.  Nebraska’s willingness to do so allowed revenue the time to catch up with 
member expansion, thereby avoiding any decrease in the current members’ share.  With regard to 
the number of institutions to invite some interviewees wanted more than one and others wanted 
to take a conservative approach and only add one, if any at all.  In the end, the conservative 
approach won out because, as stated above, doing so gave time for the impact on revenue to be 
evaluated as well as limited options that fit all the values and met the objectives.        
Implications for Intercollegiate Athletics 
Athletics is like the front porch of a house to an institution of higher education because it 
provides a first impression on a national scale.  The national exposure athletic teams brings to 
their respective institutions is unparalleled by any academic accomplishments.  Institutional 
leaders, however, value perception more than research when it comes to making decisions about 
intercollegiate athletics.  They rationalize investment in athletics, building successful programs 
on the field, by arguing that obtaining prestigious conference affiliation can improve institutional 
rankings.  The six participants in this study valued conference affiliation and admired the 
Nebraska brand.  The data revealed that they all believed that adding an institution with a 
national brand would add to the overall prestige of their conference, thus improving their 
individual institutions’ brands.  Sweitzer (2009) reported the same beliefs among leaders when 
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examining the ACC expansion in 2004. However, the institutional rankings for Nebraska before 
and after joining the Big Ten show that conference affiliation did not enhance the reputation of 
any of the current Big Ten members nor Nebraska. In US News and World Report rankings, the 
conference members were all ranked in the top 75 prior to 95th-ranked Nebraska’s entrance into 
the conference.  Since joining the conference, Nebraska’s rankings have consistently dropped, 
ranging from a drop to 96 to 101.  Other members of the Big Ten have remained steady, not 
changed more than a position or two in their rankings.   
     Abbey, Capaldi, and Lombardi (2011), however, found that even though financial 
issues drive realignment among the power 5 conferences, the quality of an athletic conference 
did help institutions create and sustain the reputations for high quality valued by alumni and 
students. Abbey, Calpaldi, and Lombardi ranked the Big Ten first in academic distinction 
followed by the PAC 12.  The nine measures used to evaluate institutions, however, were not 
connected to intercollegiate athletics nor to conference affiliation.  And yet, stakeholders 
continue to believe that an institution’s reputation is influenced by conference affiliation.    The 
prevailing theme across studies is the myth that conference affiliation influences an institution’s 
academic reputation even though empirical evidence has not been found to support that notion. 
An athletic department cannot change an institution’s academic reputation, but what 
about its brand?  Athletics provides consumers on a national scale a look inside an institution.  
Through cable television, football and men’s basketball at the Division I level can introduce a 
national audience to institution, reaching potential students beyond the regional population that 
may already be familiar with that institution.  Conference affiliation takes branding possibilities a 
step further by promoting the success of all its members together rather than providing exposure 
to just one institution.  One institution may not have a strong tradition in athletics or may be in a 
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down cycle over a period of years, but there is strength in numbers, and affiliation with a strong 
conference brand can carry an institution through unsuccessful years.  The Big Ten Network’s 
continuous rise in revenue evidences the power of group branding.   Cable television provides 
the programming space that allows conferences to package themselves together and promote 
their single brand twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.   
Decision-Making in Conference Realignment 
During a two and half year time period (from June 2010 through December 2012) one in 
every four institutions at the Division 1 level changed conference affiliation.  Since conference 
affiliation does impact the brand of an institution, the strategies of the decision-making process 
are important to understand.  Hill and Kikulis (1999) examined decision-making within 
conference realignment in Canada.  While the intercollegiate athletics contexts in Canada and the 
United States are different, I found similarities, as well as the expected differences, between the 
decision-making processes described in their study and those of the Big Ten.  The findings of 
this dissertation echo Hill and Kikulis’ discovery of organizational culture’s influence on 
conference realignment.  Using the Bradford Studies as a framework, the Canadian conference 
realignment decision-making process they described was influenced more by the rules of the 
game than by contextual complexity and politics.  In other words, conference bylaws, which 
stated that a majority vote determines whether or not the conference members realigned 
essentially dictated the outcome: those in favor of realignment were the majority, thus had power 
in the decision.  The culture of the organization, or in this case conference, was one where 
members took sides and maneuvered in ways that allowed them to gain the outcomes they 
desired.  In contrast, in the Big Ten, there is a culture of collegiality and sharing.  Issues are 
discussed openly and inclusively, and the decisions are made that are best not just for a particular 
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sub-group of institutions, but the conference as a whole.  Thus, though both studies found 
different cultures existing among conference members, in both cases, the overall culture of an 
organization played a large role in defining the decision-making process.  Whether it is an 
imbalance in power or a collegial atmosphere, organizational culture is a key component in the 
decision-making process.  Though this case study used Chaffee’s rational decision-making 
model to examine the decision process of Big Ten leaders, Chaffee did not directly reference 
organization culture as an essential feature of an application of the rational decision-making 
model.  I now turn to the implications of this study on understandings of the rational decision-
making model.   
Implications on the Rational Decision-Making Model 
 The rational decision-making model is typically used in economics and political science 
and rarely in higher education.  The origins of the rational decision-making model trace back to 
March and Simon (1958).  Their description of the model stated that the actors entered into a  
decision knowing the objectives and the cost-benefit value for all alternatives.  After collecting 
all the information on all of the alternatives, the actors choose the optimal alternative.  The 
findings in Big Ten Conference expansion decision process align with this contention in part, 
given that the actors (i.e. presidents) entered the realignment decision only after establishing 
their values and objectives. However, while the presidents could speculate on cost-benefits of 
alternative institutions, such as the projected financial consequences for adding a national brand 
like Nebraska in comparison to the consequences for adding another, those speculations could 
not be definitively confirmed.   
Leaders of the Big Ten could project revenue increases based on future television 
contracts, since adding a championship game in football would change the terms of future deals 
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with networks.  As in many areas in higher education, though, there are too many moving parts, 
or independent variables, to allow for certainty in financial predictions for institutions, or in this 
case, for a conference.  The populations within the Big Ten’s geographic footprint are not 
increasing, and esteem in which the national audiences hold Big Ten athletics, particularly for 
the conferences’ two major sports, football and men’s basketball, has been on a downslide for 
many years now.  Over the last twenty years, the conference has had only three national 
champions in football (Michigan-1997 and Ohio State-2002 & 2015), and competed only once in 
the national title game (Ohio State – 2006) in the eleven years preceding their appearance this 
year, 2015.  The Big Ten’s statistics in national championships in men’s basketball are even 
lower, with Michigan State in 2000 the only conference member to win in the last twenty-five 
years.  Though the Big Ten brand is valuable, it is worth noting that national audiences do not 
consider the conference the best among the Power 5.  The point here to take away is that it is 
difficult for the decision-makers to predict with absolute certainty the costs and benefits of 
conference realignment due to circumstances and trends beyond their control; that said, leaders 
have demonstrated a willingness to investment in a brand of a conference that has stood the test 
of time.  Nebraska last won a national championship in football in 1995, and they played for 
another in 2001.  Their men’s basketball team has never competed for a national championship.  
The Nebraska brand, though, boasts stability, tradition, and a loyal fan base, and so the Big Ten 
leaders chose to invest in it for those qualities rather than for the guaranteed financial figures 
associated with adding larger television markets than Nebraska’s.      
 Simon (1976) listed the same steps in rational decision-making as March and Simon 
(1958) but he argued that it was impossible for decision-makers to know all alternatives or all 
consequences.  The data from this dissertation supports the assertion of the impossibility of 
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foreseeing all consequences, but disproves the impossibility of knowing all alternatives.  The Big 
Ten could not foresee all consequences; for example, they did not expect the revocation of 
Nebraska’s AAU status. When it came to identifying all alternatives, however, adherence to 
March and Simon’s model was possible.  Across intercollegiate athletics conferences, there are a 
limited number of institutions that can either move from one Power 5 conference to another or 
make the jump from a lower conference up to a Power 5 conference.  Though there are obviously 
other schools that participate in Division I athletics outside of conferences, their budgets, 
revenues, and facilities do not allow them to be considered realistic alternatives for Power 5 
conference membership.  This case found that alternatives could be exhaustively identified by 
eliminating from consideration those institutions that do not meet the values and objectives of the 
decision-makers.   
 More recently, Eisenhardt and Zbaracki (1992) reviewed the literature on the rational 
decision-making model and found empirical evidence to support cognitive limits to the model.  
They argued that it is not possible for humans to engage in a comprehensive search for all 
alternatives.  The case study on the Big Ten Conference expansion, however, proves that it is 
possible to perform a comprehensive search when there exist a finite number of established 
options.  Through following the initial steps of identifying the values of the conference and 
objectives for realignment, it became possible to narrow the list of possible alternatives for 
consideration for membership.  Allison and Zelikow (1999) would likely agree with this finding.  
They defined rationality as making a consistent, value-maximizing choice within specified 
constraints.  Specified constraints make it possible to review all realistic alternative choices.  
 There are four steps to Allison and Zelikow’s rational decision-making model.  The 
decision maker(s) identify the values and objectives for the organization, choose acceptable 
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candidates among all candidates, perform cost-benefit analysis of each choice, and determine the 
candidate that brings in the highest benefits as defined by their values and objectives.  Allison 
and Zelikow frame their four steps by their definition of rationality.  The concept of specified 
constraints did emerge in the findings from this study of the Big Ten Conference realignment 
decision process; the decision to add Nebraska was aligned with consistent values among current 
members as well as Nebraska.  Data was not found, though, that definitively supported that 
Nebraska was the value-maximizing choice.  
If evidence for Nebraska’s value maximization is based on bringing additional revenue to 
the conference there are many facts to consider.  First, adding any twelfth member automatically 
increased conference revenue by the addition of a conference championship game in football.  
Further specifics on potential revenue increase would have required the COP/C having 
information on the impact each potential alternative would have on future television contract 
negotiations, but due to the public attention conference realignment brings, it would have been 
neither contractually possible, nor wise, for the COP/C to have these discussions with networks.  
First, all the Power 5 conferences have contracts with networks and therefore the networks 
would have been in violation of their contracts had they discussed with the Big Ten the potential 
revenue impact of adding a team from another conference.  Further, it becomes a slippery slope 
when institutions start making conference affiliation decisions based on the advice of networks.  
Arguably, intercollegiate athletics is already commercialized enough, and by relinquishing 
scheduling to the networks conferences would also lose control of the culture of the organization. 
Findings from this study revealed the influence of Big Ten culture on the conference realignment 
decision-making process.  The culture of the Big Ten is a collegial one in which all revenue is 
shared equally, academic resources are communal, and issues are discussed inclusively.  Third 
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party control over membership decisions would negatively disrupt the culture of the 
organization. The next section will discuss the implications this study has on Chaffee’s rational 
decision-making model.   
Implications on Chaffee’s Model 
 Chaffee called for more research into decision-making in higher education nearly thirty 
years ago.  This case study examines collaborative decision-making at the highest level across 
several institutions.  Chaffee believes the rational decision-making model can be used in higher 
education and presents the essential criteria for doing so.  Definition of values and objectives, 
identification of possible alternatives, centralization of decision-making, understanding of 
consequences, and the selection of the value-maximizing option are the five criteria Chaffee puts 
forth for testing the extent to which a decision made reflect the rational model.  Findings from 
this study both support and challenge these criteria, making it possible to offer a revised model 
for consideration.   
Values.  To begin with, a clear set of values and objectives is a must.  The findings from this 
study support Chaffee’s work on values and objectives.  The presidential leaders in the Big Ten 
have a clear set of values for their conference.  The simultaneous pursuit of academic and 
athletic excellence exist within a culture of sharing and collaboration.  These three values, 
academic excellence, athletic achievement, and collegiality, led to the formation of this first 
intercollegiate athletic conference and have guided it to its positioned as one of the leaders in 
college athletics.  Without a clear set of values, it would be difficult for leader(s) to steer an 
organization toward a decision that worked for the stakeholders affected by the decision.   
 In a higher education setting, values can differ from one institution to the next dependent 
on many factors such as location, size, mission, or tradition.  Alumni, faculty, administration, 
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and student population hold institutions and the values associated with them dearly.  The rational 
decision-making model is well suited to this setting because it guides leaders to decisions based 
on those deeply rooted beliefs.  This is never more evident than the Big Ten Conference where 
eleven institutions are connected and share common characteristics, and yet, each school has 
unique traditions that set it apart from the others.  Among conference leaders, a focus on their 
common values allows them to pinpoint the objectives for conference expansion that will benefit 
the group as a whole, and not just a group of institutions or one single institution.       
Objectives.  The values provide the decision-maker with the criteria, or requirements, for 
potential alternative solutions.  Values-aligned objectives further help to identify the best 
alternative.  In conference realignment, the COP/C aimed for increased stability and continued 
stability. With spending needs continuing to rise at alarming rates for athletic departments in the 
Power 5, it is imperative the current members not lose revenue after conference realignment as a 
result of allowing more hands into the pie, so to speak.  In order to pursue academic and athletic 
excellence while sharing all revenue evenly across members, the COP/C knew that upon 
expansion, the revenue must increase more than $22.8 million, the amount of each individual 
institution’s share in 2010-11.  Institutional leaders, as a group, would not agree to add a new 
member if it meant taking a cut in conference revenue.  This objective is not just common to 
intercollegiate athletics in the higher education landscape.  Across higher education, at all levels, 
funding has become the issue that drives almost all decisions.  State funding has decreased at a 
steady rate and institutional leaders must be financially prudent in their decisions.  Making 
values-aligned, fiscally-responsible decisions is a shared emphasis across campuses, and an 
objective that allows decision-makers to narrow their lists of alternatives.  
	   	   	  
	  
	  127	  
Chaffee argues that it is not enough for an organization to have a clear set of values and 
objectives.  The rational decision-making model also calls for stability and predictability in the 
organization’s atmosphere.  The findings from this study support Chaffee’s assertion.  The Big 
Ten leaders value for their group’s culture provides a stable and predictable environment for its 
members.  The consistent foundation of values allowed Big Ten presidents to cultivate an 
environment that is not present within other conferences.  At a time when so many conferences 
are adding and losing members, the Big Ten used the stability of their membership, finances, and 
culture to attract alternatives, such as Nebraska, from the unpredictability associated with other 
conferences.  A stable group, or organization, possessing a clear set of values and objectives can 
then name potential alternatives that provide solutions to the decision.   
Alternatives.  According to Chaffee (1983), another essential feature for the rational decision-
making model is the simultaneous consideration of all possible solutions. The findings from the 
Big Ten Conference realignment exemplified this feature.  A criticism of the rational decision-
making model is the cognitive inability for humans to consider all alternatives, but a key word in 
Chaffee’s feature is “possible.”  Using the literal definition of possible would mean looking at all 
intercollegiate athletic programs, but it can also be interpreted as only alternatives that are 
possible, or realistic.  In a vacuum, it would be nice to consider all solutions, but reality dictates 
that some solutions can be removed from consideration immediately.  The COP/C was not going 
to consider every institution that had an athletic program because of the minimum financial 
commitment it takes to compete at the highest level in Division I.  Another factor in identifying 
realistic options was the academic reputation of potential institutions.  The Big Ten leaders were 
able to dismiss potential institutions without quality of faculty, research and resources, or student 
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profiles.  The values the COP/C identified allowed the decision-makers to eliminate unrealistic 
solutions.     
The elimination of unrealistic alternatives is a feature of a revised rational decision-
making model that can apply to decisions in different areas of higher education and not just 
intercollegiate athletics.  Deans making decisions as to which curricula to offer, and strategic 
planning committees considering locations for new facilities are just two examples.  A 
department cannot add a curriculum if there is not a demand for it, faculty to teach it, or the 
resources and facilities support it.  A strategic planning committee cannot recommend building 
new facilities if the sizes of spaces available to the institution cannot accommodate additional 
facilities. The Big Ten Conference leaders model this systematic way of making collaborative 
decisions early on in their process by announcing that they would study conference expansion 
across the intercollegiate landscape.  Doing so gave them the opportunity to identify and focus 
on rational alternatives for potential membership in the conference.   
Centralization of Decision-Making.  The next criterion in Chaffee’s rational decision-making 
model is the centralization of decision-making.  Essential features of this criterion are 
consistency and identified participants.  The findings from this study support Chaffee’s claim.  
The Big Ten Conference has a tradition of stability in its membership and of setting standards for 
academic and athletic excellence.  The institutions all share a commitment to equal allocation of 
revenue, to working as a collaborative group and to sharing resources; thus, together they foster a 
culture where concerns are discussed amongst all members and decisions are consistent with 
group vales and objectives.  
 Identification of decision-makers is the other component of the centralization of decision-
making that Chaffee calls essential.  Again, the findings from the Big Ten realignment study 
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support this claim.  As with the Bradford Studies model used by Hill and Kikulis (1999), the 
rules of the game had the biggest influence on the Big Ten’s decision.  The Big Ten conference 
bylaws recognize the COP/C as the final authority on all matters pertaining to conference 
membership. That said, the COP/C welcomed input from the conference office and from their 
athletic directors.  The presidents’ collective high regard for the conference commissioner and 
the working group of athletic directors helped the COP/C feel confident that it was receiving all 
the data necessary for informing their decision.  Due to the public attention conference 
realignment receives at the Division I level, leadership recognized that it could not include others 
on campus, such as faculty athletic representatives and institutional governing boards. Limiting 
those involved in the decision-making process also created less opportunity for information to 
leak out to the media, thus protecting the brand of the conference and of the prospective 
institutions they evaluated from potential revelation that a prospective declined Big Ten interest 
or that the Big Ten decided not to extend an invitation to an interested institution.   
Prior to the Big Ten’s announcement in December 2009 that it would study conference 
expansion alternatives, there was speculation several times in the past that the conference had 
made overtures to Notre Dame and that Notre Dame had walked away from those discussions.  
No conference or institution benefits from public knowledge that it was left at the altar, so to 
speak, or spurned for another. During the time period of focus for this case study, the media 
suggested that the University of Texas was a potential alternative, and indeed that institution 
possessed strong academic and athletic programs and would have likely increase revenue and 
brand exposure while maintaining conference stability, but UT was not a good cultural fit.  Texas 
was already having talks about creating its own network and did not share Big Ten institutions’ 
belief that all conference revenue should be distributed equally.  Despite rumors, the Big Ten 
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Conference chose to work privately, keeping private all internal discussions and discussions with 
potential.  Notre Dame and the University of Texas were potential, realistic alternatives for Big 
Ten Conference realignment but did not fit the Big Ten culture like Nebraska did.  
Understanding the Consequences.  Chafee’s next essential feature of the rational decision-
making model is a method for assessing choices by the extent to which produces results that 
match the organization’s values and objectives.  In order to make the best choice possible, 
decision-makers must be able to evaluate and predict the expected consequences for each 
alternative.  This study supports this part of Chaffee’s model. The COP/C understood the 
consequences of extending a membership invitation to potential institutions.  The data from this 
study of conference realignment showed that the COP/C anticipated alternatives’ impacts on the 
conference revenue and brand.   
 As discussed earlier it was not possible for the Big Ten Conference and its leaders to 
engage in conversations with television networks on the potential impact certain institutions 
would have on future contract negotiations.  The COP/C could, though, look at the population of 
an alternative’s region and figure the increase of additional television subscribers.  For example, 
in 2010, the US Census reported a population of 1.8 million in Nebraska.  Adding this alternative 
would not significantly increase the number of subscribers to the Big Ten Network.  The 
conference could infer, however, based on numbers from other conference championship games, 
that with the expansion of the conference to twelve members and the addition of a football 
conference championship game, they could expect an increase of anywhere from $15 to $20 
million a year (Mandel, 2009; Ourand & M., 2010a).  This was additional revenue that could 
help in maintaining each member’s yearly revenue share.  Adding only one additional member to 
the conference also meant that the revenue only needed to grow by one share, rather than three or 
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four if more members were added.  It was safer for the COP/C to add only one institution since it 
could not obtain information on the impact expansion would have on television contracts.  This 
allowed them to find an institution that matched in academic and athletic prowess while also 
increasing revenue and maintaining stability in membership.  The other decision that allowed the 
COP/C feel assured that revenue for each institution would increase or at least stay the same was 
their implementation of a six-year revenue integration plan with a new member. Nebraska took 
in $14.3 million in their first year in the Big Ten, $10 million less than the other eleven 
members, but $5 million more than Nebraska had received in its last year in the Big 12.  Using 
an integration method ensured that revenue would increase and allowed for the increase in 
television contracts to come to fruition.  The decision-makers had a method for assessing the 
number of alternatives to consider and the impact on generated revenue each of them would 
likely have.     
 The second consequence under COP/C examination was the impact that expansion would 
have on the Big Ten brand.  Chaffee, as stated earlier, calls for a method for comparing the 
results that each choice would produce.  When it comes to impact on brand, there is not tangible 
evidence that can guarantee one way or the other the impact a new institution will have on the 
brand of a conference.  When it comes to brand, decision-makers have to make an educated 
guess based on past performance.  Its similiarities in academic and athletic reputations did help 
to make Nebraska an appealing choice, but the driving reason for inviting Nebraska was the 
recognition of its remarkable football tradition.  Nebraska football has sold-out all home football 
games for fifty-three consecutive years, and for many, Nebraska is symnomonous with football 
royality.  However, its success on the field is mostly from a time long ago.  Nebraska last won a 
national championship in football in 1995 and last competed for one in 2001.  The COP/C could 
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not predict the future success of Nebraska football, but the long-standing tradition and loyal 
support associated with the Nebraska brand suggested that it was a safe investment for the 
COP/C to make.  Groza (2010) did find in his research that a change in conference affiliation 
influenced game day attendance, but with Nebraska only playing four road games in conference 
a year, the impact was difficult for the COP/C to predict.  Futher, there are too many variables 
that can impact attendance, such as weather, day of the game, and time to name a few.   
In a different context, brand evaluation works similarly.  In the business sector, 
companies make agreements and mergers for financial reasons but also so that a group can gain a 
new affiliation with a strong brand to help build the perception of their own brand on a national 
landscape.  Overall, the data from this study supports Chaffee’s call for a method of assessing the 
potential impact of alternatives, but in some cases it is not always possible to do so with 
guarantees.  The final criteria in Chaffee’s model for the rational decision-making model is even 
harder to evaluate.   
Value Maximizing Choice.  The final criteria in Chaffee’s test for the rational decision-making 
model is the selection of the value-maximizing choice.  This essential feature demands an 
evaluation of the match after the decision is made.  This study did not find data to support 
whether or not the decision made was the best choice.  In order to do this the decision-makers 
would have to be able to show the impact each other realistic alternative would have had on 
revenue and brand, as determined by performance on the field.  A major flaw in this speculative 
process, however , is the outcomes would have been different for each alternative had they been 
invited to join the Big Ten because each would then have been competing against different teams 
than the ones they did.  It is therefore not possible to compare the impact Nebraska did have on 
the revenue and brand of the Big Ten to other institutions that were considered in realignment.  
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This feature of the rational decision-making model would likely also be difficult to evaluate in 
other contexts where there are multiple variables impacting the evaluation measures.  In the 
decision-making process, if the alternatives all operate or work in a controlled or under precise 
conditions, then they could be retroactively evaluated in comparison to one another, but not 
many of these situations exist.   
 Decision-makers can, however, determine afterwards whether or not the results of a 
decision met the desired objectives.  In this case, the Big Ten leaders were able to confirm later  
that the addition of Nebraska did indeed meet their objectives.  Immediately, in the first few 
years since the decision to invite Nebraska, the Big Ten members have seen a 44% increase in 
conference revenue distribution, going from $18.7 million per member in 2007-08 to $27 million 
in 2013-14.  Projections show those figures only continuing to rise in the future, but it is 
impossible to compute with certainty that these figures are the highest that they could have gone 
because of multiple, independent factors influencing outcomes.  This is a flaw in Chaffee’s 
rational decision-making model.  Rather than ask if the choice made had the best results in 
comparison to what-if scenarios, it would be more reasonable to evaluate whether or not the 
decision made met the objectives listed at the beginning of the process.  In this way, the criteria 
used by Chaffee should be modified.   
Revised Criteria for Rational Decision-Making Model.   The rational decision-making model, 
in theory, allows decision-makers to identify alternatives based on the values and objectives for 
their organization, anaylze costs vs benefits of each alternative, and use that analysis to select the 
alternative that maximizes the values and objectives (March & Simon, 1958; Chaffee, 1983; 
Allison & Zelikow, 1999).  Scholars have argued over the cognitive limits of the rational 
decision-making model and the ability to evaluate a comprehensive search of all alternatives 
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(Simon, 1976; Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992).  The findings from this study provide support for a 
revised list of criteria for the rational decision-making model.   
Values, objectives, and centralization of decision-making are all connected to the culture 
of an organization.  Culture encompases all three of these criteria, and together these three 
criteria define the culture of the organization.  For example, in this case study the culture of the 
Big Ten was one of collegiality, sharing, and cooperative.  The culture of the conference guided 
members’ decision-making process.  On the contrary, if there is a political nature to the culture 
of an organization, then the group with more power will lead the decision-making process.  The 
group in power would determine the values, objectives, evaluate the alternatives, and make a 
choice based on their values and objectives.  This could or could not be what is best for the 
organization, depending on the agenda of the power group.   
The other issue in this example is that power can swing from one group to another in a 
political environment.  The values and objectives will change and the the direction of the 
organization will change.  A political environment lacks the stability and consistency necessary 
for the rational decision-making model.  In the case where only one person is making the 
decision for an organization, then the rational decision-making model can be used, but it should 
be noted that the values and objectives are not necessarily reflective of the organization, but 
rather of one individual in that organization.  The culture of a group, or organization, plays the 
most pivotal role when it comes to decision-making.  The first criteria for the rational decision-
making model should be to identify the culture, as it is instantiated in values and objectives.  The 
findings from this study support the inclusion of the identification of values and objectives, and 
centralization of decision-making as two criteria for the rational model.   
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It is not possible for a human to compute all the alternatives for a decision, but using the 
criteria listed above can provide a list of realistic, or sensible, options.  Based on the values of an 
organization or group, and their objectives for a decision, a limited list of alternatives that fit 
these criteria can be sifted out of an infinite list of choices.  Eisenhardt and Zbaracki (1992) 
called for a bounded rational model and the findings from this study support this 
recommendation.  While there may be an infinite number of alternatives, there is limited number 
of alternatives that match the values and objectives identified by the decision-makers (see figure 
4).   
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Once the practical alternatives are identified, the decision-makers can evaluate the 
benefits and costs, and can understand the consequences, of the remaining choices.  Chaffee’s 
model calls for simultaneous consideration of multiple alternative, but does not limit that 
recommendation to those alternatives that are.  This study found that while there could be a 
large, comprehensive list of alternatives, there is a subset of alternatives that narrows the 
selection down to a manageable set of options.  A recommended change to Chaffee’s criteria is 
to identify practical alternatives, rather than just all alternatives.  Decision makers can then 
assess the practical alternatives and determine the consequences for choosing each.   
The findings from this study did not find data to support Chaffee’s last criteria for the 
rational decision-making model, determining that the value-maximizing choice was selected.  It 
is not possible to determine from the results of the choice made that consequences would be 
different than if another alternative had been selected.  Unless operating in a vacuum and not 
having other variables that impact the results, it is not possible to confirm or deny if the practical 
alternative chosen was the best one.  Prior to the implementation of the decision, leadership can 
evaluate the practical alternatives and make an educated choice based on how the alternatives 
match up with the organization’s values and objectives, but it cannot accuratly retroactively 
compare the results from the final decision to those that would have come to fruition “what-if” 
another alternative had been chosen.  Rather than try to assess the results of other alternatives, 
the decision-makers should review the extent to which the decision helped the organization meet 
its objectives and whether or not the results are consistent with the values of the organization. 
Recommendations for Future Studies 
 Throughout the process of this research study, other questions emerged regarding 
intercollegiate athletics and the rational decision-making model.  Conference realignment was a 
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major issue in intercollegiate athletics from 2010 to 2012.  This study focused on the decision 
process used by current members evaluating potential members.  Continuing with the qualitative 
lens, it would be beneficial to investigate the other side of the equation, the perspective of 
prospective institutions.  What are the objectives and processes for institutions looking to change 
conference affiliation?  How does an institution market their brand to potential conferences?  My 
current place of employment, the University of Alabama at Birmingham (UAB), is faced with 
this dilemma.  Due to the elimination of UAB’s football program, the athletic program is now 
trying to develop a strategy for either staying in their current conference or convince another one 
to extend an invitation. UAB leadership faces a number of real-life versions of the above 
questions, most pressing: Why is it good for conference “X” to ask them to join?  It would be 
valuable to learn about the process of the seventy-seven institutions that changed conference 
affiliation, to gain insight as to how the process unfolded from their side of the table.   
Since a few years have passed since the big wave of conference realignment, another 
potential study is comparing and evaluating the impacts that changes in conference affiliation 
had on institutions.  A quantitative study using the reported financial data can give some insight 
to the impact a new conference had on an institution’s generated revenue.  How did reported 
revenues change for an institution in the years prior to realignment and how did they change in 
the years after?  How did adding new member(s) impact the revenue for institutions who were 
already members? 
 This case study identified pivotal moments in intercollegiate athletics that led to the big 
wave of conference realignment.  Since this wave of conference realignment, intercollegiate 
athletics has seen a major push by the Power 5 conferences for more automony.  Paying student-
athletes, providing a cost of attendance stipend, covering insurance premiums for risk of loss of 
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future earnings, and unlimited meals are just a few of the proposals on which the Power 5 
conferences are voting that have the potential to drastically change the landscape of college 
athletics again.  All of these proposals would have direct effects on athletic departments’ 
budgets.  With so many institutions already heavily subsidizing intercollegiate athletics, how are 
institutions going to fund such proposals?  How will these new proposals impact competitive 
balance across instititions?  Using what process will institutional leaders decide what can they 
afford to do for student-athletes, and if not all, how much of competitive disadvantage will it 
have on their programs compared to others who choose to do more, if not all?  The rational 
decision-making model and the revised criteria given from this study could be used to design and 
evaluate the decision process when it comes to these new proprosals.  At the present moment, it 
is not known if conferences will implement the proposed changes together or allow institutions 
to decide individually.  Either possibility would provide a good population for research on how 
institutions make those decisisons, either through a case study within a few institutions, or a 
quantitative survey across many Division I instititions.   
 The proposals highlighted above also are creating a wider gap between the Power 5 
conferences and others.  Future researchers may want to consider elite theory if examining 
conference realignment given the Power 5 institutions heightened status.  Elite theory examines 
and enlightens the power relationships that exist in positions of authority in our society.  Elite 
theorists such as C. Wright Mills (1956) offer critical analysis of the use of elite theory in 
decision-making processes which could provide a different lens to explore the decision-making 
process of chancellors and presidents within conference realignment.   
Across other areas of higher education, the rational decision-making model can be used 
to learn more about the decision-making processes of campus leadership.  Whether the making 
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decisions about admissions, funding of programs, curriculum, or retention programs, the rational 
model can be used to frame a study for a researcher wanting to learn more about the processes 
leaders use to make decisions that impact their institutions.   
Closing 
 Throughout this process of completeing this dissertation, I had the opportunity and 
privilege of having conversations with campus leaders about the decision-making process for 
issues pertaining directly to intercollegiate athletics.  The experience of discussing leadership 
with these highly respected individuals was invaluable to my professional future.  The insight 
into how decisions were made is also beneficial to all current and future administrators.  In a 
time where social media makes decisions and actions go viral in minutes, leaders must resist the 
demand for a quick decision.  Using the criteria set out by the rational decision-making model, 
leaders can make an informed decision that matches the values of an organization and continues 
guiding the group in a consistent manner towards the goals of all involved.   
   In many ways, the case study examined here likely fit the Chaffee model better than the 
most recent decisions made on conference realignment in the Big Ten.  The most recent iteration 
appears to be less rational and focuses more on business than on values.  The University of 
Maryland and Rutgers University are both members of the AAU, but their athletic brands do not 
carry the same reputation for success as the University of Nebraska’s does.  What these two 
institutions do have, though, is that they are both attached to large populations in which, prior to 
the announcement, the Big Ten did not have a place.  The New York and Washington, D.C. 
markets added a lot of television subscribers, and at the same time expanded the Big Ten’s 
profile from the Eastern Seaboard to the plains of Nebraska.   
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 With new automony measures being passed, the financial resources gap between the 
Power 5 institutions and the others will only continue to grow.  Currently there are sixty-four 
schools with membership in the Power 5 conferences, plus Notre Dame (independent in football, 
ACC all other sports).  Will this number grow?  What changes will the next wave of conference 
realignment bring to intercollegiate athletics?  Presidents and other institutional leaders will still 
have to make decisions as to what is best for their institutions.  Will there eventually be four 
super conferences of sixteen teams each?  Football drives the realignment discussions and the 
recent inaugural college football playoff championship was a big success not only with fans but 
in terms of revenue.  The Big 12 was left out this time, and it is hard not to wonder whether its 
members will look to leave for other conferences who seem to have a stronger brand or opt to 
stay together and look to add to their membership?  If stability and longevity are valued, then the 
leaders of these institutions need to take a rational approach, making a decision grounded in their 
values, aimed at their objectives, and mindful of consequences across the whole picture and not 
just a temporary financial solution.   
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Appendix C 
Informed Consent Form 
Title of Project:  Decision-making in Higher Education and Intercollegiate Athletics:  Case 
study on the Big Ten Conference Realignment   
Responsible Principal Investigator: Dr. Lorenzo D. Baber   
Other Investigator(s):  Jeffrey S. Guin   
Purpose of the Study:  The purpose of this study is to understand the process of how conference 
and institutional leaders make decisions on conference realignment.  The past two years have 
seen a seismic shift in schools changing conference affiliation. Little is known about the process 
and how these important decisions are being made at the conference level.  Intercollegiate 
athletics provide an important opportunity to build and communicate the image and reputation of 
a university.  Through television broadcasts and the national media coverage, the state, country, 
and the world are introduced to a campus.  Football games serve as three and a half hour and 
basketball games serve as two-hour commercials that promote and give publicity to an 
institution.  When a president and athletic director decide to change the institution’s affiliation or 
invite another school to join a conference, they are tying their reputation to another school or 
schools.  Factors to consider during the exploration of this study are criteria for identifying 
prospective schools, internal and external influences on the discussion of prospective schools, 
and the goal(s) or desired outcome for expanding.  This study will investigate the conference 
realignment process leaders in the Big Ten used, which resulted in extending an invitation to the 
University of Nebraska in June 2010.  These decisions have direct and indirect impact on athletic 
and academic programs at the institutions involved, and it is imperative to understand the 
rationale behind them.   
Procedures to be followed:  The participants of this qualitative study will be requested to 
participate in an interview session. .  Participants located on the conference member campuses 
will be asked to interview in-person, phone, or video chat.  In-person interviews will last 
approximately one hour.  Phone and video interviews will last approximately 30-45 minutes.   
All forms of interview will be facilitated using open-ended questions in order to collect data 
about the participant’s experience and perspective of the expansion process and the impact it will 
have on the conference members’ athletic departments.  An example of an open-ended question 
is  describing your initial perspective on conference realignment prior to discussions?  The 
researcher will request that the in-person interviews take place in the participant’s workspace so 
it is a place of comfort for the participant.  If the participant requests to have the interview take 
place in some other location, the researcher will accommodate.   
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There is a possibility of the need for a brief follow-up discussion with the participants, in order to 
get clarification or perhaps obtain additional information.  All follow-up will be via phone 
meeting, and every effort will be made to ensure minimal time is required by the participant, not 
exceeding 30 minutes.   
During the post data collection, each participant will be contacted given the opportunity to 
review the researcher’s transcript from the interview.  If permission was given to record audio, 
the participant will review a transcribed document of the interview session.  If audio recording 
permission was not granted, then the participant will have opportunity to review the researcher’s 
notes from the interview.  During this post data verification process, the participant will have the 
opportunity to change or delete answers from the transcripts.   
The total time commitment for each participant, assuming two interviews and data verification, 
is estimated at: 
1. 45-60 minutes for the interview 
2. 30 minutes for potential follow up questions or clarification with the participant via 
phone.  
3. 60 minutes for post data collection verification, allowing the participant to review the 
transcript of the interview if they so desire. 
    
Discomforts and Risks:  The project represents no physical and only three potential emotional 
risks to the participants.  Those risks include: 1) the time commitment required to participate, 2) 
the fear of disclosing what could be perceived as negative information about their institution, 
athletic department; 3) the fear of disclosing what could be perceived as negative information 
about the current environment in which intercollegiate athletics operates.   
Benefits: This study explores the decision-making process used by conference and institutional 
leaders.  It examines the intricacies of the decision-making process in the context of conference 
realignment.  Little is known about how leadership progresses through decisions that influence 
the long-term plans of an institution.     
 Due to the novelty of the recent conference realignment movement, there has been little 
research on the topic.  The critical piece that is missing is analyzing the decision-making process 
and the long-term goals for those strategic decisions.  Concerning “big time” college sports, the 
complexities of conference realignment offer an invaluable look at decision-making in higher 
education.  Findings could help institutional and conference leaders in approaching the process 
of conference realignment from the perspective of a conference looking to expand, or from the 
viewpoint of an institution changing affiliation.  This study will identify factors to consider, 
discussions amongst the leaders involved, and conclusions drawn by a group of high-ranking 
officials.   
 This study will also demonstrate how leaders make decisions regarding intercollegiate 
athletics and the effect college sports have on the perception of academics on a campus simply 
by the conference and institutions with which it aligns.  Insight will be garnered on whether 
leaders consider factors influencing areas outside athletics when examining conference 
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realignment and how this benefits non-athletic departments and influences decision-making.  
This study could answer calls for accountability and transparency in higher education.  A better 
understanding can be acquired on the place of intercollegiate athletics into the overall mission of 
a higher education institution, and this research can offer a rationale for the investment of large 
sums of money into the athletic department by institutional leaders.   
 
1. This study could provide clarification on why certain institutions are more appealing than 
others to invite.  The characteristics and qualities that make an institution desirable can be 
valuable to college presidents seeking answers on how to raise the reputation and perception 
of their campus.  With this knowledge, presidents, athletic directors, and conference 
commissioners can strategically plan for improving their athletic department(s) and 
institution(s) while seeking an offer to a bigger, more lucrative conference.  This study could 
also explain why an institution is chosen that does not fit the geographical footprint of the 
existing conference membership.  Recognizing the rationale and thought process of leaders’ 
decision-making will shed light on this recent phenomenon that has dominated “big time” 
college athletics for the past two years.  
 
Statement of Confidentiality: Data collected via face-to-face interviews will be stored by the 
researcher on a digital recording device or on a paper based notes.  The data will be transferred 
to a computer-based document using Microsoft word.  Data collected via phone interviews will 
be stored by the researcher on paper-based notes and transferred to a computer-based document 
using Microsoft word.  Data collected via email will be stored by the researcher in a folder.  The 
data will be transferred to a computer-based document using Microsoft word.  The data will be 
secured, kept confidential, as follows: 
The digital media device containing the interview recordings will be stored in a locked cabinet at 
the researcher’s place of employment (a university).  This cabinet is maintained in the 
researcher’s office.  However, email is not confidential and most institutions archive all emails 
that are sent or received through university servers.  Confidentiality cannot be assured by 
researcher and the participant must make their own decision about selecting this method for 
interview.  After the digital audio recordings have been transcribed to a Microsoft word 
document, they will be kept in the secure cabinet for three years after the project has concluded 
(in order to allow the researcher future reference to the data).  At the end of the three-year period, 
the recordings will be erased.  The hand written notes will also be kept for a three-year period 
after the project has concluded in the same locked cabinet as the digital recordings device.  At 
the end of the three-year period the hand, written notes will be shredded.  The computer-based 
documents will be stored on a secure/password protected network drive of the University of 
Illinois.  The computer-based documents will be kept for three-year period after the project has 
concluded for future reference by the researcher.  At the end of the three-year period, all 
electronic records will be erased using the university’s standards of permanently erasing 
electronic information.   
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For each of the forms of recorded data (audio, paper-based notes, and computer-based files from 
Microsoft word) only the researcher and the responsible project investigator (RPI) will have 
access to view them.  The audio recordings and the paper-based notes will only be able to be 
accessed by the researcher or the RPI by physically going to the researcher’s office and having a 
key to unlock the cabinet.  The computer-based files will have security such that only the 
researcher and the RPI can view them.     
Whom to contact: If you have any questions about research subject’s rights, please contact 
Anne Robertson at the University of Illinois’ Bureau for Educational Research by telephone (call 
collect) at 217-333-3023 or email at arobrtsn@ad.uiuc.edu.  You may also call him if you feel 
you have been injured or harmed by this research at 217-333-1576. If you have any questions 
about your rights as a participant in this study, please contact the University of Illinois 
Institutional Review Board at 217-333-2670 or via email at irb@uiuc.edu. 
Voluntariness: Your participation in this project is voluntary, and you are free to withdraw at 
any time and for any reason without penalty. Your choice to participate or not will be 
confidential.  You are also free to refuse to answer any questions you do not wish to answer. You 
will receive a copy of the research results after this project is completed.   
Dissemination: The data compiled will be disseminated via the co-principal investigator’s 
doctoral early research and dissertation defenses.  Findings may be presented via academic 
papers, journal articles, conference presentations, and other professional venues.   
I understand that I may consent to the interview being recorded or I may not agree to recording 
and the interview will proceed based on written notes of the interviewer. (Please initial one blank 
below to indicate your choice.) 
 _______ Yes, I agree to be recorded during my interview. 
 
 _______ No, I would prefer not to be recorded during my interview. 
 
I have read and understand the above consent form and voluntarily agree to participate in this 
study.  You will be given a copy of this consent form for your records. 
___________________________________              _____________________ 
Participant Signature     Date 
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Appendix D 
Interview Protocol/Questions 
 
Decision-making in Higher Education and Intercollegiate Athletics:   
Case study on the Big Ten Conference Realignment  
 
Date: 
Name: 
Organization: 
Telephone #: 
Email: 
 
I want to thank you for taking the time to talk to me today. 
I am attempting to understand your perceptions of decision-making regarding conference 
expansion in intercollegiate athletics. These questions are open-ended and designed to get the 
conversation going, PLEASE feel free to add any additional information you think is 
relevant. If needed, I may have other questions that may expand each main topic. 
I will be audiotaping our conversation and will transcribe the interview. I will transcribe 
this interview over the next couple of days and ask you to review the transcription for 
accuracy. 
 
Do you have any questions of me before we begin? 
 
VALUES	  &	  OBJECTIVES	  OF	  THE	  BIG	  TEN	  CONFERENCE:	  
1.	  	  From	  your	  perspective,	  what	  objectives	  and	  underlying	  values	  drove	  this	  most	  recent	  expansion	  
of	  the	  Big	  Ten	  Conference?	  	  Do	  you	  think	  other	  presidents/chancellors	  shared	  those	  views?	  
2.	  	  Of	  all	  the	  factors	  you	  have	  mentioned,	  in	  the	  end,	  which	  ones	  took	  primacy?	  
ALTERNATIVES:	  
3.	  	  What	  criteria	  were	  applied	  to	  assess	  prospective	  institutions?	  	  	  
4.What	  was	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Commissioner?	  Also,	  the	  conference	  hired	  a	  consulting	  firm.	  	  What	  did	  
they	  contribute	  and	  recommend?	  
5.	  	  How	  did	  the	  consulting	  firm	  impact	  recommendations	  on	  prospective	  institutions	  for	  expansion	  
and	  how	  their	  recommendations	  aligned	  with	  the	  values	  and	  objectives	  of	  the	  Big	  Ten	  presidents	  
and	  chancellors?	  	  	  
6.	  	  Did	  other	  groups	  or	  sources	  compile	  information	  on	  candidate	  institutions	  for	  your	  use?	  	  What	  
impact,	  if	  any,	  did	  it	  have?	  The	  Athletic	  Directors,	  for	  example?	  
7.	  	  What	  process	  was	  used	  to	  evaluate	  potential	  candidates	  for	  expansion?	  	  How	  did	  you	  compare	  
and	  assess	  information	  on	  the	  various	  options?	  	  
8.	  	  Outside	  of	  the	  	  group	  of	  presidents	  and	  chancellors,	  the	  Commissioner	  and	  the	  consulting	  firm,	  
whom	  else	  contributed	  information	  and	  had	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  decision?	  	  
9.	  	  Once	  prospective	  institution(s)	  were	  identified,	  how	  was	  their	  interest	  gauged	  in	  joining	  the	  Big	  
Ten	  Conference?	  	  	  
CENTRALIZATION	  OF	  DECISION	  MAKING:	  	  	  
10.	  	  The	  Council	  of	  Presidents/Chancellors	  has	  final	  authority	  in	  expansion.	  	  	  But	  what	  input	  did	  you	  
receive	  from	  your	  campus	  (governing	  board,	  Athletic	  Directors	  and	  Faculty	  Representatives)?	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11.	  	  What	  influence	  or	  role	  did	  Jim	  Delany	  have	  on	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process?	  
12.	  	  My	  document	  analysis	  found	  a	  lot	  of	  conversations	  regarding	  the	  impact	  of	  groups	  on	  Big	  Ten	  
expansion.	  	  What	  was	  the	  impact/role	  of	  the	  following	  on	  the	  ultimate	  decision:	  	  A)	  Television	  
networks	  	  	  	  	  B)	  	  AAU	  	  	  	  C)	  Conferences	  Expansion	  Rumors	  	  D)	  Others?	  
UNDERSTANDING	  OF	  CONSEQUENCES	  OF	  DECISION:	  	  	  
13.	  	  How	  did	  you	  think	  your	  institution	  would	  benefit	  from	  conference	  expansion?	  	  	  
14.	  	  Nebraska's	  membership	  status	  in	  AAU	  was	  in	  question	  (and	  eventually	  revoked)	  around	  the	  
time	  of	  expansion.	  	  How	  was	  the	  brand/identity	  of	  Big	  Ten	  Conference	  weighed	  and	  affected?	  	  	  
15.	  What	  unintended	  side	  effects,	  potential	  negative	  impact	  of	  expansion	  did	  the	  presidents	  and	  
chancellors	  weigh	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process?	  
VALUE	  MAXIMIZING	  CHOICE:	  	  	  
16.	  	  How	  did	  this	  expansion	  influence	  the	  next	  one?	  	  	  
17.	  	  What	  else	  should	  I	  know	  to	  gain	  a	  more	  accurate	  picture	  of	  expansion?	  
Sources used: 
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Appendix E 
 
Timeline for Archival Records and Documents 
 
The following list of archival records and documents used for this study were found in two 
distinct searches.  The first search was prior to the interviews taking place and the second search 
was after completing the interviews.   
 
Archival Records and Documents Search #1 (May 2013 – August 2013) 
Associated Press.  (2010a, 7 June).  Baylor devoted to keeping Big 12 intact 
Associated Press.  (2010b, 2 August).  Nebraska AD says move not for money 
The BCS is…(2010, September 22) 
Big Ten Conference 2010-11 Handbook (2010) 
Brackin, D. (2010, 10 June).  Big Red, Big Ten: Big Deal in the works 
College Athletics Finance Database (2010, September 22) 
DeArmond, M. (2009, 15 December).  Big 10 confirms will to expand 
Dosh, K. (2011, May). Television contracts breakdown 
Dosh, K. (2012, 10 May).  College tv rights deals undergo makeovers 
Forde, P. (2010). Big 12 provides temporary solution 
Garcia, M. (2010, 10 June).  New alliances reshaping college sports 
Greenstein, T. (2010a, 1 March).  Big Ten told its safe to expand horizons 
Greenstein, T. (2010b, 29 April). Big Ten expansion with Teddy Greenstein 
Greenstein, T. (2010c, 18 May).  Delany: Big Ten not tied to expansion timetable 
Griffin, T. (2010, 17 November). Despite criticism, Big 12 will keep current revenue sharing 
model 
Ikenberry, S. (1989).  Personal Statement 
Jones, D. (2010, 7 March). How the Big Ten Network makes expansion more likely this time 
around 
Jordan, B. (1989).  Personal Statement 
Kalafa, J. (2010, February 28).  Big Ten Revenue Sharing:  Are Michigan and Ohio State getting 
fair share 
Kier, D. (1990).  No title.  
Longman, J. (2010, 2 February).  As Big Ten Studies Expansion, Others Brace for Ripple Effects 
Makinen, T., & Milner, B. (1990).  
Mandel, S. (2009, December 15).  Big Ten Serious about Expansion, but risks could outweigh 
benefits 
Moltz, D. (2010, June 9).  The great conference confusion 
NCAA Membership (2010, December 20) 
Ourand, J., & Smith, M. (2010a).  Big Ten’s title game rights to hit market  
Ourand, J., & Smith, M. (2010b).  How Big 12’s Beebe made the math work 
Ourand, J., & Smith, M. (2010c).  Texas Hold’em 
Peloquin, M. (2012, December 31).  Conference realignment.  
Rittenberg, A. (2010).  Big Ten unaware of Big 12 ultimatiums 
Sandomir, R. (1991, August 25).  College football; Notre Dame scored a $38 million touchdown 
on its tv deal 
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Sansevere, B. (1990).  Presidents stick it to their conference 
Schlabach, M. (2010, 9 June).  Expansion 101: What’s at stake? 
Sherman, E. (1990).  Is Big 10 a trendsetter? More conference realignment may follow 
Staples, A. (2012, August).  How television changed college football – and it will again 
Thamel, P. (2010, 5 June).  Conferences consider expansion, not traditions 
The Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska:  Agenda (2010, 11 June) 
The Nielsen Company.  (2012).  Report of the local television market universe estimates 
comparisions of 2010-11 and 2011-12 market ranks.  
The University of Nebraska Report from the Board of Regents.  (2010, June).   
Trotter, J. (2010, 12 June).  Conference realignment timeline:  1987 to now.  
Ubben, D. (2009, May 26).  How the Big 12’s teams rank in revenue-sharing funds 
Weaver, K.  (2010).  Conference realignment offers lesson in survival 
What’s the game plan.  (2010, June 21) 
Wikipedia.  (2012, June 7).  2010-2012 NCAA conference realignment 
 
Archival Records and Documents Search #2 (June 2014-December 2014) 
Association of American Universities (n.d.) 
Bennett, B. (2012, 4 June). Big Ten to distribute $284 million to teams 
Bennett, B. (2013, 6 May). Big Ten’s revenue keeps climbing 
Bostock, M., Carter, S., & Quealy, K. (2013, 30 November).  Tracing the history of the N.C.A.A. 
Conferences 
Carmin, M. (2014, 26 April).  Big Ten schools expect big payouts to continue 
Carmin, M. (2014, 27 April). BTN profit shares likely to boost Big Ten revenue 
Cordes, H. (2014, 9 February).  UNL’s Big Ten windfall around the corner 
Durando, S. (2012, 18 May).  Big Ten payouts estimated at $24.6 million 
Durando, S. (2013, 6 May).  Big Ten payouts to hit $25.7 million per school 
Fornelli, T.  (2014, 26 April). Big Ten schools projected to make $45 million with new tv deal 
Sturgeon, M. (2014). Memorial Stadium sellout streak continues with Husker season home 
opener 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
